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ABSTRACT 
 
 
EUROPEANIZATION AND DEVOLUTION: CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN 
TURKEY 
 
Çelenk, Ayşe Aslıhan 
PhD, Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Aylin Güney 
 
September 2008 
 
This thesis analyzes the impact of the EU accession process over the central 
and local levels of administration in Turkey from an institutionalist framework. The 
analytical tools of historical and sociological institutionalism are utilized in order to 
analyze whether Europeanization leads to devolution and the city of Kayseri 
constitutes the case through which the EU impact at the local level is determined. 
The main argument of the thesis is that although the EU accession process has 
created a demand at the local level in terms of changing the power relations with the 
centre, no institutional change has taken place so far in terms of devolution because 
of the mediating factors such as strong state tradition, lack of self-government culture 
and the political and historical context of the centre-local relations in the country and 
the central level managed to reproduce its power vis-à-vis the local political actors.  
Keywords: Europeanization, EU accession, Turkey, centre-local relations. 
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ÖZET 
AVRUPALILAŞMA SÜRECİ, YERELLEŞME VE TÜRKİYE’DE MERKEZ-
YEREL İLİŞKİLERİ 
Çelenk, Ayşe Aslıhan 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Aylin Güney 
 
Eylül 2008 
 
Bu çalışma, Avrupa Birliği’ne üyelik sürecinin Türkiye’de merkez-yerel 
ilişkileri üzerinde yarattığı etkiyi kurumsalcılık teorisi çerçevesinde incelemektedir. 
Tarihsel ve sosyolojik kurumsalcılık teorilerinden yararlanan çalışmada, 
Avrupalılaşma sürecininTürkiye’de yerelleşmeye ve desantrilazasyona yol açıp 
açmadığı sorusuna cevap aranmakta ve AB sürecinin yerel düzeydeki etkisi Kayseri 
örneği üzerinden değerlendirilmektedir. Araştırmanın göstermiş olduğu temel sonuç, 
AB üyelik sürecinin yerel düzeyde yarattığı çeşitli taleplere karşın, tarihsel ve politik 
nedenlerden dolayı Türkiye’de yerelleşme biçiminde bir kurumsal değişimin henüz 
yaşanmadığı ve merkezin yerel karşısındaki gücünü korumakta olduğudur. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupalılaşma, yerelleşme, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, merkez-
yerel ilişkileri. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) gained pace since the late 
1990s, various areas of policy making began to be discussed within the context of 
Turkey-EU relations. Political and economic reforms, identity issues and cultural 
debates were now analyzed through the introduction of a new variable: the EU 
impact. The EU was portrayed as the initiator of change and the source of 
motivation, which Turkey needed in order to complete its modernization and 
democratization. In time, it seems that a positive correlation was perceived between 
the EU impact and institutional change at the domestic level. One of the areas, in 
which this assumption was made regarding the EU impact, is the issue of centre-local 
relations. The commonly held idea, which is almost never questioned, is that as 
Turkey’s accession to the EU becomes deeper, the central state will get smaller, lose 
its power and the local level will acquire a new power at the domestic setting as a 
result of the policies imposed by the EU. This process is often equated with 
democratization and one of the components of Turkey’s democratic evolution is 
considered to be the improvement of the participation of the local level in the 
political processes. 
 2
The starting point of this study is to offer a critique of these simplistic 
assumptions regarding the EU impact over the relations between the central and local 
levels in Turkey and to test the relationship between Europeanization and devolution 
instead of taking the idea of positive correlation for granted. By doing this, the study 
also aims to contribute to the literature on the study of institutional change through 
providing a model for change, which takes the context-specific factors into account 
while dealing with different institutional outcomes and by providing new venues for 
research. 
The main question asked in this dissertation is whether the assumption that 
Europeanization leads to devolution, i.e. empowers the local level with respect to the 
centre, can be applicable to the Turkish case. While trying to answer this question, 
various hypotheses are tested through research. These hypotheses are: 
• Europeanization process has empowered the local and regional 
governance structures in the EU member states and the same impact can 
be expected in Turkey during the EU accession process (the positive 
correlation hypothesis between Europeanization and devolution). 
• The EU serves as a catalyst in changing the balance of power between the 
central and local levels in Turkey (the outcome is not necessarily in favor 
of the local level). 
• The context-specific and historical factors have an impact over the 
prospects for institutional change and determine the outcome of the 
interactions between the central and local levels. 
The case study offered in this dissertation, first of all, deals with the 
experiences of the EU member states. Then, by drawing on the Turkish case, the 
study analyzes how the EU affects the dynamics of the relationship between different 
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levels of administration. In other words, the main questions tried to be answered 
within the context of the study are whether the Europeanization process always leads 
to devolution and whether devolution always means institutional change in the form 
of democratization.   
The study, in fact, tries to offer an account of institutional change in terms of 
the dynamics of centre-local relations in Turkey and analyzes the relationship 
between the ongoing process of EU accession and the relations between the major 
central and local political actors. While doing this, the premises of the sociological 
and historical institutionalism are utilized and the impact of the EU accession process 
over the changes in the centre-local relations is dealt from the lenses of 
institutionalist theory. The reason for choosing this theoretical framework lies in the 
fact that the theory of institutionalism acknowledges the interaction between the 
structure and agency and stresses on how the institutions and the actors change, 
constrain and empower each other and evolve together. In other words, while 
explaining the political processes, the institutionalist theory takes into account how 
the institutions shape the preferences and actions of the actors as well as the impact 
of the choices made by the actors at one point on the institutional design and 
prospects for its change.  
In institutionalism, the political actors are not considered as rational, interest-
maximizing, independent agents. Thus, the institutional change can not be initiated 
by the actors according to their choices or wishes. Instead, once they are established, 
the institutions become political actors in their own right and limit the choices of the 
political actors. While dealing with the terms and prospects of institutional change, 
the power and impact of the existing institutions need to be considered as well as the 
preferences of the actors. The only way of understanding the different responses to 
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same external factors and how an impetus for change is processed at the domestic 
level is to deal with the interaction between the institutions and the actors instead of 
establishing a direct correlation relationship between two variables.  
In order to explain the terms of institutional change, the ‘change through 
networks and learning’ mechanism of sociological institutionalism is adopted, which 
is essentially based on the idea that as the domestic political actors engage in 
relations with other actors and networks, they become aware of the differences in 
values and practices and feel some sort of pressure for adaptation. In this process, 
their values and choices change, which in return leads to institutional change at the 
state level. If this model of change is applied to the research question at hand, the EU 
accession process is operationalized as the process of increased contact with the EU 
level, during which the misfit between the European and domestic policies become 
evident and pressures for change occur. The tested outcome of these pressures is the 
process of devolution, which is operationalized and measured according to the 
following criteria in the Turkish case: 
• Popularly elected bodies are given more decision-making powers in the local 
affairs. 
• The principle of subsidiarity regulates the centre-local relations. 
• The relationship between the central and the local levels is re-defined in favor 
of the latter. 
• The local administrative bodies acquire financial autonomy in terms of 
generating their own resources and deciding about resource allocation. 
• The centre adopts a more differentiated policy towards the local. 
• The accountability of the administrative bodies are enhanced. 
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The study aims to determine whether the EU accession process initiated a 
devolution process in Turkey, through measuring these indicators of devolution. In 
order to differentiate the impact of Europeanization from that of globalization, which 
is also argued to empower the local level, the study focuses on the developments 
after 1999, when Turkey officially became an EU candidate country. Moreover, the 
research is conducted on the concrete and voluntary responses of the Turkish state to 
the EU’s demands, in order to differentiate the administrative changes from the 
process of globalization. Although both processes are inter-related and the 
globalization process has initiated and facilitated the process of Europeanization, the 
emphasis on the administrative changes with a clear intent of adjusting to the EU 
helps to single out the impact of Europeanization. 
As mentioned earlier, certain intervening variables affect how the pressures for 
adaptation coming from the EU level are processed and interpreted at the domestic 
level and shape the prospects and outcome of institutional change. In determining the 
relationship between the EU accession and centre-local relations, besides the EU 
impact, two additional variables are utilized. The first variable is the impact of the 
historical and political context, which follow the point that past choices of 
institutional design and the historically determined actor positions and values have an 
impact over the present and future interactions between the agency and structure. The 
second intervening variable in testing the Europeanization-devolution positive 
correlation is the actor preferences, since while the institutions constrain the actor 
preferences, the outcome of the struggles between the major political actors and 
changes in their preferences have an impact over institutional design. Utilizing both 
the impact of the historical and political context and the impact of the actor 
preferences in the study of institutional change is in fact a theoretical requirement, 
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since the institutionalist framework is based on the interactive relationship between 
the agency and structure, in which the institutions and the actors evolve together. 
The thesis is based on a case study, which mostly focuses on Turkey. However, 
while testing the validity of the hypothesis and applying the theoretical model, the 
cases from the EU member states are also utilized to see whether a common practice 
of centre-local relationship emerged in the EU countries as a result of interactions 
and Europeanization process.  
In order to determine the nature and content of the pressures for adaptation from 
the EU-level and the misfit between the EU practice and the Turkish practice 
regarding the management of centre-local relations, the progress reports of the 
European Commission about Turkey and the concrete demands from Turkey, the 
National Programs and the Development Plans are extensively analyzed. The 
analysis of the European experience regarding the centre-local relations and the 
impact of the EU for different groups of countries will also help to understand the 
nature of the adaptational pressures. 
When it comes to dealing with the Turkish response to these pressures and to 
understand whether this response entails devolution, the central and local levels are 
initially analyzed separately according to the actor preferences, historical and 
political context and the impact of the EU accession process. At the central level, the 
immediate response to the pressures coming from the EU-level are determined from 
the legal changes made in the post-1999 period until 2007. The texts of the draft 
laws, laws, national programs, EU adjustment reforms and development programs 
are utilized for the analysis of legal change.  
In order to determine the positions and preferences of the major actors at the 
central level and the EU impact over these, the in-depth interviews conducted with 
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the specialists of Central Planning Agency, the government and opposition 
representatives, the legal basis of the presidential vetoes about various laws and the 
political party programs are utilized.  
For the analysis of the local level, the study focuses on a single case. This 
methodological choice may be criticized for not being viable for theoretical 
generalizations, however, since one of the aims of the study is to determine whether a 
value and preference change takes place at the local level as a result of the 
interactions with the EU level, focusing on a single case seems to be a better choice 
instead of getting lost in finding the points for comparison between different cases. 
Moreover, focusing on a single case will also contribute to the theory, since it will 
reveal the impact of the context-specific factors over the institutional outcomes. 
Conducting this analysis on a single case is also hoped to generate new analytical 
research questions to be asked in other contexts as well. However, focusing on a 
single case makes the case choice much more critical for the theoretical integrity of 
the study and thus, that choice needs to be justified in order to respond to the 
theoretical concerns. 
The case chosen for this study is the city of Kayseri, located in Central Anatolia. 
The first reason to choose Kayseri is this geographical location of the city. In the 
debates about the cultural gap between Turkey and the EU, one argument is that 
although the big cities like Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, the coastal regions and the 
western parts of the country are already European and have no difficulty in adopting 
to the ‘EU way’ of doing things, the Central and Eastern Anatolian regions of the 
country remain non-European and they are resistant to change. Thus, choosing a case 
from Central Anatolia seems to be both a challenge to explain the impact of the EU 
accession process and to analyze whether the Anatolian region of Turkey is really 
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resistant to change. Following this, choosing a case from Central Anatolia over the 
big cities also helps to respond to the theoretical concern about differentiating the 
impacts of globalization and Europeanization, since in case of big cities, which are 
already integrated into the global economic and processes, the EU impact would be 
harder to single out. In the case of Kayseri, the globalization process has also been 
influential by initiating the economic transformation of the city and by opening it to 
the adaptational pressures from the EU. However, as the research will reveal, the 
impact of globalization has mostly been in economic terms, while the EU accession 
process initiated a demand for administrative change. In addition to this, since 
Central Anatolia is the highest recipient of the EU structural funds, a case from this 
region is a more viable choice in terms of determining the EU impact at the local 
level. 
The reason to choose Kayseri among the other cities in the Central and Eastern 
Anatolia is simply the fact that Kayseri has the most contact with the EU in terms of 
the number of EU-funded projects conducted in the city, the amount of the structural 
funds received from the EU1 and the economic relations of the business circles of the 
city in Europe. The intensity of contact with the EU, prepares a more suitable 
environment for the pressures for adaptation to be channeled from the supra-national 
level to the local level and for the value change to be related to the EU factor. 
Moreover, the fact that the city has been governed by the cadre of the same political 
orientations and positions since the early 1990s also helps to single out the impact of 
the EU factor over the actor preferences and policy changes as other factors, like 
political party changes or ideological re-orientation can be controlled. 
                                                 
1 As of the end of 2007. 
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The case study conducted in Kayseri is mainly based on the in-depth interviews 
conducted with the major political actors, who became more important during the 
Turkey’s EU accession process. The metropolitan mayor, officials working in the 
metropolitan municipality, the specialists in the Central Anatolian Development 
Agency, the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and managers of certain EU-
funded projects were interviewed during the research in order to determine the 
impact of the EU accession process over the preferences and positions of the local 
political actors and what kind of change the EU initiates in terms of the balance of 
power between the centre and the local levels in Turkey.  
In order for this analysis to be made, the first chapter of the dissertation gives an 
account of the theoretical framework, the research question, main variables, 
hypotheses and the methodology of the research. The basic premises of the 
institutionalist approach, the way in which the concepts of institution and 
institutional change are understood within the framework of research and how the 
historical and sociological institutionalist theories are utilized in the study are 
discussed extensively in order to lay out the framework for analyses. The first 
chapter also discusses the research question, operationalizes the hypotheses, the main 
and intervening variables, and the methodology to be adopted while answering that 
question in order to offer the roadmap for the later stages of the research. 
The second chapter applies the theoretical framework to the European context in 
order to test the validity of the variables in explaining institutional change and to see 
whether the hypothesis that the process of Europeanization leads to devolution is 
valid in the European case. While doing this, the historical and political context of 
the centre-local relations in different European countries, the importance of the actor 
preferences and the EU impact are analyzed in order to see how each domestic 
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setting processes the EU-level adaptational pressures and to understand whether the 
EU factor has led to a convergence in Europe regarding the way in which the centre-
local relations are managed. 
The third chapter introduces the Turkish case into the study and discusses the 
historical and political context of the centre-local relations in Turkey from the late 
Ottoman period to the 2000s, in order to understand under which conditions and 
institutional constraints, the central and local political actors have identified their 
values and acquired their powers. The fourth and fifth chapters deal with the actor 
preferences, positions, powers and the impact of the EU accession process over these 
extensively, as this forms the crux of the research. While the fourth chapter focuses 
on the political actors at the central level, the fifth chapter analyzes the case of 
Kayseri. 
After the analyses of the actor preferences and the EU impact, the sixth chapter 
offers a general analysis of the Turkish case within the theoretical framework stated 
in the first chapter, revisits the initially offered questions, variables and hypotheses, 
and discusses the validity of the positive relationship between Europeanization and 
devolution by dealing with the findings of the research and the indicators of 
devolution stated in the first chapter. The chapter also discusses the theoretical 
contributions of the research together with some conclusive remarks for future 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 11
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO THE CENTRE-
LOCAL RELATIONS  
 
 
 The nature of politics has been explained from various approaches, using 
different variables and mechanisms leading to certain political outcomes. While for 
some analysts, the political outcomes are a direct result of the actions, calculations, 
orientations and interests of the individual political actors; for others, the structure 
and other macro-level variables constrain the actions of the political actors and thus 
lead to the political outcomes. Different levels of analysis, objects of study, causes of 
change lead to different accounts of political life, each having their own strengths 
and weaknesses. Without disparaging other approaches, this project aims to adopt the 
models, levels of analysis and variables of the theory of institutionalism to the 
question at hand, i.e. the impact of the EU accession process over centre-local 
relations in Turkey and whether a process of devolution is taking place in the Turkish 
context. 
 This chapter lays out the basic research questions of the study together with 
the hypotheses to be tested and variables to be introduced. While dealing with the 
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Europeanization-devolution relationship in Turkey, the study builds its theory on 
historical and sociological institutionalist perspectives, thus the chapter also covers 
the basic premises and variables of different types of institutionalism as well.  
 The chapter starts with the general features of the theory of institutionalism, 
different approaches to the institutions within the theory itself and different ways of 
defining the concepts of “institution” and “institutional change”. Then, it goes on 
with explaining the way in which the institutions are defined within the scope of this 
project and with applying the institutional framework to the research question. While 
doing this, the main research question and the hypotheses to be tested are explained 
in detail. Finally, the chapter lays out the main features of the research design and 
operationalizes the main variables of the research question. 
 
2.1  The Institutionalist Theory in Social Sciences 
 The rise of institutionalism2 in social sciences was a reaction to the behavioral 
approach, which saw the politics as the outcome of individual actions and choices. 
Regardless of the way they define the institutions, for the institutionalists, 
“institutions are political actors in their own right” (March& Olsen, 1984: 738), 
“[t]he organization of political life makes a difference, and institutions affect the 
flow of history” (March& Olsen, 1989: 159). Contrary to the behavioral approach, 
                                                 
2 The term “institutionalism” used in this study refers to “the new institutionalism”. While the “old” 
institutionalism studies the formal institutions of government and used a descriptive methodology to 
explain the relations between different branches of government and defined institution in terms of 
political, legal and administrative arrangements of the state; “new” institutionalism brought the 
institutions back into the political agenda in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a constraining factor 
over the behavior of political actors, defined them in broader terms and argued that behavior can not 
be understood without reference to the institution within which it occurs.  The old institutionalism 
composed of detailed configurative studies of different administrative, legal and political structures in 
different countries. In the 1950s and 60s, the Behavioral Revolution in Social Sciences rejected the 
formal laws, rules and administrative structures in explaining actual politics and used powers, 
attitudes and behaviors of the political actors as independent variables instead. New Institutionalism 
challenged this idea based on the fact that same challenges were given different responses and that the 
idea of rational behavior can not explain these differences and instead they focused on different 
institutional configurations of institutions in explaining political interactions. See Thelen& Steinmo 
(1992) for the details of the timeline leading to new institutionalism in political science. 
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the theory of institutionalism focuses on the environmental factors, which affect the 
actions and decisions of the political actors and deals with the impact of structure 
over agency with its history and characteristics.   
Any model of explaining a political phenomenon within the theory of 
institutionalism is based on the premises that an institution is composed of a set of 
formal or informal regulative rules, which determine the interactions of political 
actors; political institutions affect the distribution of resources, which in turn affects 
the power of political actors; the policy alternatives of leaders are not defined 
completely by exogenous forces, but are shaped by existing administrative agencies 
and the explanation of genesis or persistence of institutions lie in prior institutions; 
not individual choices or actions (Scott, 1995: pp. 6-7; March& Olsen, 1984: pp. 
739-740). 
As the institutionalist approach evolved in time, there occurred alternative 
ways of dealing with the institutions within the theory itself. These alternatives 
offered different definitions of the concept of institution and explained institutional 
change through different mechanisms. For the Rational Choice Institutionalism, 
institutions are important to the extent that they provide the context for individual 
action and create constraints over the behaviors and strategies of self-interested 
political actors, who are rational interest-maximizers3. On the other hand, the other 
major disciplines within the institutionalist theory, Sociological Institutionalism and 
Historical Institutionalism, attribute a much greater role to the institutions than 
merely being the context for strategic interaction. Moreover, these approaches also 
give fewer roles to the political actors, as they do not perceive them as rational 
                                                 
3 See Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 7), “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics” in Thelen, 
Steinmo and Longstreth (eds.) Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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interest maximizers and they focus on how individual goals and preferences are 
shaped by the institutional context. 
In the Rational Choice Institutionalism, institutions are defined as the rules of 
the game, i.e. the norms, laws and organizational forms, which channel individual 
rational action and institutional change results from the strategic actions of the 
political actors. For the Sociological Institutionalists, however, actors, interests and 
preferences are all socially constructed and endogenous. The informal norms of 
behavior are as important as the formal rules and the institutional change is a result 
of diffusion, training and practice, while for Historical Institutionalism, probability of 
change is lower and it is often a result of an exogenous shock or a crisis situation4. 
In the Rational Choice Institutionalism, the institutions are important to the 
extent that they affect the actions of rational political actors. For this approach, the 
agency is stronger than the structure and it is argued that the actors are capable of 
creating and  controlling the institutions. Rational Choice Institutionalism fails to 
explain the anomalies within the given institutional setting, which are not driven by 
the self- interests of the individuals and why certain institutions persist despite their 
‘irrational’ character. 
In terms of explaining the impact of institutions over the political actors, the 
Historical Institutionalist approach works better than the Rational Choice 
Institutionalism by focusing on  how they constrain actor preferences and actions 
through their unintended consequences. This approach deals with continuities and 
path dependencies, thus it can also at times be problematic in terms of explaining 
institutional change. While having the power attributed to the institutions over the 
political actors in common with Historical Institutionalism, Sociological 
                                                 
4 See Nielsen (2001). “Review of Institutionalist Approaches in Social Sciences” Research Papers 
Network, for details.  
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Institutionalism is more open to the possibility of institutional change through 
learning and adaptation to new norms.  
The way in which institutional change is theorized in historical and 
sociological approaches is worth a deeper discussion for the purpose of this study. 
However, before dealing with this issue in more detail, one needs to clarify what is 
meant by the concepts of ‘institution’ and ‘institutional change’ in order to be able to 
operationalize them in the research question. 
 
2.1.1 Defining “Institution” 
An institution can be defined as the totality of formal and informal rules, 
practices and procedures of interaction, which shape the relationship between 
individuals within a polity. Following this definition, it is possible to argue that an 
institution is in fact an organization. However, a more elaborate study of both 
concepts reveals that while an organization is a concrete body, which serves for 
certain functions according to given rules, an institution provides the context in 
which the organizations function. While organizations can be formed and changed 
easily, institutions are more enduring and more resistant to change. As Douglas 
North (1996) has put forward, the organizations, which come into existence, reflect 
the conditions provided by the institutional setting. In other words, an organization is 
the formal structure that reflects a certain institutional background. 
For some scholars5, institutions provide the framework for political conflicts 
to be contested by creating various opportunities for developing political strategies. 
While the formal rules of the institutional design affect the way in which the powers 
of actors are channeled into concrete policies, the results of these policies change the 
                                                 
5See  Immergut, 1992: 85, North, 1996: 344, Olsen, 1991: 96, Wildavsky, 1988: 593 for details. 
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ways in which formal institutional design works in practice. While some interests 
and actors are constrained, others are represented in the political processes depending 
on the institutional setting. In other words, institutions serve the functions of 
legitimizing, constraining and stabilizing certain actors, interests and political 
processes. 
The way in which institution is defined changes according to the subject 
matter at hand and this study also needs a definition of institution in accordance with 
its scope and the questions it tries to answer. Since the aim of this study is to analyze 
the centre-local relations in Turkey and the impact of the prospects for EU accession 
over these relations, the object of analysis is the relationship between different levels 
of government or administration and the changes in the balance of power (if there is 
any) between these levels. Thus, a broad definition of institution, which consists of 
informal rules, cultural and historical factors as well as formal rules applying to the 
relations between different political actors is necessary. In this study, institution is 
defined as the totality of formal and informal rules that govern the behaviors of 
political actors, which are based on the cultural, social, historical, political and 
economic characteristics, which have accumulated over time and have an effect over 
policy outcomes and actor choices. In more specific terms, the nature of centre-local 
relations in Turkey is analyzed with its historical, social and economic context in 
addition to its formal and legal characteristics and devolution is taken as a form of 
institutional change, whose prospects and terms are needed to be determined. As the 
aim of the study is to find out whether a certain mode of institutional change is 
taking place in the Turkish context, one needs to clarify and operationalize what is 
meant by the concept of ‘institutional change’ as well. 
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2.1.2 Defining Institutional Change 
 One striking feature of the theory of institutionalism is the fact that 
institutional change is not considered as an easy-to-achieve political process. Instead, 
one can see in the writings of the students of institutionalism6 that some extreme 
conditions need to come together in order for a major institutional change to take 
place and once an institutional design is put into place, it can not be changed that 
easily. 
 A crisis situation leading to institutional change is a common theme in 
institutionalist theory7. Institutions are often perceived as resistant to change and 
“institutional change is neither frequent nor routine because it is costly and difficult. 
When change does occur, it is likely to be episodic, highlighted by a brief period of 
crisis or critical intervention, and followed by longer periods of stability or path-
dependent development” (Powell, 1991: 197). 
 Sociological Institutionalism offers a framework for explaining institutional 
change through socialization (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 8). In this framework, the 
relationship between the institutions and the individual action is explained with “the 
logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1989). According to this logic, there 
exists a collective understanding of what constitutes a proper action, which affects 
the actor behavior. When new norms and practices emerge, they are internalized 
through learning, persuasion and socialization, which lead to an incremental change.  
                                                 
6 See March, James and Johan Olsen (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of 
Politics. New York: Free Press; Clemens, Elisabeth and James Cook (1999) “Politics and 
Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 25: pp. 441-446 
and Colomy, Paul (1998) “The New Institutionalism” in Barry Clark and Joe Foweraker (eds.) The 
Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought. London: Routledge for a detailed account of the difficulty of 
institutional change.  
7 This theme is based on the “punctuated equilibrium” concept of Stephen Krasner, which argues that 
significant institutional adjustments follow sudden major challenges to the previous stable system 
(e.g. war). See Stephen Krasner (1984) “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and 
Historical Dynamics” Comparative Politics Vol. 16, No.2: pp. 223-246. 
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 One common theme in the institutionalist literature is the impact of prior 
institutional choices and historical factors over the policy choices of political actors. 
In other words, the possibilities for intentional institutional change are constrained by 
earlier choices and institutional history. Once an institution comes into existence, it 
gains a power of its own, which determines the rules of the game for the future 
interactions. The phases of institutional creation and institutional operation are 
distinct from each other (Lindner& Rittberger, 2003: 446) and although the 
preferences of the creators and executers of the institutions are different from each 
other, the executers may not be able to realize the desired institutional change 
because of the power of the institution itself as a political actor on its own.  
 While dealing with devolution from an institutionalist perspective, one needs 
to define institutional change in broad terms in accordance with the way in which 
institution was defined. This definition has to cover all aspects of institutions from 
formal rules to historical, social and political setting and all types of possible change. 
“In general, changes are produced through some kind of encounter between the rules 
(or action based on them) and an environment, partly consisting of other rules” 
(March& Olsen, 1989: 167). In other words, an exogenous shock and the need to 
adjust to the new environment provide an impetus for change. However, from a more 
comprehensive perspective, institutional change is something more than changing the 
rules of the game; it comprises both “organizational change and value change” 
(Peters, 2000) and internal factors also need to be assessed in order to give a better 
account for change. 
 In analyzing the impact of the EU accession process over centre-local 
relations in Turkey, three factors, which affect the prospects for institutional change, 
are to be explored. First of all, the historical and political context, within which the 
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institutions operate needs to be analyzed. Second, the preferences and the role of the 
main political actors as the agency of change and their relations to the given 
institutional setting will be introduced to the equation and lastly, the exogenous 
shock, i.e. the impact of Europeanization over the change of the institutional setting 
will be analyzed.  
 In order to deal with the prospects for institutional change in the Turkish 
context, the study borrows from both historical and sociological institutionalist 
frameworks. The historical institutionalist perspective is adopted for explaining the 
intervening factors in the process and outcome of institutional change, while 
sociological institutionalism is appropriate for explaining the mechanism through 
which the institutional change takes place. Although the preferences and the role of 
the major political actors are considered to be an integral part of understanding the 
process of change, the rational choice institutionalism is not utilized in this respect. 
The main reason for this theoretical choice is the fact that the structure-agency 
relationship is understood in the form of control and constraint of the former over the 
latter instead of taking the institutions merely as the context of strategic interaction 
between interest-maximizing and rational actors as the rational choice 
institutionalism indicates (Steunenberg and van Vught, 1997: 20). In order to justify 
this choice, a more in-depth discussion of the historical and sociological 
institutionalist accounts of change with respect to the research question is necessary. 
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2.2 Explaining Devolution from an Institutionalist Perspective: Historical 
Context and Change Through Learning 
 
 While studying institutions in general and institutional change in particular, 
one needs to take the historical context into consideration. “Much of the 
developmental path of societies is conditioned by their past. At any moment in time, 
actions are constrained by customs, norms, religious beliefs, and many other 
inherited institutions” (Alston, 1996: 25). Historical institutionalism adopts the idea 
that “how the parts are put together channels the choices available to individuals and 
distinctive ways of doing things today will matter tomorrow” (Migdal, 1997: 218). 
Thus, while dealing with institutional change, the historical and political context is 
indispensable for determining the intervening factors during the process.  
The key concept of historical institutionalism is the concept of ‘path 
dependency’. This concept reflects the power of institutions as political actors in 
their own right as it implies that “the policy and structural choices made at the 
inception of the institutions will have a persistent influence over its behavior for the 
remainder of its existence” (Peters, 2000: 3). In other words, once a path is chosen, 
the options, which were available at the beginning, will cease to exist afterwards and 
the chosen path will determine the future choices and actions of the political actors. 
Historical institutionalists focus on the continuities and persistence of institutions 
over time and the unintended consequences of the choices made at a certain period in 
time while explaining the prospects for institutional change. This approach enables 
them to explain the persistence of institutions despite their “ineffective and 
inefficient nature” (Hay& Wincott, 1998: 954) and to understand policy continuities 
and variations across different settings. 
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 Historical institutionalists are mostly criticized for failing to explain 
institutional change and rather focusing on institutional persistence8. As Peters, 
Pierre and King (2005: 1276) argue, “historical institutionalism conceives of public 
policy making and political change as a discrete process, characterized by extended 
time periods of considerable stability-referred to as path dependency- interrupted by 
turbulent ‘formative moments’. During those formative periods, public policy is 
assigned new objectives, new priorities are established, and new political and 
administrative coalitions evolve to sustain those policies”. Thus, for historical 
institutionalists, institutional change may be an outcome of a crisis or an exogenous 
shock, which changes the power relations and preferences and in the absence of this 
sort of a variable, institutions are more likely to persist. In sum, one may argue that 
historical institutionalism can explain the persistence of institutions but does not 
work well in explaining why a certain institution comes into existence in the first 
place. It does not leave much room for the role of actor preferences, new ideas and 
necessities in the process of institutional change and its insistence on path 
dependency and necessity of crisis situations for change neglects the possibility of 
incremental change. At this point, sociological institutionalism comes into the picture 
as the framework for explaining the mechanism of institutional change, i.e. 
devolution and how it is affected by the Europeanization process. In addition to 
critical junctures, policy initiation, value change, actor preferences, incremental 
developments and introduction of new ideas and practices may also be a source of 
institutional change or lack of it. While historical institutionalist theory does not 
consider these as a possible source of change, for sociological institutionalism, these 
                                                 
8 See Thelen and Steinmo (1992): p. 18. 
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points, especially the introduction of new ideas and the changes in the values of the 
political actors, are the main variables to consider in explaining institutional change. 
 According to the theory of sociological institutionalism, institutional change 
occurs as a result of three mechanisms (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983: pp. 150-152). 
The institutions may change as a response to formal or informal pressures, they can 
change as a result of the imitation of the other successful applications for the purpose 
of legitimacy or institutional change takes place as a result of the diffusion of norms 
and standards through the interactions with the other institutions or networks. The 
way in which this change takes place is shaped by the cultural attributes, values, 
beliefs and identities of the major actors as the perceptions of the actors determine 
how the input from the external world will be processed and responded to within the 
domestic setting.  
 The actions and decisions of the political actors are rooted in their 
institutional setting and the history of their interactions among themselves and with 
their environment determine their preferences. The institutions have a constraining 
effect over some actors, while they empower the others and the institutions and the 
actors evolve and re-define themselves together. As Doğan (2005) argues, while the 
power of the actors determines what kind of institutions to be established, institutions 
alter the distribution of power among these actors during policy implementation.  
 As Eton Kent (2004: 219) argues, “when politicians fight over devolution, 
what they are fighting over are the institutional rules that distribute political authority 
and governing capacity between distinct levels of government”. In other words, 
devolution affects the rules that govern the relationship between different levels of 
government, alters the balance of power between these levels together with their 
rights, duties and responsibilities, which in turn create a change in a wider political 
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and social scale. Thus, given the broad definition of institution used in this study-as a 
totality of formal and informal rules and the historical, social, political and economic 
context-, devolution is first and foremost an institutional change, which has an 
impact over all aspects of the concept of institution and which can be resisted by 
various political actors for that reason. 
 The sociological institutionalist framework explains institutional change as a 
process of administrative adaptation and value change in response to an external 
demand. In the case of Europeanization-devolution relationship, a discrepancy 
between the EU-level requirements and the domestic structure initiates a process of 
change and the nature and outcome of this process are determined by the 
administrative tradition and structure (Knill and Lenschow, 1998: 5). In case of an 
institutional “misfit” (Börzel, 1999), domestic rules, procedures and collective 
understandings attached to them are challenged (Risse and Börzel, 2000: 5). New 
norms, rules, practices and meaning structures emerge at the European level as a 
model and the domestic political actors internalize these new norms in order to 
remain as legitimate actors in the international community. Through socialization 
and collective learning, an incremental institutional change occurs at the domestic 
level as a part of the domestic adaptation process (ibid: 2; Börzel, 1999: Risse, 
Cowles and Caporaso, 2001; Hansen and Scholl, 2002). 
 Sociological Institutionalism points out to the interaction between the 
adaptation pressures and different mechanisms of domestic adaptation, where the 
member states adopt to the EU way of policy making through learning, 
communication and trade offs in an incremental manner. This approach has to be 
supplemented by historical institutionalism, which focuses on the context-specific 
factors and their constraints over institutional change as the organizational culture 
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and history of each domestic setting have an impact over how they adopt to the 
supranational pressures. 
 
2.3. Operationalization of the Main Variables 
 
2.3.1 Devolution 
 Since the main aim of this study is to test the hypothesis that Europeanization 
(the EU accession process in the Turkish case) triggers devolution in Turkey, first of 
all, what we need is to have a concrete definition and criterion of what to consider as 
devolution. Operationalization of the dependent variable in this manner will 
contribute to the process of testing the main hypotheses listed in the next section.  
 In simplest terms, “while to centralize is to concentrate by placing power and 
authority in a centre, to decentralize means to disperse or distribute power from the 
centre” (Wolman, 1999: 29). However, defining and applying the concept of 
devolution within the context of political relations is not that simple. The process of 
devolution involves various levels of government, various political actors with 
different political agendas and various societal and economic sectors.  
One way of defining devolution is as “the process of devolving political, 
fiscal and administrative powers to sub-national units of governments” (Burki, 
Perry& Dillinger, 1999: 3). The process of devolution has two basic dimensions: 
territorial and functional. Territorial devolution involves “the physical dispersal of 
operations to local offices” (Hambleton& Hogget, 1994: 6) or “transfer of centrally 
produced and provided public goods and services to local-level units in the 
government hierarchy of jurisdiction” (UNDP, 1999: 4). When there exists a 
functional devolution in a given political setting, it means that the central 
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responsibilities are transferred to either organizations under state control or to the 
units outside central government’s control like non-governmental organizations or 
private firms (ibid: 4).  
This study deals with devolution in terms of allocation of power and 
responsibilities between different levels of government and this allocation takes 
place in different amounts and forms at each setting. If it takes the form of 
deconcentration, then it means that the subordinate lower-level/sub-units (regional, 
district, local offices of central administration) have delegated authority in policy, 
financial and administrative matters without independent local inputs. While 
deconcentration involves very limited transfer of authority, in case of devolution, the 
authority is transferred to autonomous lower-level units (provincial, district, local) 
that are legally constructed as separate governance bodies outside of direct 
government control as in the case of federal states. In this system, local units are 
autonomous and independent; they have clear and legally recognized geographical 
boundaries; they are institutionalized service providers in the eyes of citizens; and 
there exists a reciprocal and coordinated relationship between central and local 
governments9. 
Following this distinction, another point that has to be made within the scope 
of this study is the local government-local administration distinction. The local 
government refers to a political institution, which controls a sub-national area to a 
certain degree and whose leaders are popularly elected by the local people. The term 
‘government’ implies a certain level of autonomy or independence in administrative 
matters. However, the term ‘local administration’ implies that the activities at the 
local level are carried on under direction and control of a higher central authority. In 
                                                 
9 Ruşen Keleş, 1992. UNDP, 1999. 
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other words, while deconcentration creates local administrative bodies, devolution 
means that a local government, which is accountable to the local community, is in 
charge of the local affairs. In the Turkish case, since the local authorities function 
under the tutelage of the centre, the term ‘administration’ will be used while referring 
to the local level. 
In this study, devolution is defined in terms of allocation of both responsibilities 
and resources and certain indicators are identified in order to determined the course 
of devolution during the EU accession process of Turkey: 
1. Popularly elected local bodies are given more responsibilities in the local 
affairs in terms of decision-making. 
2. The principle of subsidiarity is introduced to the laws and directives, which 
regulate the centre-local relations. 
3. The relationship between the central level and the local level is redefined in a 
way that empowers the local level. 
4. The local bodies are allowed to generate their own resources and to collect 
and spend their own revenues. 
5. The central government allocates the budget and differentiates its policies by 
considering different local development needs. 
6. The accountability of the administrative bodies are enhanced. 
Within the scope of this study, devolution is understood with its context-specific 
variations. Thus, the organizational logic of the study is based on first determining 
the way in which devolution is understood in Europe, which factors shaped this 
understanding and what sort of experience can be observed in terms of realizing 
devolution in Europe. Then the study will analyze the Turkish setting with its 
dominant understanding of devolution, try to determine the context-specific factors 
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determining this understanding, the differences between the European and Turkish 
understandings and finally to see whether Turkey’s integration with the EU is likely 
to create an experience and understanding of devolution in Turkey along with the 
European understanding. 
This brings us to the independent variable of the main hypothesis, i.e. the process 
of Europeanization-EU accession process in the Turkish case-, which is assumed to 
have an impact over the process and understanding of devolution in Turkey. Thus, 
before getting in to the analysis of the Europeanization-devolution relationship, one 
needs to operationalize the concept of Europeanization as well. 
 
2.3.2 Europeanization 
 Like devolution, Europeanization is also a broad concept, which refers to 
various processes. For instance, it may refer to changes in the territorial boundaries 
of Europe through enlargement; to development of institutionalized governance at 
the European level through policy co-ordination and coherence; central penetration 
of national and sub-national systems of governance by the European level 
institutions; to exporting forms of political organization and governance beyond 
European borders or to a big political project of creating a unified and politically 
stronger Europe (Olsen, 2002: 3). However, this study takes a narrower definition of 
the concept and analyzes it only as an interaction between the EU-level institutions 
and policies and the domestic institutions.  
 In terms of explaining this interaction, one can observe three main tendencies 
in the literature. One group of scholars see Europeanization as a form of governance 
(Bache, 2003; Buller and Gamble, 2002; Guilani, 2003), while another group explain 
Europeanization as discourse (Hay and Rosamond, 2002), where policy makers and 
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stake holders construct Europe through language and discourse. Finally, for some 
scholars, Europeanization is institutionalization (Radaelli, 2004), where the response 
of the member states to adaptational pressures involves a re-distribution of resources 
among domestic political actors and institutions and a process of socialization, which 
depends on the power of the opposing actors and support of the existing institutional 
structure.  
 Taking Europeanization as institutionalization seems to work for the purpose 
of this study and the particular mechanism of Europeanization to be applied is the 
“misfit model” (Jacquot& Woll, 2003: 2; Börzel, 1999, 2001), a domestic change 
caused by an incompatibility between the European and national conditions. 
According to this model, Europeanization changes the distribution of resources 
among domestic actors if there is a misfit between the EU regulations and the 
domestic institutional structure. Europeanization creates a misfit, which leads to 
adaptational pressures and the mediating institutions and preferences and practices of 
the actors determine the emerging domestic structural or policy change (Börzel, 
1999: pp. 574-575; Börzel, 2001: 143; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001: 6). 
Following the combination of historical and sociological institutionalism, according 
to the misfit model, the formal rules, informal understandings about appropriate 
behaviors and institutional culture determine how domestic actors adopt to the new 
situation (Börzel, 1999). In other words, the impact of Europeanization is institution-
dependent and path dependency determines the outcomes of the domestic adaptation 
to the European norms (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001: pp.1-3; Börzel, 2001: 
138) or in other words, how the adaptational pressures from the European level are 
interpreted at the domestic setting. 
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 This model takes into account the fact that there exist cross-country and 
cross-sectoral differences in terms of responses towards the inputs from the EU-level 
(Andersen, 2004: 26). The different ways of adopting to European-level pressures are 
based on “institutional resources and traditions, pre-existing balance of domestic 
institutional structures and values which define the appropriate forms of political 
organization” (Olsen, 2002: pp. 14-15) and these context-specific factors have an 
explanatory value in analyzing the different responses to the same policy input from 
the EU level.  
 In this study, Europeanization is operationalized within the context of centre-
local relations and the misfit, which is the triggering mechanism of institutional 
change, is revealed through examining the differences between the historical and 
political context of centre-local relations in the European and Turkish settings. The 
indicators of the adaptational pressures from the EU level are the progress reports, 
the nature of assistance and the amount of funds given to the local and regional 
projects by the EU, the national program and reform packages of Turkey and the 
developments, which have taken place during the screening process. In order to 
understand whether these adaptational pressures have created a change in the centre-
local relations, the nature of the contacts between the local administrative bodies in 
Turkey and the EU, the projects developed at the local level, the regional policy 
initiatives, the concrete legal changes and distribution of financial means are 
thoroughly examined.  
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2.4 The Research Question and the Methodology of the Study 
 
2.4.1 The Research Question 
 The puzzle, which this study seeks to solve, is basically whether the 
commonly held idea that the EU has empowered the local level in the nation-states 
through devolution can be applicable to the Turkish case. To put it more precisely, 
the study aims to identify the impact of the EU accession process over the power 
relations between the central and local levels in Turkey. 
 The main hypotheses, which will be tested in this study, are: 
• The Europeanization process has empowered the local and regional level 
governance structures in the EU member states and the same impact can be 
expected in Turkey during the course of EU accession. 
• The EU serves as a catalyst in changing the balance of power and re-
distributing the resources between the central and local levels of government 
in Turkey. 
• The context-specific factors and the historical legacy of the existing 
institutions will condition/constrain the prospects for institutional change in 
Turkey in terms of devolution and the EU can only be an intervening 
variable. 
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2.4.2 Applying the Sociological Institutionalist Framework of Change to the 
Research Question 
 In this study, three main variables of institutional change, which were 
explained earlier, will be analyzed in order to analyze the impact of the EU accession 
process over the centre-local relations in Turkey: 
1. Historical and Political Context: This first dimension of institutional change 
is crucial for the scope of this study as the aim is to assess the impact of the 
same variable, i.e. Europeanization over different contexts, i.e. the EU 
member states in general and Turkey in particular. It is also crucial for 
showing the misfit between the two contexts, which triggers institutional 
change and for determining the different domestic responses to the same 
pressure from the supranational level and different mechanisms of 
institutional adaptation. The political context of the relations is also crucial 
because of the fact that the defined functions, responsibilities, duties and the 
division of power between different levels of government and the 
implications of these formal rules over actual performance of the governance 
structures will be dealt with as a potential domestic source of institutional 
change. The study of the norms is also important for the analysis of the 
relationship between the legal change and value change, which constitutes a 
significant aspect of the sociological institutionalist model. 
2. Actor preferences: While determining the domestic mechanisms of 
institutional adaptation, the main actors of devolution (the potential losers and 
winners) will be identified and the nature of interaction among these actors 
and between these actors and the existing institutional setting will be 
analyzed to see whether it may have an impact over the prospects for 
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devolution in Turkey. The analysis of actor preferences is also necessary for 
the determining the agency-structure relationship and the impact of the power 
relations over institutional change. 
3. Exogenous shock: The main variable for this dimension is the process of 
Europeanization. In fact, the basic question asked is whether an exogenous 
shock, i.e. the Europeanization process or the EU-level pressure, is enough 
the create an institutional change, i.e. devolution, alone. All the inputs 
coming from the EU level like the regional policy, the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity and the related phenomenon of multi-level 
governance will be dealt as possible factors triggering devolution in Turkey, 
i.e. as the independent variable leading to institutional change. 
 
2.4.3. The Methodology 
 The research conducted in this study has two main objectives: 
1. To show the misfit between the EU practice and the Turkish practice with 
respect to the relations between the central and local levels of government. 
2. To determine the course of institutional change regarding the centre-local 
relations in Turkey and the EU impact over the course of change. 
For the first objective, the historical and political context of the centre-local 
relations and the administrative practices in Europe and in Turkey will be examined 
and with the revealing of the misfit, the need for institutional change in the Turkish 
context will be justified.  
The second objective forms the crux of the study and the course of 
institutional change within the context of this study will be determined through an 
impact analysis. The impact analysis is carried out mainly through in-depth 
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interviews and content analyses and it covers three main areas of change: legal 
change, policy change and discourse change. 
For the analysis of legal change, the legal documents, which govern the 
affairs of central and local administrative bodies in Turkey, are analyzed. This 
analysis will show how the administrative system functions in Turkey, the nature of 
the administrative divisions and their compatibility with the EU practice and how the 
responsibilities and resources are shared between the central and local levels of 
administration in Turkey.  
In order to determine the impact of the EU factor over legal change, the EU 
progress reports, EU harmonization reform packages, and the administrative reform 
drafts will be examined together with the timeline of administrative reform in Turkey 
in relation to the EU accession process. 
While determining the impact of Europeanization over policy change, in-
depth interviews conducted at the central level of government are utilized. These 
interviews are mainly conducted with the specialists of the State Planning Agency, 
which is the main responsible institution for the distribution of funds received from 
the EU to the various administrative institutions and coordination of EU-related 
affairs. In these interviews, the main aim is to determine the nature of adaptational 
pressures received from the EU level and the response of the Turkish state in terms 
of policy formulation. The questions asked to the officials of the State Planning 
Agency are listed below: 
1. What were the requirements of the EU in terms of regional development and 
local administration? 
2. Did these requirements create any problems in terms of compatibility with the 
Turkish administrative system? 
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3. Which projects were developed in terms of meeting these requirements? 
4. Which of these requirements were hardest/easiest to fulfill? 
5. To what extent have the EU criteria been met? 
6. At what point is Turkey with respect to the initial requirements? 
7. How much progress has been made? 
8. Do you have any policy suggestions regarding regional development and/or 
administrative reform, which would facilitate the EU accession process? 
For the analysis of the third aspect of institutional change, i.e. the discourse 
change, related documents and in-depth interviews are utilized. The aim of these 
analyses is to determine the agency-structure relationship, the position of the central 
and local levels regarding devolution process in Turkey and the impact of the EU 
factor over the relations between the two levels.  
The related documents regarding the discourse change are the political party 
programs, the speeches and declarations of the major political figures, the records of 
the parliamentary proceedings  and documents about the related laws and reform 
packages for administrative reform in Turkey. 
The in-depth interviews cover the members of the parliament, who played an 
active role in the preparation of the major administrative reforms, the officials at the 
municipalities and the managers of the EU-funded local and regional development 
projects. In order to determine the discourse of the centre, following questions are 
asked to the interviewees:  
1. What were the major demands of the EU regarding administrative reforms in 
Turkey? 
2. Which conditions led to the administrative reform attempts at the time? 
3. Were there any obstacles during the preparation phase? 
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4. What was done to overcome these obstacles? 
5. What is your opinion about the EU-funded regional development projects? 
6. What do you think about the project selection and funding mechanisms? 
7. What is your opinion about the current administrative structure of Turkey? 
8. Do you think that an administrative reform is necessary in Turkey? 
9. Is the existing administrative structure adequate for Turkey to join the EU? 
10. How do you think should the best form administrative structure be? 
While determining the position of the local regarding the issue, focusing on a 
single case is preferred over trying to compare and contrast multiple cases for a more 
thorough understanding of the changing dynamics of centre-local relations. The case 
chosen for this purpose is the city of Kayseri, one of the largest and economically 
prosperous cities of Central Anatolia and Turkey. This choice is justified in the later 
stages of the research in a more elaborate manner. However, for the methodological 
concerns, at this point, it is sufficient to note that Kayseri was chosen because of the 
advantages it offered in terms of differentiating the impacts of Europeanization and 
globalization at the local level, its close contact with the EU and its openness to the 
adaptational pressures from the European level and because of the fact that the city is 
being governed by the same cadre since the early 1990s, which makes it easier to 
single out the impact of the EU over the value change. In order to determine the EU 
impact at the local level, the in-depth interviews are conducted with the managers of 
EU-funded projects and at the municipalities, in order to determine the impact of 
Europeanization over discourse change. The following questions are asked to the 
project managers: 
1. How many projects have you managed so far? 
2. How many of them were funded by the EU? 
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3. What are the aims and scope of the EU-funded projects? 
4. What was your reason to apply for the EU funds? 
5. What was the role of the EU funds in the formation of the project? Did you 
have the idea before the existence of EU funds? 
6. How was the application process? (place of first application, direct 
relationship with the EU-level, the difficulties, the guiding institutions, 
suggestions about the process) 
7. How was the project conducted? (the obligations, the involved institutions, 
difficulties, the control, results) 
8. Were the impacts of the project measured by any institutions after it was 
completed? 
9. How do you define the experience of managing an EU-funded project? 
10. Do you have any suggestions for the improvement of project selection and 
conducting processes? 
11. What do you think about the role of the State Planning Agency within the 
EU-funded projects? 
12. What do you think about the role of the EU in the development projects? 
At the municipalities, the participants are asked the following questions: 
1. Do you receive any financial assistance from the EU? 
2. If so, how is this financial assistance distributed? 
3. Do you have any particular division, committee or working group about EU-
related affairs? 
4. Are you in any sort of cooperation with the municipalities in the EU member 
states? 
5. If yes, what kind of cooperation is it? 
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6. Do you have any concrete project related with Turkey’s accession to the EU? 
7. What is the role of Ankara in your relations with the EU? 
8. What are your impressions about the funding and project selection process? 
(application procedures, difficulties, problems, suggestions) 
9. What do you think about the role of the central government in the 
administrative affairs? 
10. What will Turkey’s EU membership bring for the local administrative 
bodies? 
11. What is your opinion about the current administrative structure of Turkey? 
12. Do you think that an administrative reform is necessary in Turkey? 
13. Is the existing administrative structure adequate for Turkey to join the EU? 
14. How do you think should the best form administrative structure be? 
 
At this stage, it is accepted from the outset that analysis of one case may be 
problematic in terms of theoretical generalizations. However, since the research in 
concerned with what changes have been taking place in the Turkish context during 
the EU accession process, understanding the process and change mechanism itself 
has a priority over reaching at theoretical generalizations. One in-depth case study is 
understood as a better option in terms of providing a thorough understanding of the 
ongoing process of EU accession instead of focusing on cross-case comparisons or 
generalizations. Moreover, the study aims to contribute to the theory by revealing the 
mediating factors at macro and micro levels to the relationship between 
Europeanization and devolution, which would provide new analytical tools for 
further research and in a way, generate a grounded theory, which will help in the 
future in-depth research on new cases, like other cities in Turkey.  
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Before getting into the details of these analyses, however, the first step of the 
methodology needs to be fulfilled and the misfit between the EU practice and 
Turkish administrative structure needs to be revealed. In order to do this, one needs 
to analyze the evolution of central-local relations at the European context. This 
analysis is conducted at the next chapter and the theoretical framework is applied to 
the European context before dealing with the Turkish case. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN 
EUROPE: TOWARDS A COMMON MODEL? 
 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to apply the theoretical framework of the study 
to the European context. In other words, the chapter tries to analyze the impact of the 
process of Europeanization over the centre-local relations in the EU member states 
by showing the degree of misfit with the EU practice for each case and how each 
state responded to this misfit. While determining the course of change and which 
states were more open to change, the contextual variables become crucial as the 
historical and political context and the actor preferences help to reveal the inter-
country differences in terms of responses to Europeanization.  
 The chapter is organized in accordance with the theoretical framework and in 
order to underline the different responses of each country to the similar adaptational 
pressures, it first deals with the impact of the contextual variables in the European 
setting. The chapter, then proceeds with the analysis of the impact of 
Europeanization over the centre-local relations in the EU member states and the 
different responses and patterns of institutional change are tried to be revealed.   
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3.1. The Historical and Political Context of Centre-Local Relations in Europe 
 “The tradition of the free or chartered cities and boroughs, based on an 
acceptance by the state of the contribution they made to shared wealth as free centers 
of wealth and commerce, is a common root in virtually all European systems” 
(Norton, 1991: 24). In the history of Western Europe, the commune exists as the unit, 
which formed the basis of local self-government. The commune “derives from the 
administrative structure of the Catholic Church and the government of its estate 
within the feudal system. It later acquired simple administrative secular functions 
like the registration of births, deaths and marriages” (Bennett, 1993b: 34). As Robert 
Bennett (1993a) argues, “the ecclesiastical structure of the Catholic Church gave rise 
to an independent status for commune as a geographical territory with basic 
administrative functions. The Christian commune has a history of autonomy within a 
network of centre-local relations within the church. The commune in Western 
Europe was significant as the foundation for subsequent local power” (pp. 2-3). 
Thus, the common commune experience of the Western European countries created a 
potential for strong local self-government in these countries. The early forms local 
government in Europe were found in places where hard forms of feudalism were 
absent and the peasants were free to make their own decisions (like England and 
Scandinavia) and in the parishes under church guidance (Wollmann, 2006: 1421). 
However, the profound changes throughout Europe altered the position of these 
bodies and thus the prospects for local self-government. The communes of the 
middle ages gave way to absolutist centralist states with Reformation, nationalism 
movements and industrialization.  
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  The 17th and 18th centuries witnessed the emergence of the states in Europe 
in the modern sense. The kings began to win the struggle they carried on with the 
nobles for transforming the feudal monarchies into administrative governments and 
administrative agents were appointed to deal with the local businesses in the 
territorialized absolute monarchies in order to increase the royal income (Fox, 1992: 
pp. 3-4). Thus, the European state was under profound transformation with the 
establishment of “extensive and uniform field administrations, central bureaucracies 
and taxation systems” (Tilly, 1993: 29). This shift from indirect to direct rule had 
various purposes such as more resource extraction, securing the boundaries and 
nation building and resulted in the handling of the local matters by the agents of 
central government instead of landlords, church or city councils. The emergence of 
the modern state was achieved through centralization and in the 19th century and 
early 20th century, the centre-local relations were based on the central control over 
the local in Europe.  
 According to Edward Page (1991), three factors were influential over the 
weakening of the local self-governing bodies in Europe in the 19th century. The first 
factor was  
the system of military conscription, which was based on personal 
contracts between the monarchy and the nobility, according to which land 
was granted explicitly in exchange for making up the military. The strict 
hierarchical character of this relationship destroyed the old county levels 
of government. [Moreover,] the state building process destroyed the 
counties and replaced them by new administrative districts supervised by 
state officials. [In addition to these,] the fact that the local nobility were 
seen as a threat to the national government required the replacement of 
the local self-governing bodies with state agencies (pp. 116-117).  
 
As a result of these factors, “across most of Europe, local government in the early 
19th century was structured hierarchically in terms of its relations with the centre: 
central government, through governors or prefects had direct administrative control 
over the actions of local government bodies” (ibid: 132).  
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 Until the 19th century, the European political landscape can be portrayed as “a 
dual polity, in which central officials and local officials were isolated from each 
other and wished to be isolated because of the distinction of high politics and low 
politics10. Two levels existed autonomously” (Rose, 1985: 15), however in the state-
building process of 19th century, local bodies such as regions were seen as obstacles 
in the construction of national identity and modern state (Keating, 1998a: 12) and the 
centre extended its control over the local bodies.  
 Thus, as mentioned above, one of the important aspects of the European 
heritage, which affected the evolution of centre-local relations, is the existence of 
communes as a basic social unit, which created a tradition of local self-government. 
The French Revolution and the administrative structure spread by Napoleon in 
Europe are the other important factors shaping the centre-local balance in favor of 
the former. The German unification and the German federalism were a reaction to 
this administrative centralization in a way and they created another trend within the 
centre-local relations in Europe. In addition to French Revolution and German 
unification, the Russian Revolution and the establishment of centralized socialism 
afterwards also led to a different form of centre-local balance. 
 The common theme of Europe after 17th century was the state-building 
process, which had a profound impact over the fate of local self-governing bodies 
with the redefinition of centre-local relations and the division of responsibilities. 
However, although the apparent common outcome is centralization of some sort, 
different countries chose different strategies in redefining the centre-local 
boundaries. Although “the enduring nature of the commune as the building block of 
local administration was a common trend in Europe, different paths to state-building 
                                                 
10 The matters related with the local communities were considered as low politics, as issues of daily 
life, which should be handled at the local level, without bothering the central officials, who were busy 
with diplomacy or war making, i.e. the matters of high politics. 
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and democratization led to different administrative structures” (Newman and 
Thornley, 1996: 32). The different traditions of centre-local relations across Europe 
are significant for explaining the different responses given to the common challenges 
for local government reform in the European countries, thus they are worth a deeper 
discussion. One way of dealing with the historical and political context of different 
responses in the European countries is to group these countries according to their 
similarities. For the analytical purposes of this study, the European countries are 
analyzed in five groups as the Napoleonic, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Scandinavian 
and Central and Eastern European countries with respect to the similar nature of 
centre-local relations. Later, it will be argued that the countries of each group have 
responded to the adaptational pressures from the EU-level in line with their 
organizational heritage. 
 
3.1.1 The Napoleonic Tradition11 
 The Napoleonic state is based on the idea of “the abstract citizen represented 
in the National Assembly with no intermediary bodies” (Loughlin, 2000: 24). It is a 
centralized, unitary nation-state. The French Revolution suppressed all the 
peculiarities like regions and other self-governing bodies, which were perceived as 
pre-modern and incompatible with the nation-state (Hueglin, 1986: 441). After the 
French Revolution, “1791 Constitution established a uniform system of departments 
and communes as the basic administrative units. [It] imposed a uniform structure 
everywhere. Excessive devolution was replaced by the fused state system and a 
centralized administrative state” (Bennett, 1989: 17).  
                                                 
11 France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium and Greece are the countries affected by this tradition. 
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 In the Napoleonic system, the state is divided into “fairly uniform 
jurisdictions that are larger than the basic units of local governments and over which 
normally presides an appointed civil servant-the prefect” (Page, 1991: 109). The 
prefect is the representative of the state at the local level (Siedentopf, 1988: 342) and 
is appointed by the central government to replace the locally elected officials 
(Bennett, 1993b: 37, Fox; 1992: 86). In this system, there exists a strong central 
supervision, leaving little or no discretion to local government (Lane and Ersson, 
1999: 182) and the system, which originated in France, spread to other countries, like 
Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium through territorial conquests of Napoleon and left 
a strong legacy in these countries. 
 The motive for creating such an administratively centralized system after the 
Revolution in France was to assure the unity of the country (Johnson, 1993: 52). In 
1871 and 1874, two modifications were made in this system with the introduction of 
the election of a department representative council and a municipal council in the 
communes (Wagstaff, 1994: 19), however, the hierarchy between the prefect and the 
mayor remained unchanged until 1980s. The local government concept was replaced 
by the concept of local administration and “the administration was subordinate to the 
government” (Meny, 1988b: 273).  
 “References to the ‘indivisible Republic’ have been a commonplace of 
constitutional texts over two centuries, as successive regimes have sought to affirm 
and to strengthen the integral, seamless nature of the French state” (Wagstaff, 1994: 
15). This Napoleonic legacy has affected the mode of change in the centre-local 
relations in France, where “the initiative comes from above, the base of the system 
has a minor role and is controlled by central government” (Meny, 1988a: 130) and 
the context of devolution is often the tension between nationalism and localism.  
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 The Napoleonic Legacy was not that strong in Spain because of the historical 
and political factors specific to the country. Although the country was once under the 
influence of strong centralization tradition, the late unification of the country, the 
strength of cultural and linguistic diversities and the impact of uneven economic 
development throughout the country (Williams, 1994: pp. 85-86), made it easier to 
overcome this legacy. 
 For a long time, Spain remained as an artificial territory, which emerged in 
the 16th century under the authority of one king from a union of kingdoms, achieved 
either through dynastic marriage or through annexation by force. It consisted of 
dissimilar territories in cultural and legal traditions and institutions. In 1833, 49 
artificial provinces were directly subjected to Madrid. Moreover, the lack of 
traditional monarchical stability and legitimacy created a power vacuum for the 
regional identities to develop and the domestic and international failures of the 
unitary state in the 19th century, like late industrial development, military defeats and 
the loss of colonies (Diaz-Lopez, 1985: pp. 236-238) made it harder to retain the 
centralized structure inherited from the Napoleonic Empire and shaped the route that 
the centre-local relations would take in the country. 
 Like most of Europe, in Italy, commune was the basic unit of political 
organization. However, in the Italian case the commune was more significant in the 
sense that it was a means of “protecting individuality through attaching to local 
traditions, language and religion” (Melchionni, 1994: 72). This function of the 
communes and the strong identification of people with their local communities 
affected the course of centre-local relations in the country.  
 As it was with the case of France, in Italy administrative centralization was a 
means of achieving unity. During the time of unification, the main aim of the ruling 
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class was to harmonize the regional differences. The chosen solution was 
centralization and the 1865 Law introduced “a rigid prefectorial system along 
Napoleonic lines. The prefect became the representative of executive power at the 
local and provincial level” (Bull, 1994: 70). Moreover, a strict legal control 
mechanism was established over administrative actions. Every administrative action 
had to be based on written procedures in order to be enforced and this also limited 
the municipal autonomy, while increasing the central involvement in local matters 
(Dente, 1985: 135-136).  
 The Belgian state, another state affected by the Napoleonic tradition, was “an 
artificial creation, owing its existence to war and the European balance of power in 
the first half of the 19th century” (Mughan, 1985: 277). Between 1795 and 1815, it 
was governed by the elite imposed by France. With the Congress of Vienna in 1815, 
it was given to the Kingdom of Netherlands and after intense religious and political 
struggles and 1830 Revolution, the Belgian state was created with the 1831 
Constitution (Wagstaff, 1994b: 40).  
The population of the country “was from the outset divided socially, 
economically and geographically long linguistic lines with the Dutch-speaking 
Flanders in the North and French-speaking Wallonia in the South” (Mughan, 1985: 
277). The state was structured by the French-speaking elites as a unitary and 
unilingual one with French as the official language while most of the population 
spoke Dutch. However, this structure could not last long as at the end of 19th century, 
the Dutch people were politically mobilized and the result was “a compromise 
between the Napoleonic model and the traditions of local and provincial autonomy” 
(Molitor, 1988: 221) with two layers of popularly elected government in the 
commune and province, a central government in Brussels and two official languages. 
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 At each country, one can observe the traces of the Napoleonic tradition either 
in the form of administrative structure or as a means of establishing political control 
over people, which later provided a motive for administrative reform. The country-
specific conditions have shaped to what extent the Napoleonic structure would 
endure and the tensions between the Napoleonic structure and the country-specific 
factors affected the later form of central-local relations. 
 
 3.1.2 The Anglo-Saxon Tradition12 
 The Anglo-Saxon tradition reveals a contradiction with the Napoleonic 
system as instead of the excessive centralization of the Napoleonic system and its 
hierarchical structure, the Anglo-Saxon system is based on devolution and delivery 
of local services with little or no state intervention (Subramaniam, 1988: pp. 88-89). 
The system itself is based on a dual polity approach, where the central and local 
levels of government have distinct political spheres and the local government is 
understood in functional terms as a means of service delivery rather than in a 
political manner (Newman and Thornley, 1996: 30). In this system, there exists no 
unified executive, however, although they have distinct political spheres, the central 
government is capable of supervising activities by setting legal and financial 
constraints (Bennett, 1989: 13).  
 The United Kingdom is the most important country in Europe following the 
Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, where in the 19th century there was limited 
state intervention to the local affairs and all the local spending had to be borne 
locally (Pickvance, 1991: 50). The most important aspect of local government 
organization in the UK, which has a significant impact over the central-local 
                                                 
12 The United Kingdom and Ireland are the European countries of the Anglo-Saxon tradition. 
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relations is the absence of constitutional protection over the structure, powers, 
functions and responsibilities of the local government (Newman and Thornley, 1996: 
31). This situation makes it easier for the central government to make certain 
changes, which have profound impacts over local self-government and enables the 
government to supervise the local affairs.  
 
3.1.3 The Germanic Tradition13 
 As an inherently federal structure, the Germanic administrative tradition 
provides the context, which favors the local self-government, the most. Until 17th 
century, the German cities were politically and legally autonomous units. With the 
weakening of towns after the 30 Years’ Wars, they integrated into territorial states 
but this integration did not change the autonomous self-governing nature of the 
towns. A dualism between the state and the municipalities was developed and local 
matters were considered as a part of self-administration (Häußermann, 1991: 99-
100). When Germany was unified in 1870, the emerging state was a mosaic of 
different autonomous bodies, it was made up of “a multitude of semi-sovereign 
kingdoms, principalities and city-states with their own urban, economic and cultural 
centers. The modern state emerged not as one national state, but as a plurality of 
territorial states” (Reissert, 1985: 105). This situation had far-reaching implications 
over the centre-local relations in the modern Germany. 
 In contrast with the Napoleonic states, where regionalism and region-building 
were considered as a reaction and an alternative to the national state, in Germany, 
region-building was a means of state-building. As Brunn (1994) argues, “German 
regionalism did not develop in relation to a German national state but within 
                                                 
13 Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg come from the Germanic tradition in terms of 
central-local relations.  
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territorial states approaching administrative perfection” (p. 40). “The regional 
particularism of pre-unification Germany survived well into the 20th century. 
Loyalties to regions remained high and Berlin never enjoyed the dominating central 
strength of some other West European capitals. Political power may have been 
concentrated in the capital, but administrative power was retained by the constituent 
states of the Federation” (Urwin, 1982: 176). 
 When “the local self-administration of the Prussian state extended to the rest 
of Germany to bond together a new German nation” (Bennett, 1989: 22), the 
resulting form of state was “a federal system, which was designed as an instrument 
for the vertical division of powers rather than as an instrument for the integration of 
centre and periphery” (Reissert, 1985: 122). There was a functional division of labor 
between the Federal state and the Länder14, where the federal government was 
responsible for legislation and the administrative tasks were left to the Länder.  
 In addition to the inherent regionalism of the political system, another 
important feature of the Germanic tradition, which affects the centre-local relations, 
is the importance of the written constitution in contrast with the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition. The powers, status, functions and responsibilities of the local 
administrative bodies are under constitutional protection. The constitution clearly 
states the powers of different tiers of government and it requires a constitutional 
amendment to make certain changes in the centre-local balance (Newman and 
Thornley, 1996: 34). This sort of legal protection both empowers the local 
governmental bodies and prevents a rapid transformation of the institutional setting. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Land (Länder in plural) means state in German.  
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3.1.4 The Scandinavian/Nordic Tradition15 
 The Scandinavian/Nordic tradition is characterized by a combination of a 
strong relationship between central government and the regions and an emphasis on 
local democracy. The outcome of this tradition is a multi-level state structure, where 
the agencies of the central government operate at the regional level for the purpose of 
supervision next to the autonomous regional and local councils (Lundquist, 1988: pp. 
159-160; Newman and Thornley, 1996: 35). In other words, the central government 
may hold considerable political power over the provincial level but localities have 
their own autonomy, councils and tasks of self-government (Bennett, 1989: 14; 
Bennett, 1993b: 42).  
 Edward Page (1991: 140) observes a shift from strong central supervision to 
more local government discretion in administrative control and functions in the 
Scandinavian countries. The administrative and financial autonomy of the local self-
governing bodies are under constitutional guarantee (Parlak, 2002: 55) and a trend 
towards devolution can be observed within the Nordic tradition. As Sharpe (1993: 
15) argues, the main reason for this situation is the historical identification of 
devolution with democratization and its ideological conceptualization as a reaction to 
the fascist centralization. 
 
3.1.5 The Central-Eastern European Tradition16 
 The evolution of centre-local relations in the Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) 
has a more different point of departure from that of Western Europe. While the 
commune was the basic administrative unit of the Western European Catholic 
Church, which created the tradition of local self-government, there was no such unit 
                                                 
15 Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway. 
16 The former Soviet Republics together with Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic 
and Slovakia are some examples of this tradition.  
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in the East European Orthodox Church (Bennett, 1993a: 2). In addition to this, the 
experience of communism specific to this region, created a whole-different context 
for central-local relations, where there were “no experience of self-governance, no 
tolerance to the shifts in the central control and no independent institutions at the 
local level” (Regulska, 1993: 184).  
 The roots of the centre-local relations in the CEE countries can be 
characterized with a high degree of communist party supervision over the local 
soviets, excessive central planning, which leaves minimal space for local autonomy 
and the principle of democratic centralism (Bennett, 1993b: 43). According to this 
principle, popular elections are held for government posts but at the same time, there 
exists a high level of dual subordination within a single state system. On one hand, 
all decisions are subject to the next higher level in the state hierarchy, where the 
decisions of the village soviet have to be approved by the main district soviet, which 
needs the approval of the communist party (ibid). On the other hand, all the 
administrative departments of a local soviet are responsible to both their soviet and to 
the same department at the next higher level in the state hierarchy (Yıldırım, Duben 
&Tıkız, 1993: 79).  
 This form of state organization leaves no room for local self-government and 
for the division of powers between the central and local administrative bodies and the 
local level exists merely as the agent of central government, i.e. the communist party. 
This legacy of communism institutionalized the high central control in the CEE 
countries and affected the prospects for devolution. 
 
 As these briefly-described forms of state organization demonstrate, the 
European states (both in the West and in the East) had different points of departure in 
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the evolution of centre-local relations up to the present. The historical departure point 
of each country has affected the strategies they have chosen in dealing with the 
common economic, social and political challenges, which created a disparity 
between the existing norms of institutional design and the emerging needs and 
performance expectations.  
 
3.2 The Political Context of the Centre-Local Relations in Europe 
 The Great Depression and the economic and political consequences of the 
Second World War in the 1930s and 1940s and the world-wide economic crisis of 
the 1970s were the major challenges over the performance of the existing 
organizational structures in the European states and they contributed to institutional 
change in terms of centre-local relations. The different socio-economic conditions of 
each period led to a re-definition of state-society relations and the role of the state in 
economic and social life. This situation was effective over the balance of power 
between the central and local levels of government and administration throughout 
Europe. The rise and fall of the welfare state in Europe can be considered as a 
common response in the European countries in each period. However, the path, 
which led to these responses and the resistance of certain actors to them reveal cross-
country differences and thus, they are valuable for the purposes of this study. 
 
3.2.1 1930-1970: The Emergence of the Welfare State 
 The period between 1930 and 1970 witnessed the establishment of the 
welfare state model throughout Western Europe. This situation was a response to the 
needs of the post-war reconstruction process and other emerging infrastructural, 
economic and social problems as a result of advanced industrialization and rapid 
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urbanization (Wollmann, 2006: 1428). In the welfare model, the central state was 
responsible for health, education and housing services together with the employment 
and social welfare policies. The nationalization of economic and social policies 
resulted in “the integration of the local authorities into the national state, 
centralization of the political power and a model of interventionist state” (ibid: 1426-
1427) instead of the dual polity structure of the previous century, where the local and 
central government structures had distinct spheres of action and distinct 
responsibilities.  
 The strategic role taken over by the central government in the economic and 
social life created “a culture of entitlement” (Bennett, 1993a: 13) to certain rights for 
the citizens. As the central government became the main regulatory actor for 
providing a uniform life standard for the citizens, central-local balance began to 
favor the former, where the local governments became the agencies to deliver 
services and to conduct the centrally-decided policies. During the post-war 
reconstruction period, as the industrialization advanced in time, the existing local 
government structure became inadequate for dealing with the new problems, the 
states opted for acquiring new responsibilities (Sharpe, 1993: pp. 8-9) and became in 
charge of the macroeconomic policy with various interventionist instruments 
(Keating, 1998b: 140). 
 In this centralized system, the local administrative bodies, often the regions, 
were seen “as a unit for spatial planning and policies, managed by the central state” 
(Keating, 2004: xii). The regions were significant only in terms of overcoming the 
territorial disparities and the problems of regional disparities were tried to be solved 
by various economic development policies, which were formulated and conducted 
centrally. These policies were perceived as a part of national policy and of the duty 
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of the state to achieve “equity, uniformity and modernization” (Keating, 1998b: 49). 
Within this context, any “restructuring of central-local relations was often based on 
the necessities of indicative national planning and of creating local governments that 
were of a sufficient scale to deliver services that were increasingly demanded by the 
citizens” (Loughlin, 2004d: 392).  
 Until the 1970s, the general trend in Europe was an “asymmetrical 
relationship between central and local government structures” (Jouve, 2005: 286), 
where the central government had more political power and more responsibilities in 
order to cope with the economic and social problems challenging the European 
states. However, the country-specific factors and the historical context affected the 
division of powers between the centre and the local bodies in each state to some 
extent. For instance, As Michael Keating (1998b) points out, in the post-authoritarian 
regimes of post-war period like Italy and Germany, strong centralization was 
considered as a threat and devolution was associated with democratization and 
stability, which resulted in more local involvement in the decision and conduct of 
welfare policies. In the consolidated Western European democracies, centralized 
government was the means for modernization and establishment of equality and the 
local bodies became the agencies of service delivery, while in the authoritarian 
regimes like Spain and Portugal, strong centralization remained intact until the mid-
1970s.  
 The United Kingdom and France are two examples of high level of 
centralization after the Great Depression in order to cope with the new problems. 
When the existing structure became unable to cope with the changing economic, 
political and technological conditions, in the United Kingdom, the local government 
activities were reduced and various policies were nationalized in addition to central 
 55
supervision of local government spending (Pickvance, 1991: pp. 52-53). Faced with 
the similar problems, the central government took over the responsibility to cope 
with the uneven distribution of wealth and economic activities and declining quality 
of life in France and with the laws of 1940 and 1942, the mayors were appointed by 
the central government instead of being popularly elected and the local election of 
municipal councils was also abolished (Wagstaff, 1994a: pp. 20-21). 
 The social and economic problems and necessities of the period affected the 
prospects of devolution in Italy, too. Although devolution was on the agenda after the 
Second World War in order to prevent the rise of fascism again and the country was 
divided into twenty regions with limited legislative powers in the 1948 Constitution, 
this was not applied until the 1970s (Bull, 1994: 71) and the strong central 
government remained in charge. Because of the existence of the Franco regime, 
Spain also remained as a highly centralist state in the period despite the highly 
developed sub-national identities and regional demands.  
 In the Scandinavian countries, one can observe the attempts to combine the 
centralist responses to the problems of the period with the existing local self-
government tradition. The Scandinavian model can be described with its “large 
public sector, extensive welfare commitments, strong trade union movements, 
corporatist arrangements and relative social and ethnic homogeneity” (Lidström, 
2004b: 344). As a result, although the number of communes was decreased through 
amalgamation and the financial relations between the central and local bodies were 
redefined in the Nordic countries, and the public sector expanded, it remained 
dependent on the lower-level decision-making bodies (Kjellberg, 1988: 43). Thus, 
the local government expanded in scope for the implementation of development of 
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programs while it lost its discretionary powers with the standardization of social 
services, which left little room for local variations.  
 Germany illustrates a case, where the common trend towards centralized 
welfare state was in clash with the federal tradition. In the post-war period, the 
country lived through the difficulty of reconciling the need for uniformity and 
multiplicity and the result was a tendency towards centralism for the maintenance of 
uniform living standards and a reduction in the responsibilities of the Länder 
(Stammen, 1994: 61).  
 Belgium is the country, which was least affected with the centralist 
tendencies in the Western Europe during the period between 1930 and 1970 because 
of its national dynamics and strong cultural and national basis for regional and local 
demands. Contrary to the empowerment of the central state in the rest of Europe, the 
advanced industrialization led to the empowerment of the regional level in Belgium 
as the economic development of the Flemish area led to increased political demands 
(Wagstaff, 1994b: 46). With a series of new laws in the 1960s, the existence of two 
linguistic communities was acknowledged officially and these communities acquired 
cultural autonomy in time. In other words, because of the strength of the existing 
regional cleavages, the central state had to accommodate the demands of different 
communities while dealing with the socio-economic problems of the period and this 
situation established the centre-local relationship more in favor of the local level in 
comparison to the rest of the Western Europe.  
 Although one can observe a certain level of increase in the role and power of 
the central state vis-à-vis the local governments and administrative bodies in Western 
Europe during this period, it is important to note that this result was easier to achieve 
in some European countries, while in other countries centralization through the 
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establishment of welfare state was resisted by certain political actors and thus, a 
different kind of power sharing occurred.  
 In countries, which were highly influenced by the Napoleonic tradition, like 
France and Italy, it was relatively easier for the central state to take over more 
responsibilities and powers because of the existing unitary and centralist state 
tradition. In countries, where there were strong regional or local demands, like Spain 
and Belgium, the major political actors were resistant to more centralization and 
although a transformation towards centralization occurred, it was a harder one. In the 
states with a federal tradition of government, i.e. Germany and the Scandinavian 
countries, the major challenge for the state was the reconciliation of the increasing 
social and economic demands from the central state and the existing tradition of local 
self-government. The increased role of the central state was met with suspicion and 
resistance by the local political actors and the resulting form of central welfare state 
was a compromise between central and local levels. While this was the trend in the 
Western Europe during this period, the Central and Eastern European countries were 
closed to the global demands for transformation and the highly centralized system of 
government remained intact. 
 
 
 3.2.2 1970-1990: The Retreat of the Central State? 
 The socio-economic climate of the 1970s created new burdens for the 
advanced welfare state in Western Europe, which gave rise to a new discrepancy 
between the performance of the existing institutional structure and the demands from 
the system. This situation led to a new wave of redefinition of centre-local relations 
throughout Europe. The oil crisis of 1973, which hit the globe, led to the recession of 
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the world economies, created stagflation and economic depression. This situation 
was especially problematic for the welfare state, which had assigned itself to 
extensive social expenditures as the fiscal pressures created budget deficits. In order 
to cope with the economic crisis situation, the welfare states had to reduce their 
public expenditures. The need to cut back welfare measures together with the decline 
in voting levels, poor government performance to reduce geographical and socio-
economic imbalances and increased distrust towards big government led to the 
redefinition of the boundaries and responsibilities of the central state in Europe 
(Jouve, 2005: 290; Tonboe, 1991: 30; Khan, 1999: 5; Rhodes, 1997: pp. 41-42; 
Loughlin, 2000: 17). 
 The common trend emerging in Europe to cope with the new problems can be 
summarized as “the contracting neo-liberal state” (Loughlin, 2000: 14), where 
extensive deregulation and privatization took place, the state cut back of the services 
it previously provided, devolution and regionalization became the general application 
together with the marketization of public services and the citizens were perceived as 
customers instead of being entitled to certain services (ibid: pp. 14-15). With respect 
to the evolution of centre- local relations in Europe, the post-welfare model is 
significant for the changing role of the central state from controller to a partner with 
local government and the market. However, as Robert Bennett (1993a: 15) points 
out, the level of devolution that took place in each country and the emerging form of 
centre-local relations depended on the antecedent conditions and internal dynamics 
of the countries. 
 In France, the devolution reforms of the period occurred in order “to contain 
expenditures, respond to the fiscal pressures as well as to social demands for regional 
governance” (Ansell and Gingrich, 2003: 149). “Devolution occurred at the time of 
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and was inspired by the beginning of a long period of economic crisis” (Gremion, 
2002: 73) and in order to cope with this economic crisis, with the series of laws 
between 1982 and 1986, the territorial structure of the country was reorganized and 
more role was assigned to non-central tiers of government like municipalities, 
departments and regions (Preteceille, 1991: 127). With the 1982 reforms, the 
multiple-office holding among sub-national officials17 was restricted, the powers of 
the prefect were reduced and the local administration became more coherent as the 
territorial and functional characteristics of the communes, departments and regions 
became clearer (Wagstaff, 1994a: 30; Ansell and Gingrich, 2003: 147). In the case of 
France, these reforms were an important turning point for the evolution of centre-
local relations as they inserted judicial review of local government acts instead of 
prior central government control, the prefect lost his executive status and became the 
observer and commissioner of the state and the local authorities obtained the right to 
determine certain economic and social measures (Meny, 1988a: 139).  
 In Spain, the internal dynamics of the country were very influential over the 
devolution of the state in the late 1970s and the 1980s as “by the latter years of the 
Franco regime, repressive centralism, together with the social tensions related to 
uneven development and the lack of democratic channels for regional representation 
had brought about a regional backlash of varying intensity” (Williams, 1994: 86). 
Thus, when the new regime was founded in 1975, the regional problem was a 
priority in order to achieve stability in the country. With the purpose of solving the 
regional question, “the 1978 Constitution radically transformed the centralist non-
democratic socio-political regime inherited from fascism and made possible the 
creation of Autonomous Communities System based on symmetrical devolution” 
                                                 
17 In France, the mayors, members of the district councils or other local officials can also be members 
of the parliament, which increases the interdependency and clientelism between the central and local 
levels of government. 
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(Guibernau, 2006: pp. 61-62). The Constitution identified three routes to regional 
autonomy, where the regions with a historical claim to autonomy, i.e. Catalonia, 
Basque and Galicia, would take the faster route and have a higher level of autonomy; 
the regions with exceptional cases, like Andalusia, Valencia, Navarre, Canaries, 
would follow these regions in obtaining autonomy and the remaining ten regions 
would have lower levels of regional autonomy for the first five years and then would 
be reviewed and given more autonomy (Williams, 1994: pp. 90-91). This 
arrangement aimed to create a compromise between the centralist and federalist 
tendencies in Spain, however, the result was a lot of confusion and difficulties of 
application, which required the intervention of political actors to the organization of 
centre-local relations in the country. 
 The socio-economic problems of the 1970s led to the creation of regions in 
Italy in 1972, which was stated in the 1948 Constitution and these regions were given 
the autonomy to administer the income they receive from the State together with 
certain administrative powers within the scope of the Constitution (Bull, 1994: 72). 
On the other hand, in Belgium, the devolution trends from the previous period went 
on with a nationalist motive and the regions, which were legally acknowledged in 
1960s gained the autonomy to administer their cultural and linguistic affairs in 1970 
and in the 1980s, they gained more responsibilities in the affairs of health care, 
education, public works and transportation (Wagstaff, 1994b: 47). Thus, the already 
existing trend towards devolution gained momentum in Belgium in the late 1970s 
and 1980s.  
 In the Scandinavian countries, the already existing centre-local partnership 
tradition in the delivery of public services, made the change of a more gradual and 
consensual nature. In the 1970s and 1980s, the emerging form of state was a 
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“decentralized local welfare state” (Tonboe, 1991: 24) and local government 
discretion increased along with responsibilities and autonomy. The increase in local 
taxing powers, local control over finances and free commune experiments (Ansell 
and Gingrich, 2003: 149) demonstrate a smooth transformation of the centralized 
welfare state into a more decentralized form. The federal states, like Germany, also 
reveal a case of smooth transformation, where it was relatively easier to redefine the 
responsibilities of the Länder and the federal government and to assign more powers 
to the local level because of the existing tradition of dual polity. 
 The case of United Kingdom illustrates a whole different situation in 
comparison to the continental Europe as the redefinition of the centre-local relations 
in the country in the 1980s reveals a paradox, where the revival of the market forces 
and the socio-economic problems led to more central government control at the 
expense of local government (Davies, 1993: 83). While a high level of devolution 
and a general administrative, financial and political empowerment of the local level 
could be observed in the continental Europe, in the UK, “the local government lost 
its powers and revenues, central limits and guidelines were set for the local services, 
expenditure controls and local spending targets were established and local 
governments lost some of their duties to nongovernmental organizations through 
privatization” (Bennett, 1990: 9). In the post-1980 period, with the Thatcher 
government, too much state intervention was highly criticized and “to trim down the 
state by reducing and restricting it to its core functions” (Wollmann, 2006: 1430) was 
the basic aim. However, this was not done through devolution, the metropolitan 
county councils were abolished and the local political institutions were bypassed 
through privatization and contracting out of services (Pickvance, 1991: pp. 68-72).  
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 The post-1970 period witnessed the retreat of the central state in the Western 
Europe in general. However, this retreat, which was a response to the similar 
challenges, took place in different phases and was initiated by different dynamics and 
actors in each country. The terms and conditions of the retreat of the central state 
varied in each setting. For instance, in France, where the strong state tradition 
prevailed, the central state moved with a pure economic motive in sharing the 
responsibilities with the local level and determined the terms of the division of 
responsibilities. The Italian state had the similar economic motive and the terms of 
the retreat were determined by the centre as well. Faced with the same situation of 
economic crisis, Spain transformed itself into a decentralized state more easily 
because of the internal dynamics of the country, which demanded more regional 
autonomy. Belgium followed a similar pattern as the internal dynamics of the 
country had already initiated the retreat of the central state from the political and 
economic matters. 
 The UK presents another striking example of how the internal dynamics of 
each state affected the responses to the crisis environment of the 1970s. The UK has 
opted for privatization of the delivery of services instead of delegating them to the 
local levels of administration and as a result, while the central state shared the burden 
of service delivery, it retained its political power vis-à-vis the local level. In contrast 
with the UK, in Germany and the Scandinavian countries, where the strong 
federalism tradition prevailed, one can observe a re-definition of centre-local 
relations in a more consensual manner, and a more gradual retreat of the central state 
from the delivery of services, which was accompanied by the increase in the political 
powers of the sub-national levels of government. 
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 As the different country experiences in the Western Europe between 1930 and 
1990 reveal, the historical and political context of each country has affected how the 
emerging needs of the time were responded and how easily a required transformation 
occurred. In this transformation process, another factor that needs to be considered is 
the role of the major political actors, who have an influence over the re-definition of 
the terms of the centre-local relations. 
 
 
3.3 The Actor Preferences in Designing Centre-Local Relations 
 One striking example of the impact of the political actors in the 
reconstruction of centre-local relations is the process of devolution, which took place 
in France in the 1980s. The centre-local relations in France is characterized as “a 
complex system of relationships between the prefect and his administration and the 
local politicians (the notables)” (Loughlin and Seiler, 2004: 189). In this system, the 
local notables ensure the loyalty of the local population to the state in exchange for 
receiving resources from the centre. The relationships are of a highly informal 
nature, where networks are important for the distribution of rewards, advantages and 
privileges (Dupvy, 1985: pp. 96-102; Hunt and Chandler, 1993: 67). Moreover, the 
members of the national parliament, who can hold local offices as mayors or as the 
members of department assemblies (Gremion, 2002: 67) further increase the 
“interdependent relationships” (Cole, 2006: 35) between the major political actors at 
central and local levels.  
 Given this interdependent and informal nature of the centre-local relations, 
one can expect reluctance towards major devolution moves, which would end the 
status quo among the major political actors. As Peter Wagstaff (1994a: 27) observes, 
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at the end of 1970s and in the early 1980s, “those with their hands on the levers of 
central power remained largely antipathetic to the themes of regionalism and 
devolution as they represented a threat to that power”. When the socio-economic 
conditions of the 1970s and 1980s urged some kind of restructuring in the centre-
local relations, the central elite chose to determine the new institutional design in 
order to retain their powerful position in the new structure and the devolution 
measures were dependent on the decisions taken at the centre. In the end, the 
devolution reforms reallocated the responsibilities between the central and local 
levels but did not create a profound structural change. “The regional level was given 
new autonomous powers, but at the same time new contractual relationships between 
the central and local government were created” (Newman and Thornley, 1996: 158). 
The devolution process initiated by the central political elite in the 1980s did not 
create an impact over the existing power relations as the state was still “the primary 
responsible for the management of the territory and was able to make its own 
objectives prevail over the local administration” (Marcou, 1990: 266).  
 The United Kingdom is another example, where the perceptions of the central 
political elite have had a profound impact over the nature of centre-local relations. 
The mistrust towards the local government and local politicians and their integrity 
made the British political elite opt for political centralization. “Regional government 
and elected regional assemblies were depicted as introducing extra and unnecessary 
layers of bureaucracy” (Philip, 1994: 113). The municipalities and the metropolitan 
counties were seen as “inefficient bureaucratic structures functioning according to 
clientalist and paternalistic logics” (Jouve, 2005: 287). Because of these negative 
perceptions of the Conservative government regarding the local government 
structures, the process of shrinking the central state in the 1980s did not lead to the 
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empowerment of the local structures in the UK, as it was in the continental Europe. 
Instead, the locally elected officials were bypassed and in 1986, “Quasi-autonomous 
Non-governmental Organizations-the Quangos18” (ibid), which were financially 
dependent on the central government, were created for local services. 
 In Spain, while the sub-national actors initiated the process of devolution with 
their demands in the mid-1970s, it was the Constitutional Court that played a crucial 
role in terms of consolidating the process. Between 1975 and 1978, the sub-national 
actors and the central state negotiated the statutes of the autonomy, which were 
accommodated in the 1978 Constitution. However, the ambiguities of the terms of 
the transformation led to confusion and conflict in the country (Diaz-Lopez, 1985: 
pp. 265-266). After the coup attempt in 1981, there was extensive political pressure 
in the country for slowing down the devolution process, all regions were urged to 
take the slowest route to autonomy and the powers given to Catalonia and Basque 
regions were reduced. However, in 1893, the Constitutional Court came into the 
picture, ruled out the slowing down of the devolution process and the autonomy 
granting process resumed in accordance with the Constitution (Williams, 1994: pp. 
91-92). By 1989, all regions had full autonomy with varying powers and the process 
of devolution was guided and consolidated by the Constitutional Court. 
 “The Belgian experience illustrates dramatic devolution in response to 
discontent from below” (Ansell and Gingrich, 2003: 148). In other words, in 
Belgium, the Flemish population was the pioneer of devolution. “Their numerical 
superiority and increasing dominance in economic terms gradually undermined the 
hegemony of the francophone minority” (Wagstaff, 1994b: 43) and created a 
                                                 
18 These were created instead of locally elected councils, they consisted of business leaders as well as 
bureaucrats and had the purpose of service delivery based on financial assistance from the central 
government. 
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sustained pressure over the unitary state for devolution and official recognition of 
two linguistic communities. 
 The UK, France, Spain and to a certain extent Belgium are the most striking 
examples of the impact of the preferences and struggles of the major political actors 
over the nature of centre-local relations Europe. In the Scandinavian countries, which 
had corporatist tendencies and deeply-rooted local-self government traditions, the 
establishment of consensus among the political parties was an important requisite for 
the restructuring of centre-local relations (Kjellberg, 1988: 56). In Western Germany, 
the preferences of the Allied Powers for a decentralized structure were an important 
factor in the establishment of eleven Länder in the country in the post-war period 
(Stammen, 1994: 51; Keating, 1998: 40), in addition to the already existing federal 
tradition. In the case of Italy, the clientelist relations between the national politicians, 
political parties and the regional bodies were an important factor in determining the 
prospects for local autonomy, increase of local resources and powers (Dente, 1985: 
146; Bull, 1994: 73; Cassese, 1988: 300) in addition to the secessionist demands of 
the Lega Nord, which advocates a federal state of three republics in the north, south 
and centre based on the claim that the Northern and Southern Italy are two distinct 
and non-converging societies to be left alone (Bull, 1994: pp. 75-76). 
  
 The period from 1930s to 1990s was a time in which the Western European 
countries have dealt with common problems like the post-war reconstruction, urban 
and social problems, the fiscal crisis and recession of the 1970s. These problems and 
the strategies chosen to deal with them affected the nature of centre-local relations. 
The boundaries and responsibilities of the different levels of government were 
redefined at different periods as a result of the requirements of the socio-economic 
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context and the internal political dynamics. While this was the case in the Western 
Europe, the socialist states of the CEE were closed to these challenges of advanced 
capitalism. However, in the 1990s, the changing international context and the 
political and economic developments at the global scale began to affect Europe as a 
whole and the international wave of democratization and the globalization process 
came into the picture as the new variables in the evolution of centre-local relations. 
 
 
3.4 The Changing International Environment in the 1990s and Centre-Local 
Relations 
 The most significant international developments of the 1990s with respect to 
centre-local relations were the further integration of world economies and cultures 
through globalization, the rise of identity politics and “the re-valorization of local 
and minority cultures” (Keating, 1998b: 74) in relation to that and the global wave of 
democratization, which followed the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. This 
time, the CEE countries joined Western Europe in the trend towards devolution as 
the process of democratization became increasingly associated with the new concept 
of governance, which implied “devolution and devolution of power, revalidation of 
local authorities and rebuilding of local democracy” (Loughlin, 2000: pp. 14-15). 
The world-wide rise of local cultures and communities and the concept of self-
government together with the globalization process had a significant impact over the 
re-construction of centre-local relations in the European countries19. 
 
 
                                                 
19 This trend resulting from economic restructuring, state reform, globalization and European 
integration in the 1980s and 1990s is called “new regionalism” in the literature, denoting the rise of 
local vis-à-vis the centre in terms of culture, politics and economics.  
 68
3.4.1 The European Charter of Local Self-Government   
The European Charter of Local Self-Government20, which was adopted by the 
Council of Europe on 15 October 1985, is an expression of the common 
understanding about the centre-local relations and the concept of local self-
government which has formed in Europe over time. The Charter defines the legal 
foundations (Article 2), the concept (Article 3), the scope (Article 4), the 
administrative structures and supervision (Articles 6 and 8), the financial resources 
(Article 9) and the rights and legal protection (Articles 10 and 11) of the local 
government and provides a guideline for the signatory countries in designing their 
governance structures. As Marcou (1993: 52) argues, a major development of the 
1990s has been “the wide acceptance across Europe of the common values 
formulated in the Charter of Local Self-Government”. 
 In terms of contributing to the re-definition of centre-local relations in 
Europe, the Charter is significant for stressing the principle of local self-government, 
introducing the principle of subsidiarity and giving importance to the constitutional 
protection of financial and political powers and responsibilities of the local 
governments and administrations vis-à-vis the central level. 
As a reflection of these principles, in Western Europe, one can observe an 
increase in the powers, responsibilities and democratic qualities of the local 
administrative bodies. For instance, in Germany, “the 1990s have seen a steady 
expansion of the elements of direct democracy in the Länder and local authorities” 
(Bullmann, 2004: 109). In France, with 1992 and 1995 laws, consultative committees 
were created, which brought the elected representatives and the representatives of 
local associations together for discussing the local matters and local referenda were 
                                                 
20 See Appendix A for the full text of the Charter. 
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allowed on any question concerning the commune, although they were not binding 
(Loughlin and Seiler, 2004: 202). Belgium reached an important step in the process 
of devolution when it became a federal state of three regions (Flemish, Walloon and 
Brussels) with the 1993 Constitutional amendment (Hendriks, 2004: 295). In 1993, 
Italy chose its mayors and the presidents of provincial councils with direct elections 
for the first time (Loughlin, 2004: 227), which created a new generation of local 
politicians, who were more independent from the political patronage of the centre. 
While the European Charter of Local Self-Government reflected a common 
trend of devolution in the Western Europe, it was a source of inspiration and 
legitimacy basis for the CEE countries. “The collapse of totalitarianism in eastern 
Europe in the autumn of 1989 brought a demand for popular representation and local 
community control” (Wannop, 1997: 142) and the principles outlined in the Charter 
served as a basis for institutional reform and as “an expression of political will to 
adopt Western norms” (Marcou, 1993: 52).  
“The transformation of the territorial structure of government-its devolution, 
particularly the introduction of territorial self-government-was considered as an 
essential task in the process of rebuilding political and administrative systems in 
Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Indeed, the reforms of territorial government 
followed closely after the collapse of the Communist regimes and after the 
transformation of the constitutional bodies and central governments in 1990” 
(Baldersheim and Illner, 1998: 7). The reforms of devolution were a part of the 
process of catching up with the Western standards of governance and the Charter 
provided a basic guideline and starting point in this process21.  
                                                 
21 In this period, the Council of Europe paid special attention to the CEE, as the Council decision on 
18 March 1993 welcomes the attempts in the CEE to establish local self-governing bodies and calls 
for further democratization and clarification of powers between different levels of government 
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3.4.2 Globalization and the Empowerment of the “Local” 
 The concept of globalization has been discussed extensively from various 
perspectives in international relations, sociology, political science and economics. 
The diverging views about the meaning of the concept and the interaction between 
the globalization and the political actors, mainly the national state, demonstrate the 
fact that the term ‘globalization’ is an umbrella for several economic, financial, 
cultural, political and social processes around the world, which entail both 
symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships between various political actors.  
 With respect to the impact of globalization over centre-local relations in 
Europe, one can define the process itself as the outcome of “the successful 
transformation of capitalism itself following the crisis in the 1970s of the Keynesian 
welfare state model of economic management and the subsequent development of 
neo-liberal models of free trade, the end of protectionism, and the rapid spread of 
new technologies, communication, and productive systems around the world” 
(Loughlin, 2004: 23). With increased cross-border mobility of capital, loss of 
government control over the market activities and the rising territorial inequalities 
because of different investment and production activities (Verdier and Breen, 2001: 
pp. 229-230), the central governments are faced with new challenges like the threat 
of secession and resource redistribution problems and they need to find new political 
strategies to deal with the sub-national actors and their demands. 
All of these intertwined processes have led to the rise of the political and 
economic importance of the local level in the world. “The conventional way of 
looking at the nation-state as genuine compound, integrating feeling of belonging 
                                                                                                                                          
(Resolution 250 (1993) on Development of Local and Regional Self-Government in Central and 
Eastern European Countries).  
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(identity) and compulsory authority in a given territorial space that is deemed 
sovereign, no longer seems natural or inevitable” (Reis, 2004: 252). The central 
government is looking for new ways of dealing with the local forces within its 
territory, which have gained strength during the course of globalization. Thus, 
especially during the 1990s, the forces of globalization have had a considerable 
impact over the re-definition of the boundaries of the state, levels of governance and 
the balance of power between the central and local political actors in Europe. 
However, in the European context, there was one additional factor, which affected 
the nature of centre-local relations and which for some, had similar effects to those of 
globalization: the process of European integration. 
 
3.5 The EC/EU Factor and Centre-Local Relations 
 The EC/EU has affected the central-local relations in the Member States 
through the establishment of its regional policy and the deepening of the European 
integration process.  These two processes led to the demands for participation at the 
EU-level decision making by the sub-national authorities, which created an 
environment for multi-level governance in time and which changed the balance of 
power between central and sub-national governments in the Member States.  
 The six founding members22 of the European Community (EC) were rather a 
homogeneous group with respect to their economic situation with the exception of 
Southern Italy. However, the redistribution logic is evident at early beginnings of the 
Community as in its preamble, the Treaty of Rome refers to the need of “reducing 
the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less 
favored regions.”23. This principle was the result of the bargains with Italy for the 
                                                 
22 The original six were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg.  
23 Treaty of Rome (1957), Preamble. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/treaties_founding.htm  
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acceptance of the Treaty of Rome and it led to the establishment of the European 
Investment Bank and the European Social Fund in 1958 (Springer, 1994: 110; 
Artobolevskiy, 1997: 88; Martin, 1999: 7).  
 The real problem of regional disparities within the Community occurred after 
the 1973 enlargement, when Denmark, United Kingdom and Ireland joined the 
Community. Denmark did not pose an important problem, however, the backward 
regions of Britain and Ireland made “the division of the Community between richer 
and poorer areas, corresponding largely to a geographical distinction between centre 
and periphery, evident” (Coombes, 1991: 135). In order to cope with these regional 
disparities, in 1975, the European Regional Development Fund was established along 
with the other structural funds for Agriculture, Social Policy and Fisheries24. These 
funds comprised limited resources for the regional development programmes in the 
areas designated by the Member states and functioned on quota basis (Michie and 
Fitzgerald, 1997: 17).  
 In the second half of the 1980s, the regional inequalities became even more 
critical with the completion of the single market with the Single European Act in 
1986 and the Southern enlargement of the Community, which included Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. This second wave of enlargement increased the income 
disparities among the member states and together with the anticipated impacts of the 
single European market over poorer regions, required a reform in the Community’s 
                                                 
24 The Structural Funds are namely, The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which 
finances infrastructure, job-creating investments, local development projects and aid for small firms; 
the European Social Fund (ESF), which aids the unemployed and disadvantaged groups in the work 
force; the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), which finances rural 
development measures and aid for farmers; the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), 
which helps to modernize the fishing industry and the Cohesion Fund, which provides direct finance 
for regional projects to improve environment and develop transport networks (European Commission-
Regional Policy) http://europa.eu/pol/reg/index_en.htm  
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regional policy. With the 1988 reforms, the resources for structural funds were 
doubled and their principles and objectives became more concrete25. 
 The 1995 enlargement26 was not very problematic in terms of the regional 
redistributive mechanisms of the Community, however, the steps towards the 
political union and the common currency in the 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty, 
made the regional policy remain as a critical item on the European political agenda. 
Economic and social cohesion became one of the pillars of the Treaty, the objectives 
of the structural funds were re-organized27 and the financial resources were 
increased. The Eastern enlargement posed a similar challenge for the Union and with 
the prospects for more regional disparities, the structural funds were reformed again 
in 2000 with a new financial perspective28. 
 The mechanism of regional policy is based on the idea that “the richer regions 
subsidize the poorer ones in exchange for the advantages of integration and the 
Commission regulates the national assistance procedures, where the member states 
are allowed to subsidize a limited amount of the project costs” (Artobolevskiy, 1997: 
pp. 96-97). The starting position of the regional policy is the recognition of the fact 
that not all member states have the same advantages and chances in the process of 
integration. For this reason, the policy aims to “overcome adverse effects of market 
integration and disadvantaged regions” (Hooghe and Keating, 1994: 367) through 
                                                 
25 These objectives are basically the areas in which the structural funds are to be concentrated. 
Objective 1 regions are the ones lagging in development, Objective 2 is the regions suffering from 
industrial decline. Objective 3 are the regions with the problem of long-term structural unemployment. 
Objective 4 is directed towards the occupational integration of young people and Objective 5 aims at 
adjustment of agricultural structures and development of rural areas. 
http://europa.eu/pol/reg/index_en.htm 
26 With this wave of enlargement, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the Community. 
27 Objectives 3 and 4 were combined, facilitation of structural change was added as Objective 4 and 
adjustment of fisheries industry and development and adjustment of low population density areas were 
added as new objectives.  
28 The previous objectives were combined under three main headings as Objective 1 (development and 
structural adjustment of the regions whose development is lagging behind), Objective 2 (economic 
and social conversion of areas facing structural difficulties) and Objective 3 (development of human 
resources). 
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financial redistribution and contribution to the growth of regions with structural 
weaknesses29. This approach is based on the solidarity principle and the need for the 
equal distribution of the benefits of market integration (ibid: 370). The regional 
policy has a political rationale in addition to its economic orientation as the 
deepening of the European integration needs to be legitimized especially in the 
peripheral regions, which might lose from change and the regional imbalances, may 
form a barrier to integration.  
 The increased interest in the regional disparities and development at the EU 
level has an unavoidable impact over the centre-local relations in the member states 
as the sub-national units become a subject of Community action and face with a 
change in the nature of their competences, responsibilities and political position 
within the government machinery.  
 The conventional argument in the existing literature is that “the regional 
policy is the leading edge of multi-level governance in which supranational, national, 
regional and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy 
networks” (Ollsson, 2003: 285). The EU has provided for the sub-national actors “a 
new basis for the exercise of political power and authority” (John, 2000: 878) and 
while dealing with impacts of the Single European Market and competing for 
receiving funds, the sub-national actors began to mobilize at the EU level as well as 
the national level (Loughlin, 2004: 395; Mazey, 1995a: 79). The European 
integration increased the number of decision-makers in the policy areas and thus 
made the policy outcomes less predictable, led to institutional reforms at the local 
level, changed the traditional regional policies based on the hierarchy between the 
central and local governments and administrations, created new policy networks and 
                                                 
29 Article 158 of Treaty establishing European Community. http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301.html  
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new tasks for the sub-national level and made the governance structure more 
complex by opening it to new strategic interactions and coalitions (Wright, 1998: 44; 
John, 2000: 879) and all of these processes have increased the power of the local in 
the end. 
 According to this ‘empowerment argument’, “the EU affected the internal 
traditional balance of power and increased sub-national independence” (Zerbinatti, 
2004: 1001) as the distinct regional programmes and the structural funds made the 
central governments devolve new rights to lower levels and reorganize their 
administrative-territorial divisions (Artobolevskiy, 1997: 2) and encouraged 
horizontal cooperation in addition to the existing vertical relationships (Bachtler and 
Turok, 1997: pp. 5-6). With the partnership principle, on one hand, sub-national 
actors can now participate in the formation of the regional policy and represent their 
interests at the EU level and on the other hand, the EU legitimizes its activities, 
achieves a better implementation and can work with the regions as new allies in 
strategic planning (Onestini, 1995: 172). Thus, the regional policy works for the 
advantage of the local actors and empowers them in the national context with respect 
to the central actors, while making it easier for the EU to implement its policies. 
However, as Michael Keating (1998: 172) suggests, the regional policy also has a 
political and distributive logic in addition to its policy orientation and this political 
logic is determined through intergovernmental bargaining in the Council, which 
makes the central governments an important part of the policy itself. Thus, ‘the 
empowerment argument’, which gives the EU an important part in changing the 
balance of centre-local relationships in the member states, fails to explain the 
complex nature of the process. 
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 In reality, the European integration creates two adverse effects over the sub-
national authorities at the same time. On one hand, in line with the empowerment 
argument, it makes the local units independent players at the EU level through 
reducing the regulatory role of the state and through the idea of democratic multi-
level governance. On the other hand, the European integration also weakens the sub-
national authorities as more and more competences are transferred to the EU level 
from the states, some of which belong to the sub-national authorities. While the 
existence of structural funds and regional assistance leads to regional mobilization 
and emergence of new actors at the EU level, the European integration also creates 
opportunities for further centralization as the Community affairs are essentially seen 
as foreign policy matters, which fall under the responsibility of the central state. 
 The European integration has limited the power of the nation-state in various 
areas, however it has also eroded regional and local competence and created a 
centralizing effect. One reason for this situation is the primacy of the EU law over 
national laws and its direct applicability30. The removal of the barriers for the free 
movement of goods, capital and people with the Single European Market required 
extensive community legislation in areas which were reserved to regions, while the 
regions were not formally represented at the decision-making institutions of the 
Community (Hrbek, 1995: 56) and this situation reduced the autonomy of the local 
and regional authorities in regional policy. Regional authorities increasingly became 
subject to and responsible for the EC legislation with the deepening of integration 
while trying to cope with its socio-economic impacts. Moreover, the representation 
of their interests at the EU level depended on the domestic political system (Mazey, 
                                                 
30 This principle does not exist explicitly in the Treaty, however, in order to increase the efficiency of 
the Treaty, the European Court of Justice has created this principle with a series of decisions ruling in 
favour of the Community legislation against national legislation.  
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1995b: pp. 81-82), which made the governance structure even more centralized and 
remote from the citizens.  
 The way in which the regions are identified31 and the distribution mechanism 
of the regional and structural funds also reveals an essentially central nature, where 
“the regions are not real protagonists in the process of development” (Storper, 1995: 
212). The Council of Ministers decides on the size of the funds, the member states 
and the Commission determine their scope and the member states submit application 
programmes to the Commission. The funds go directly to the central governments, 
which transfer them to the regional authorities and implementing agencies afterwards 
(Ollsson, 2003: 285; Greenwood, 2003: pp. 244-245). Moreover, the Council has 
given the states the choice of appointing the authorities responsible for preparation 
and implementation of the development programmes (Nay, 2002: 249) and as a 
result, the influence of  sub-national authorities over the use of funds and the nature 
of the projects is exercised under the gate-keeping of the central government.  
 The Commission engages in the regional policy as a part of bureaucratic and 
elite apparatus and the central governments are the decision-makers in the usage of 
funds as the sole contributors (Martin, 1999: 75) and this control mechanism 
highlights the centralized nature of the process, where the local problems are tried to 
be solved by the central authority. For this reason, it would be too simple to 
generalize the impact of the EU over the centre-local relations as a means of further 
participation for the local level. Although the EU made the sub-national interests 
more visible at the international arena, in reality “sub-national interests have been 
drawn into the European arena in diverse ways, and the degree and form of 
                                                 
31 The entire EC area is divided into units according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units System 
(NUTS). NUTS 1 regions are the largest units, NUTS 2 refers to medium-sized units and NUTS 3 is 
used for smaller units. These units are identified according to economic criteria, while the sociological 
factors and differences among administrative units in Member States are ignored.  
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participation have tended to follow distinctly national patterns. Their influence 
similarly is still largely determined by their linkages into national government” 
(Keating, 1998: 176).  
 As John (2000: 882) argues, “while sub-national governments are not 
impotent when faced with central government decisions, relations on European 
policy matters tend to reflect the pre-existing balance of power in central-local policy 
networks”. Depending on the balance of power, there can be a hierarchical 
intergovernmental relationship, which is often the case in unitary states, a 
consultative relationship, where there exists a certain level of devolution or 
regionalization or a participatory relationship as in the case of federal states 
regarding the European policy matters. If the sub-national levels already have 
important powers and responsibilities, they see the European integration as a threat to 
their sovereignty, they have more to lose and thus they adopt a rejectionist approach 
towards European integration.32 On the other hand, the sub-national authorities of the 
unitary states adopt a more positive approach to European integration as they see it 
as an opportunity for economic gains and as a framework for contesting their 
political interests33. While the federal states establish formal ways of participation in 
the EU policies for the sub-national governments, there exist fewer formal 
procedures in the unitary states and informal representation at the EU level through 
lobbying or networks is more common (Mazey, 1995b: 91).  
 France demonstrates an example for the unitary states, where the European 
integration is seen as a matter of foreign policy and thus as a job for the central 
government. As a result of this approach, until very recently, the central government 
was the sole responsible in the selection, negotiation and distribution of European 
                                                 
32 The Scandinavian countries are examples of this sort of reaction. 
33 The Basque region of Spain and Lega Nord in Italy are some examples.  
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funds (Marcou, 1990: 275) and all interactions between the EU and the sub-national 
authorities were carried out by a bureaucratic unit within the office of Prime Ministry 
(Cole, 2006: 43). With the devolution reforms in 1982, the regional authorities were 
allowed to open offices in Brussels for information gathering purposes and to join 
cross-border associations (Loughlin and Seiler, 2004: pp. 205-206). In 2004, they 
were allowed to have complete control over the management of structural funds only 
on experimental basis (Cole, 2006: 44). However, despite the devolution reforms, the 
institutional weakness of the local bodies and the traditional existence of the central 
state at the local level, enabled the state to re-deploy its power vis-à-vis the local 
actors. In the domain of regional policy, the state remains legitimate and powerful as 
an arbitrator and coordinator and thus has reproduced its power at the local level 
(Nay, 2002: pp. 246-258).  
 Italy is another regionalized unitary state, where the central government has 
had an important impact over the relations between the sub-national authorities and 
the EU-level institutions and the European integration has been utilized by sub-
national actors in their political claims. Until 1990, the narrow definition of the scope 
of international politics by the Constitutional Court reserved the EU affairs for the 
domain of central government and there existed little direct contact between the sub-
national authorities and Brussels. In the 1990s, the desire of the country to join the 
common currency with the first group of countries led to certain administrative and 
economic reforms. These reforms, together with the re-definition of the scope of 
international politics, increased the activities of the sub-national authorities at the EU 
level (Loughlin, 2004: pp. 224-225). For the sub-national actors with secessionist 
desires, the European project was seen as an opportunity to unite with their counter-
parts in other member states (Bull, 1994: pp. 81-82) and this situation made the 
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central state keep its control over the European-level activities of the sub-national 
authorities34.  
 In Spain, the idea of ‘Europe of Regions’ was also highly supported by the 
autonomous regions (Williams, 1994: 95) and along with the powers they acquired in 
the national politics, the regions also gained important rights at the EU-level for 
representing their interests such as the obligation of the government to consult with 
the Autonomous Communities before making decisions in the areas related to them 
and the right to be represented at the Council in related issues along with their offices 
in Brussels (Aja, 2001: 249).  
 In case of the Scandinavian countries and the UK, one may argue that the 
internal dynamics went on to determine the course of centre-local relations and they 
were rather cautious about the European integration process (Lidström, 2004: 353; 
Giordano and Roller, 2003: pp. 911-912).  
 Germany, arguably, is the country, where the European integration had the 
greatest impact over the intergovernmental relations and the sub-national authorities 
adopted a more reactionist strategy during the integration process. The basic reason 
for this situation was the fact that the German Länder had extensive competences and 
“saw the EC as a centralized organization, which threatened their autonomy” (Benz, 
1998: 112). In order to protect their autonomy and powers, the Länder demanded 
national and EU-level participation rights with respect to Community decisions, 
which fall within their competence. At the national level, they obtained rather 
significant rights with respect to centre-local relations as it became necessary to get 
the approval of Bundesrat for any transfer of sovereignty to the EU, which enables 
                                                 
34 For instance, the Italian government resisted the establishment of cross-border cooperation between 
Austria and Italy in the Tirol region with the fear that it would develop separatist tendencies among 
the German-speaking elite in the Italian Tirol region. See Perkmann, Markus (2003) “Cross-Border 
Regionalism in Europe: Significance and Drivers of Regional Cross-Border Co-operation” European 
Urban and Regional Studies Vol. 10 No.2: pp. 153-171, for details.  
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the Länder to obstruct the European policy making. Moreover, when the issue at the 
EU agenda is about Länder competence, the Länder governments attend the Council 
of Ministers meeting and can protect their own interests at the EU-level (Bullmann, 
2004: 106; Hrbek, 1999: pp. 220-221).  
 As these different country experiences reveal, “the real transformation in the 
relative roles of the sub-national authorities and the central state in EU policy-
making has taken place in the intra-state arena and the European policy for the sub-
national authorities has become domesticated rather more than they have become 
internationalized” (Jeffery, 2000: 4). Especially in the federal states, where the sub-
national authorities had more to lose with the transfer of competences to the 
European level and the representation of their interests by the central state, there 
were attempts to take the European policy into the domain of domestic politics 
instead of understanding European integration as a foreign policy matter. In these 
states, the sub-national level sought to find certain ways of representing their 
interests both at the national and European levels and these attempts were pioneered 
by Germany, which was the leading figure in putting the regional demands to the 
Maastricht Treaty and these attempts were supported by Belgium, Austria and Spain 
(Bullmann, 2004: 106).  
 The main demands of the federal states were the introduction of the 
subsidiarity principle, the right to participate in the Council, the establishment of the 
Committee of Regions and the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
for Community decisions (Hrbek, 1995: 57). However, the sub-national authorities 
could not fully achieve their aims as while they gained the right to participate in the 
Council35, they were not given the right to appeal to the ECJ and although the 
                                                 
35 Article 146 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301.html  
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subsidiarity principle was introduced36, it was worded rather problematically and in a 
way that did not explicitly recognize the sub-national authorities37 and the 
Committee of Regions38, which was established with the Article 198 of the Treaty 
was only an advisory organ (Hrbek, 1999: pp. 224-225).  
 When the Union decided to draft a European Constitution, the federal states 
led by Germany once again tried to increase their participation at the EU policies and 
demanded formal recognition of the sub-national level at the Constitution, 
introduction of the consultation procedure and clarification of the subsidiarity 
principle, a formal EU institution status for the Committee of Regions and the right 
to appeal to ECJ for the Committee of Regions and the regions (Hrbek, 2003: 68). 
However, as the absence of a working group on the regional and local dimension of 
European integration illustrates, the empowerment of the local level in the European 
policy making was not a priority and these demands were not considered during the 
drafting phase of the Constitution (ibid: 72).  
 The status of the sub-national authorities within the EU shows that the power 
relations at the national level affect the functioning of the multi-level governance 
structure and the Europeanization has weakening effects over the sub-national bodies 
as well as decentralizing effects. The main reason of this seemingly paradoxical 
                                                 
36 Article 3b “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Community shall take action, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action can not be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the 
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.” 
http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title2.html  
37 The principle applies only to the relations between the supra-national and national levels, leaving 
the sub-national level out. It contradicts with the coherence principle in terms of regional policy and 
multi-level governance. Moreover, the ambiguity of the wording enables each state to interpret it 
differently. The principle can serve to defend national sovereignty against the Community action, to 
justify additional competences for the EU or to defend the empowerment of the sub-national level.  
38 It is an advisory organ composed of the representatives of regional and local bodies. The different 
status, competences and authorities of these representatives pose a serious challenge in terms of 
putting coherent policies forward. See www.cor.europa.eu/en/index.htm for the details of the activities 
of the Committee of Regions.  
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situation is the heterogeneity of the European sub-national governments in terms of 
their degree of autonomy, power and competences (Springer, 1994: 111; Smouts, 
1998: 31). This situation creates difficulties in policy co-ordination (Benz, 1998: 
118) as “diversity of realities are re-grouped under the term region and the rivalry 
between different levels of government” (Le Gales, 1998: 248). Together with this, 
the economic competition within the Community creates a tension between the 
common interests of the regions at the EU level and their individual interests 
(Keating, 1998b: pp. 165-166).  
 The initial political systems and national political circumstances turns the 
Committee of Regions into a marginal institution with weak powers, limited 
cohesion and no common purpose and this situation hinders the empowerment of the 
local level within the multi-level governance structure of the EU. Moreover, the 
distribution mechanism of the structural funds, which makes the sub-national units 
dependent on the central state, the presence of the representatives of the central 
government together with the regional representatives at the Council meetings and 
the ineffective and un-coordinated lobbying activities of the sub-national units 
(Jeffery, 2000: pp- 4-5; Greenwood, 2003: pp. 230-231) work to the advantage of the 
centre in the re-structuring of the centre-local relations during the course of European 
integration. 
 
3.6 Europeanization and Centre-Local Relations: A Critical Overview 
 The Europeanization process leads to domestic structural change, if there 
exists a misfit between the EU norms and the national practices in a way that creates 
adaptational pressures. In this process, the mediating institutions and the preferences 
of the main political actors, which are shaped by the existing institutional culture and 
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tradition, determine the outcome of the structural change (Cowles, Caporaso, Risse, 
2001: 6; Börzel, 2001: 143; Börzel, 1999: pp. 574-575).  
 In the case of centre-local relations, the Europeanization process affected the 
member states through the deepening of integration and the transfer of competences 
to the EU-level. The principles of the regional policy and structural funds applied 
equally to all countries, however, they all responded differently to similar pressures. 
In the federal states, as it was previously argued, the transfer of competences had a 
greater impact over the existing centre-local relations and created a bigger misfit, 
thus higher adaptational pressures, which led to institutional change (Börzel, 1999: 
580). On the other hand, in the unitary decentralized states, the sub-national 
authorities had less to lose with the European integration and they faced with less 
adaptational pressure, which led to administrative reforms instead of major 
institutional change (ibid: 593). 
 As the country experiences discussed in previous sections reveal, the 
administrative traditions and the preferences of the political actors have shaped the 
way in which the EU countries responded to the economic and political changes, 
which were created by the European integration. Thus the path-dependency of the 
institutions and the accumulating institutional culture determine the way in which 
each state adopts to the European norms. However, this situation does not deny the 
fact that the Europeanization has been a major factor in the re-structuring of centre-
local relations with its re-distributive impacts. In order to better comprehend these 
impacts, one needs to try to differentiate it from the process of globalization as well. 
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 As Paul Chesire (1995) has argued, “economic integration is not a process 
which is confined to Europe. Integration in Europe has been occurring against a 
background of increasing integration in the world economy as a whole” (pp. 31-32). 
In other words, the Europeanization process was initiated and facilitated by the 
process of globalization. However, the EC has strengthened this process with the 
Single European Act, the single currency and by increasing its political legitimacy 
through reduction of regional disparities. According to the ‘hollowing out of the 
nation-state’ argument, “global economic integration restricts the ability of the 
national government to intervene effectively in and guide the development of internal 
economies. As a result, they transfer their power both upwards to supranational 
institutions and downwards by conceding power to regional governments” (Amin 
and Tamaney, 1995: 172). When looked from this perspective, Europeanization and 
globalization seem to be two different names for the same process as “they both 
demonstrate the inability of the nation-state to attain desired outcomes through 
independent action and provide external pressures over the nation-states for 
integration” (Longo, 2003: 486).  
 Given this similar impact, one can easily argue that it is not possible to decide 
whether it was the European integration or the impacts of globalization that created 
institutional change in terms of centre-local relations. One way to overcome this 
problem is taking globalization as a variable, which changes the powers and 
preferences of the actors at the Member State level, which in turn change the 
preferences of the states at the EU-level policy making (Hennis, 2001: pp. 834-835). 
In other words, a careful sequencing of the global developments, changes at the 
domestic level and the European integration becomes critical for differentiating 
between globalization and Europeanization. 
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 Another and perhaps more useful way of differentiating these two processes 
is acknowledging inevitability aspect of globalization as opposed the political 
voluntarism dimension of the Europeanization process. While globalization has 
decentralizing and deregulatory effects, in the case of Europeanization, a political 
component is added to the picture, where the member states agree upon centralized 
decision-making procedures, policy coordination and enforceable policies depending 
on the consent of the interested parties (Verdier and Breen, 2001: pp. 231-232). 
Since the regional policy is a result of a political agreement between the member 
States and entails a transfer of powers between different levels of government, it 
clearly has a political component and Europeanization is more influential over the 
centre-local relations than the process of globalization. 
  
 The institutionalist framework seems to work in explaining the impact of 
Europeanization over the central-local relations in the ‘old’ members of the 
Community (the EU15), where the principles of subsidiarity and coherence create 
adverse effects of devolution and centralization at the same time and the strength of 
these effects depend on the existing institutional design and power relations in each 
member state. In other words, although there exists an agreement regarding the 
concept of good governance and need for sub-national democracy39, the Community 
policies also erode the powers of sub-national authorities through transfer of 
competences and this inherent tension makes the centre-local relations a rather fluid 
relationship, which prevents the convergence of models of intergovernmental 
relations. However, it is also possible that Europeanization has different impacts over 
                                                 
39 The White Paper on European Governance (25 July 2001)  calls for more openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence within the context of Community action along with a 
stronger interaction with regional and local governments. 
http://eur.lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf  
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the old members and the new comers into the Community and in order to fully 
understand the Europeanization-devolution relationship, a brief analysis of the latest 
Eastern enlargement of the Community is also necessary. 
 
 After the fall of communism, while restructuring their state structure, the CEE 
countries carried the common institutional heritage of the communist legacy, which 
was basically an undemocratic, highly bureaucratized and centralized system with no 
territorial self-government understanding (Illner, 1998: 11). Therefore, the 
institutional culture, which affected the impact of Europeanization over centre-local 
relations, was also a common one. The concept of local government reform was 
weak, the establishment of sub-national authorities often ended with deconcentration 
because of the existing centralizing tendency, political participation was limited and 
the system was not flexible enough to adopt to the rapid political and economic 
changes (Regulska, 1993: pp. 187-189).  
 Given this institutionalized centralization, one may expect that the European 
integration, which created little convergence in governance patterns in Western 
Europe, can not pass through the domestic structure and create institutional change. 
However, the EU has been more effective in the transformation of intergovernmental 
relations in the CEE countries than it has been over the incumbent members and the 
misfit model can explain this situation. 
 For the CEE countries, the Europeanization process has been much more 
intensive. They engaged within the process through formal accession based on 
conditionality, where they had to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria40 and had a 
                                                 
40To join the EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria: 
? political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities;  
 88
very limited maneuvering area for negotiation. Because of the above-discussed 
communist legacy, there was a great deal of misfit between the EU requirements and 
the existing domestic structures and this created a higher level of adaptational 
pressure over the CEE countries. The EU had a strong bargaining position in the 
accession process and was able to shape the procedures and norms unilaterally. At 
the national level, the institutional vacuum after Communism created the need to 
establish new models of intergovernmental relations and the political elites, who 
were very eager to join the EU, were open to EU influence. This situation facilitated 
domestic structural change and increased the impact of the Europeanization process 
over the CEE countries (Brusis, 2002: 533; Grabbe, 2001: pp. 1013-1014).  
 
 The brief overview of the European experience regarding the centre-local 
relations reveals that the impact of Europeanization over the transformation of the 
balance of power between the central and local levels of government and 
administration depends on certain contextual factors. These contextual factors have 
determined the course of and outcome of change and the intensity of the EU 
influence in each country. Table 1 summarizes these factors and the outcome for 
each country or group of country dealt in this chapter. 
 As it can be inferred from the table, the state tradition of each country has an 
impact over how same challenges and environmental factors are dealt with and to 
what extent each country is open or resistant to change and transformation. The 
states with a tradition of strong central government have been more open to the 
centralization trends and more resistant to giving more power to the local 
                                                                                                                                          
? economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  
? acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.  
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administrative bodies. In these countries, the balance of power between the central 
and local levels was redefined according to the terms and conditions of the central 
political elite and the impact of the EU over this process depended on the choices and 
consent of the central political elite. In contrast, the countries with a federal tradition 
and with strong local and regional identities were more prone to devolution trend and 
the internal dynamics and demands facilitated the empowerment of the local level in 
time. In this process, Europeanization served as a legitimating device for the local 
demands and strengthened the hand of the local vis-à-vis the centre. 
 With respect to the European context, one may also argue that the actor 
preferences were more influential over the transformation in the countries, where the 
central political elite had more to lose from a possible change in the existing form of 
power relations. In these countries, the central political elite have tried to prevent, 
shape and dominate the transformation process as much as possible.  
 The analyses also show that the impact of Europeanization varies according 
to the position of each country within the EU and the level of institutionalization of 
the centre-local relations. The CEE countries have faced with more misfit and more 
adaptational pressures as the new comers and the EU had a greater impact over the 
transformation of centre-local relations in these countries. While the existing 
members responded to the adaptational pressures from the EU-level through gradual 
administrative reform and were able to filter the EU influence, the new members of 
the EU responded to these pressures through institutional change, which was easier 
because of the institutional vacuum, filled during the course of EU accession. One 
may develop a similar argument for Turkey, since Turkey is facing with more 
adaptational pressures from the EU level as an accession country. The remaining 
chapters discuss the validity of this argument and analyze the relationship between 
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the ongoing process of EU accessions and the relations between the two levels of 
administration in Turkey. 
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Table 1: The Transformation of Centre-Local Relations in some EU countries 
Political Context 
COUNTRY Historical  Context 1930-1970 1970-1990 
Actor 
Preferences 
EC/EU 
Factor Outcome 
France Napoleonic 
Tradition-
Centralized-
Unitary State 
Open to 
centralization 
trend-
easy/little 
transformation 
Retreat of the 
central state on 
its own terms-
no political 
empowerment 
of the local 
level 
High impact-
Terms of 
transformation 
determined by 
the central 
political elite 
Gradual 
influence as a 
result of 
adaptational 
pressures, 
whose terms 
are 
determined by 
the centre 
Learning at 
the local level, 
value change, 
administrative 
reform 
according to 
the terms of 
the centre 
Italy Napoleonic 
Tradition-
Centralized 
Open to 
centralization 
trend-
easy/little 
transformation
Retreat of the 
central state on 
its own terms 
High impact- 
Clientelist 
relations 
between the 
central and 
local political 
elite 
determining 
the course of 
transformation
Gradual 
influence as a 
result of 
adaptational 
pressures, 
whose terms 
are 
determined by 
the centre 
Learning at 
the local level, 
value change, 
administrative 
reform 
Spain Napoleonic 
Tradition-
Strong 
linguistic and 
cultural 
diversities 
preventing 
centralization 
Resistant to 
the 
centralization 
trend because 
of regional 
political 
demands-hard 
transformation
Retreat of the 
central state 
accompanied 
by the political 
empowerment 
of the local 
level 
High-
demands of 
the local 
political elite 
initiating the 
transformation
Empowerment 
and 
legitimation 
of the local 
demands  
Empowerment 
of the local 
vis-à-vis the 
centre, 
administrative 
reform 
Belgium Napoleonic 
Tradition-
internal 
dynamics 
and strong 
local 
identities 
preventing a 
centralized 
state 
tradition 
Local 
demands 
stronger than 
the economic 
pressures-
empowerment 
of the local 
Local demands 
continues to 
empower the 
local level 
Low 
influence-
transformation 
based on the 
internal 
dynamics 
Empowerment 
and 
legitimation 
of the local 
demands 
Empowerment 
of the local 
vis-à-vis the 
centre, 
administrative 
reform 
United 
Kingdom 
Anglo-
Saxon-Local 
delivery of 
Open to 
centralization 
trend-easy 
Retreat in the 
form of 
privatization-
High 
influence of 
the central 
Low 
influence, 
which is 
No significant 
change in the 
balance of 
 92
services with 
a strong 
central state 
transformation the political 
power of the 
centre remains 
intact 
political elite controlled by 
the central 
political elite 
power 
between the 
centre and the 
local 
Germany Germanic-
Federal State 
Resistance to 
centralization 
by the Länder-
attempts to 
reconcile the 
federal 
tradition with 
the economic 
requirements 
Gradual and 
consensual 
transformation-
centre-local 
partnership 
Consensus-
Neither 
central nor the 
local political 
elite 
dominated the 
process 
High 
influence, 
adaptational 
pressures, 
which 
empowered 
the local level 
Administrative 
reform, which 
strengthened 
the local vis-à-
vis the central 
and the EU 
levels 
Scandinavian 
Countries 
Nordic 
Tradition-
Multi-level 
state 
structure 
with a strong 
local level 
Resistance to 
centralization 
-attempts to 
reconcile the 
federal 
tradition with 
the economic 
requirements 
Gradual and 
consensual 
transformation-
centre-local 
partnership 
Consensus-
Neither 
central nor the 
local political 
elite 
dominated the 
process 
Low 
influence, 
already 
established 
centre-local 
partnership 
remains intact 
Administrative 
reform, which 
strengthened 
the local vis-à-
vis the central 
and the EU 
levels 
The CEE 
Countries 
Communist-
High level of 
centralization 
with no 
experience of 
local self-
government 
Closed 
system-
Central 
planning 
remains intact 
Closed system-
Central 
planning 
remains intact 
Central 
political elite 
remains 
strong 
Highest 
influence, new 
comers facing 
with more 
misfit, more 
adaptational 
pressures, 
open to 
influence 
because of the 
institutional 
vacuum 
Institutional 
change in 
order to deal 
with the EU-
level 
adaptational 
pressures 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EU ACCESSION AND THE CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN 
TURKEY: THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
 Following the structure of the analyses about Europe, the analysis about the 
impact of Europeanization over the centre-local relations in the Turkish context starts 
with an overview of the historical and political conditions, which have shaped these 
relations in the first place. For this purpose, the chapter first deals with the origins of 
the local administration understanding in Turkey. Then the responses to the 
challenges of the 1930-1970 and post-1970 periods in the Turkish case will be 
analyzed. Finally, in order to show the significance of the actor preferences and the 
EU factor in terms of the transformation of the balance of power between the central 
and local levels in Turkey, the chapter will offer an analyses of the internal dynamics 
and the strong state tradition in the Turkish context. 
 
4.1 Turkish State Tradition and the Centre-Local Relations 
 Seeing the centre-periphery relations and the strong state tradition as the key 
to understand the Turkish politics has been one of the most prominent theoretical 
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tendencies among the students of Turkish politics. In his elaborate accounts of the 
Turkish political life, Şerif Mardin (1971, 1973, and 1991), has pointed out the major 
characteristics of the Turkish centre and the periphery and argued that instead of 
being in constant confrontation with the centre, the Turkish periphery was under its 
domination. According to Mardin, “the Ottoman Empire consisted of two-well 
defined groups: an elite stratum of military and civil establishment and a folk stratum 
of the administered” (Mardin, 1991: 114). The secularization of the political 
institutions led to the alienation of these groups from each other and the political and 
social modernization attempts of the elite failed to establish a linkage with the rest of 
the society (Mardin, 1971: 199). The duality between the ruler and the ruled and also 
among the ruling elites was a structural problem inherited by the Republic from the 
Ottoman period along with “the strong state and a weak civil society” (Heper, 
1985:16).  
 The perception that any reform of the society to be imposed from above or 
the need for the progress to be guided by the elite (Heper, 1985: pp. 55-60), which 
was common among the founders of the Republic, has been one of the major 
historical factors that determined the course of centre-local relations in Turkey 
together with the inherent centre-periphery cleavage. The distance and mistrust 
between the centre and the periphery have had an impact over the institutional design 
in which the central and local administrative bodies have operated and over the 
prospects for the change of that design since the late Ottoman period. 
4.1.1 The Ottoman Period: Tanzimat and the Emergence of Local 
Administration in Turkey 
 The local administrative bodies have a rather recent history in the Ottoman 
Empire. The first attempts to officially establish local administration and to define 
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the duties of the central and local administrations took place in the 19th century after 
the Tanzimat decree of 1839. Until the 19th century, the local services were left to the 
local notables, foundations and religious organizations (Özgür, 2002: 140; Ortaylı, 
2000: 17). The towns, cities and other residing areas did not have distinct legal 
identities (Öztürk, 1997: 52) and in these areas, all services, administrative matters 
and legal issues were dealt with single-handedly, by kadı, who was supported by the 
local people. (Tekeli and Ortaylı, 1978: 17). Before the reforms of the 19th century, 
there were mainly three structures, which provided local services. The guilds were 
responsible for regulative functions, while the foundations provided health and 
cultural services and the neighborhood units took over the duty of providing physical 
and social security for people (Göymen, 1990: 138).  
 One may argue that until the 19th century, the life at the local level was 
organized through unofficial networks and solidarity of people, without much control 
or support from the Istanbul administration and there was no or little interaction 
between the central and local levels. However, the developments of the 19th century 
changed this situation. The economic and political opening of the Empire to the 
world, the growth of some cities as a result of  economic interactions and 
penetrations, the need for financial centralization, the external pressures for the 
political participation of the minorities and the imposition of the Western European 
institutions led to the reforms of local administration and gave it an official status 
(Keleş, 1992: 94; Tekeli and Ortaylı, 1978: 6; Göymen, 1990: 138).  
 Faced with external and internal pressures for administrative reorganization, 
the 19th century reformers opted for centralization and in order to establish a strong 
central government, they took the services carried out by local networks back under 
the umbrella of central administration through the administrative bodies founded at 
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the local level. As Ortaylı (2000) argues, the local administration is the product of 
the efforts of the central bureaucracy to establish political control over the Empire 
more efficiently, the local administration was understood in functional terms with no 
purpose of democratization. In the 19th century, the central-local relations were 
organized in the form of deconcentration, i.e. the extension of central control to the 
localities (Heper, 1989: 4). The locally elected assemblies, which were introduced in 
1860, were mainly responsible for the application of certain tasks, while the 
decision-making power remained within the domain of the centre. These assemblies 
were primarily loyal to the centre instead of the local community and they were a 
means of re-enforcing central control (Köker, 1995: 55). 
 The first municipality was established in Istanbul in 1854. Its mayor was 
appointed by the Sultan, which was an indication of the strong central control over 
local administration. Istanbul can be considered as the laboratory of the local 
administrative organization as in 1858, the first district municipality was founded in 
Beyoğlu-Galata district as the 6th Arrondisement- 6. Daire-i Belediye, with a district 
head and council, who came to office by appointment. In 1869, a two-tier structure 
was established in Istanbul with fourteen districts and a mayor. In 1877, there were 
twenty districts, which were all abolished in 1912 and replaced by nine municipal 
departments for more centralization of administration (Keleş, 1992: pp. 95-97). 
 In 1870, the municipal organization of Istanbul was extended to the whole 
Empire and mayors were appointed by the centre for each vilayet (city) (Öztürk, 
1997: 59). The 1876 Constitution introduced the councils, which were to be locally 
elected, into the local administrative system. In 1877, two separate laws were enacted 
for Istanbul municipality and other municipalities, which assigned a legal personality 
and various duties to the local administrative bodies (Tekeli and Ortaylı, 1978: 20). 
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The 1877 Municipal Law required establishment of one council in each city and 
town and tried to distinguish the duties of the central administration and the 
municipalities by assigning the duties of administration of the city property, counting 
of the population, cleaning, fire fighting and opening of the schools to the 
municipalities. The mayor was to be chosen from the council by the centre and the 
members of the council were required to speak Turkish (Ortaylı, 2000: pp. 186-189).  
 The Municipal Law of 1877 provided the legal foundation for the local 
administrative structure in Turkey in terms of establishing a central tutelage over the 
local authorities and perceiving the local administration as an extension and 
representative of the central authority and the administrative organization of the early 
Republic shows similar characteristics to the Tanzimat period.  
 
4.1.2 1930-1970: Centralization Tendencies and Turkey 
 The period, during which a centralist welfare state was established throughout 
the Western Europe, coincided with the establishment of the new Turkish Republic 
(founded in 1923). This situation made Turkey more open to centralist tendencies, 
since the economic conditions of the time and the political requirements of the new 
state both dictated a strong central state with a great deal of powers and 
responsibilities.  
One can observe continuity between the late Ottoman period and the early 
Republican period in terms of the local administration understanding and the 
economic and political problems regarding the division of powers between the 
central and local levels. The new state inherited little municipal experience from the 
Ottoman era together with limited financial means, low public participation to local 
affairs and lack of infrastructure (Tekeli and Ortaylı, 1978: pp. 30-31). Added to this 
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were the urgency of post-war reconstruction in Anatolia and the construction of the 
new capital, Ankara, as the symbol of the new state and the victory in the war. 
Dealing with these problems and keeping the different groups together within the 
new state required a centralized administration and the Republican elites opted for 
that (Mansur, 1955: 12).  
 The political system of this period was a centralized system based on 
administrative tutelage of the centre over the decisions, transactions, composition 
and personnel of local administrative bodies (Heper, 1989: p. 4). The 1930 
Municipalities Law, which laid the foundations for the organization of local 
administration in Turkey, saw the municipalities as the extension of central 
government and in addition to administrative tutelage, it also brought a uniform 
administrative structure to be applied in whole country, regardless of geographical, 
cultural and economic differences (Göymen, 1983: 18). In the law, the municipality 
was defined as a legal person, which was established to fulfill the common needs of 
the inhabitants of the area. It was responsible for the cleaning, health, transportation, 
construction and provision of cultural and sports facilities for people. The municipal 
council was to be elected by people, while the mayor would be appointed by the 
Ministry of Interior (Official Gazette, 1930). In order to provide additional financial 
resources to the municipalities for the fulfillment of their duties, the Provinces Bank 
was established in 1933. The Bank would collect and redistribute the revenues of the 
municipalities, provide long-term loans with low interest rates, funds and technical 
assistance to projects (Özyörük, 1955: 39; Keleş, 1992: 327). When the economic 
situation deteriorated as one of the implications of the Great Depression, the newly 
established municipalities became more dependent on the centre because of their lack 
of financial capacity and their tasks were gradually transferred to the central 
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government, which in return empowered the hand of the centre vis-à-vis the local 
right from the beginning. 
 The early republican period was a period of reconstruction and state-building. 
Strong central control at the local level suited the political context of the time and 
issues like the modernization of local administration, development of local 
democracy and local capacity did not have the top priority on the agendas of the state 
elite. This situation remained intact during the single-party period and it was the 
multi-party period and democracy experiences, when the issue of local 
administration became more important in the Turkish political context. 
 During the multi-party period (1945-1960), two major factors affected the 
nature of centre-local relations in Turkey. The first factor was the rivalry between the 
two main political parties, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and the Democrat 
Party (DP) during the transition to the multi-party system. Towards the end of 1940s, 
it was clear that the single-party, which ruled the country since 1923, the RPP, would 
be replaced by DP with the general elections. However, the political elite of the RPP 
wanted to protect the existing system and make it harder to change. In the First 
Administrators Congress in 1947, the party ideologues proposed establishment of 
bureaucratic control, which would follow the RPP logic, over municipalities 
independent of the political influences of the government and they wanted to prevent 
the politicization of the local administrative units (Fişek, 1990: pp. 119-120).  
 Once DP came to the power, there was an evident tension between the 
municipalities established by the RPP and the central government. While the local 
political actors demanded popular elections for the mayors and abolishment of the 
law about the central approval for the mayors, these demands were not taken into 
consideration by the DP government. In fact, the government took an even more 
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reactionary stance towards the local political actors by postponing the municipal 
elections and making them stay at the office unlawfully (Geray, 1990: pp. 218-219).  
 In addition to the political tensions of the transition period, the economic 
problems of the period also led to the empowerment of the central government vis-à-
vis the local administrative units. The new problems created by the process of 
industrialization and urbanization affected the daily lives of citizens. These problems 
had to be solved at the local level, however, the lack of financial capacity of the 
municipalities prevented them from solving these problems. Once again, their 
economic and financial dependency on the centre increased together with the number 
of tasks transferred from the local level to the central government (Heper, 1989: 6; 
Göymen, 1983: pp. 51-52). 
 The 1960 military coup against the DP government added new dimensions to 
the centre-local relations in Turkey. The 1961 Constitution tried to define the 
administrative structure of the state together with the forms and duties of local 
administrative structure and the type of the relationship between the central and local 
levels. According to the Article 112 of the Constitution, “the administration formed a 
whole with its organization and functions and it were based on the principles of 
centralization and devolution” and with the Article 115, the centre-local relations 
was based on the principle of deconcentration.  These principles enabled the central 
government to have branches and departments at the local level, which would carry 
out certain tasks on behalf of the centre along with the elected municipal organs. 
Article 116 of the 1961 Constitution defined the local administration as a legal 
person that fulfils the common needs of the people in a given area, whose decision-
making organs are popularly elected by the local people. The city with its governor, 
mayor and their related organs and councils and the village were identified as the 
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local administrative units. The principle of judicial review over the actions of the 
local bodies was brought instead of governmental control and it was stated that the 
local administrative bodies would be provided with resources in proportion with their 
responsibilities. However, the planned economic policy of the 1960s brought more 
centralization (Altaban, 1990: 319) and other than the direct elections for the mayors, 
which were held in 1963 for the first time, there was no significant change in the 
strength of the centre over the local administration. In this period the number of 
municipalities increased together with the tutelage of the centre over them. There 
were some projects regarding the reform of administrative structure, like the 
MEHTAP Project (Merkezi Hükümet Teşkilatı Araştırma Projesi) –The Central 
Government Structure Research Project, which started in 1962 (TODAIE, 1962), 
however, the major concern of these projects was the reorganization of central 
administration and they did not deal with the local administrative structure 
(Başbakanlık, 2003). 
 
4.1.3 1970-1990: The Retreat of the Centre? 
During this period, the issue of centre-local relations became more significant 
on the political agenda after the 1973 local elections. With the 1973 elections, most 
of the municipalities were won by the RPP, while the centre was mainly right-wing. 
As it was in the case of early multi-party period, the dominance of different political 
parties at the central and local levels led to political conflict, tightening of the 
tutelage and cutting of the resources by the central government and demands for 
more devolution and financial autonomy by the mayors (Heper, 1989: 7; 
Belediyecilik Yazıları, 1983: 10; Gülöksüz and Tekeli, 1990: pp. 373-375).  
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 One important step taken by the central government in the 1970s was the 
establishment of the Ministry of Local Administration in January, 1978. The 
Ministry coordinated the existing state organizations regarding local administration 
under one authority and had took over some competences from the Ministry of 
Interior. It had a short life as it was abolished in November, 1979. The ministry was 
significant in terms of being a central institution, which dealt directly with the 
municipalities and being a means of establishing inter-municipal cooperation. 
However, it was still a central authority, which had extensive political control over 
the local administrative bodies and it was also heavily criticized for its partisan 
decisions regarding the distribution of funds among the municipalities (Keleş, 1992: 
pp. 367-390). 
 In 1980, another military coup hit Turkey and led to a tighter central control 
over the local political actors. Between 1980 and 1982, the elections for the mayors 
and municipal councils were suspended and they were appointed from the centre 
(Aytaç, 1990: 99). The 1982 Constitution, which is still in effect, reflected the 
centralist tendencies and defined the administrative structure in a way that 
consolidated and increased the central tutelage over local administration.  
 Article 123 of the 1982 Constitution emphasized the integrity of the 
administrative structure by stating that “the administration forms a whole with regard 
to its structures and functions, and shall be regulated by law. The organizations and 
functions of the administration are based on the principles of centralization and 
devolution”. The local administration had two branches: the provincial 
administration and the local authorities (the municipalities and the villages). The 
provincial administration “is comprised by provinces and districts established to take 
and implement decisions on behalf of the centre. These units are headed by 
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provincial and district governors” (Ministry of Interior, 1999: 23) and according to 
the Article 126 of the Constitution, the provincial administration is based on the 
principle of deconcentration. 
 The local authorities are democratic entities established outside the central 
administration to carry out local public services. They are based on the principle of 
devolution in terms of having their own competences and organs. Their decisions and 
actions are subject to judicial review. They may form associations among themselves 
with the permission of the Ministry of Interior and they are given financial resources 
in proportion to their functions (Ibid: pp. 24-27). 
 The makers of the 1982 Constitution were very much concerned with the 
unity, order and integrity of the state and for this reason, they opted for a uniform 
local administration regardless of cultural, economic and geographical differences 
and established a tighter administrative tutelage over the local level. The central 
government had a control over the decisions of the local authorities in the form of 
approval, postponement, cancellation or seeking prior permission; over their acts 
through the control of legality; over the local administrative organs with the right of 
the governor to call the municipal council for extraordinary meetings and the 
Ministry of Interior having the ability to remove the mayor and council from office 
as a provisional measure in case of an unlawful act. The central government also had 
tutelage over the local administrative personnel by having the final say in their 
appointment and discharge from the office and providing their financial and social 
rights (Ministry of Interior, 1999: pp. 30-32). 
 In the first general elections held after the coup, the Motherland Party (MP) 
came to power and it had a reform agenda regarding the local administrations in 
Turkey. The MP government passed legislation about the municipalities in 1984, 
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which introduced another tier to the local administrative structure. With the 
Metropolitan Municipalities Law No. 3030, two-tiered metropolitan system was 
introduced for the first time in Turkey. The main aim of this law was to increase the 
efficiency of the service delivery in the cities and for this reason additional resources 
and duties were transferred to the metropolitan municipalities (Gülöksüz and Tekeli, 
1990: pp. 376-378; Heper, 1987: 6). The reforms aimed to delegate certain tasks to 
the lower tiers of administration, however, they did not contribute to the 
democratization of the local administrative system. In fact, the tutelage of the centre 
was reproduced at the local level through the organization of the relationship 
between the metropolitan mayor and the district mayors, which formed a hierarchy 
among the popularly elected mayors. According to the Article 14 of the Law No. 
3030, the decisions taken by the district municipalities had to be sent to the 
metropolitan mayor, who could send them back for reconsideration (Official Gazette, 
1984). With the responsibilities and powers assigned to him, the metropolitan mayor 
became another figure in the hierarchy of local administration along with the 
governor, who had the final say in case of a conflict or unresolved issue among the 
district mayors or between the district mayors and the metropolitan mayor41.  
 Despite not reaching at the district level and not prioritizing democratization, 
the 1984 reforms were nevertheless a new tendency in the centre-local relations in 
Turkey as an attempt to renovate the existing administrative structure. The projects 
of the time like the KAYA Project (Kamu Yönetimi Araştırma Projesi)- Public 
Administration Research Project- of 1989 (TODAIE, 1989) reveal that there has 
been a new impetus for reforming the public administration as a whole in the 1980s 
and the issues of public administration reform and centre-local relations became a 
                                                 
41 Article 24 of the Law No. 3030. 
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permanent part of the political agenda since then. However, in 1987, took a step back 
in this reform process and removed some of the duties and competences given to the 
metropolitan municipalities. These duties and competences were mainly about their 
financial autonomy and were transferred to the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry 
of Public Works and Housing. The central government criticized the municipalities 
for poor investments, which had no return in terms of production and which 
increased inflation rates (Aytaç, 1990) and this situation was utilized by the centre as 
a means of retaining its economic and political control over the local level. 
 One may argue that Turkey’s response to the challenges of the post-1970 
period was based on the political motive of consolidating the system as well as the 
economic motives. Achieving political stability was more important than getting rid 
of the financial burdens for the central state and this situation prevented the full 
retreat of the central state from the political and economic affairs. In the cases, where 
the centre has delegated certain tasks to the local administrative bodies, there was no 
transfer of resources nor did powers and the dependence of the local level on the 
centre remain intact. The result of this situation was the reinforcement of the power 
of the centre and institutionalization of the central tutelage over the local level in 
Turkey. 
 
 
4.2 Public Administration Reform Attempts in the post-1990 Period 
The late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a wave of legal changes and reform 
attempts regarding the public administration system as a whole and the local 
administrative system in particular. One of these attempts was the 1998 Draft Law on 
Public Administration Reform. One may argue that this draft law did not aim to 
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achieve a radical change in the centre-local relations as the principles of integrity of 
the administration and deconcentration remained unchanged. The draft law was 
increasing the number of services to be provided by the local administrations, 
decreasing the amount of administrative tutelage at the local level and opening ways 
for inter-municipal cooperation and privatization of local services. However, the 
draft law failed to provide a concrete division of responsibility between the central 
and local levels of administration and it was not debated nor voted in the National 
Assembly. 
 The Draft Law on Local Administrative Bodies of July, 2001 was more 
concrete in terms of the division of responsibilities as in Article 1, it gave the centre 
the responsibility of justice, security and defense, foreign policy, finance, population 
matters, national education, health, agriculture and social security, while the local 
administrative bodies would be responsible for the local services in the areas like 
education, health, social assistance, sports, culture, tourism, environment, 
construction and transportation. However, according to the draft law, the central 
government was also responsible for the services, which needed to be coordinated at 
the national or regional level, for determining the standards of the public policies, 
preparing and applying national and regional development plans, checking the 
compliance of the local services to the determined standards and providing guidance 
and technical and financial assistance to the local authorities. Moreover, according to 
Article 2, the Ministries were responsible for the local and regional coordination of 
related policies and governors would provide coordination at the provincial level. 
Thus, one may argue that, except for the effort to clarify the division of 
responsibilities between the centre and the local administrative bodies, the 2001 
Draft Law did not change much in terms of political devolution and the local level 
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remained under the control of the centre. Like the 1998 Draft, the 2001 Draft Law 
also could not be debated and voted at the General Assembly because of the early 
elections held in November, 2002. 
 It was the Draft Law on Public Administration Reform of 29 December 2003, 
which created much debate in the Turkish domestic politics. Unlike the 2001 Draft 
Law, the 2003 reform proposal was not only concerned with the division of 
responsibilities between the central and local levels, but it also aimed to reform the 
centre itself. The division of responsibilities between the central and local levels was 
essentially same as the 2001 Draft Law, however the 2003 Public Administration 
Reform also contained provisions on reducing the number and responsibilities of the 
ministries, transforming the office of Prime Minister into a coordinating position and 
reorganization of the central administrative structure (Başbakanlık, 2003). The 
Reform Draft also aimed to decrease the administrative tutelage of the centre over 
the local administrations as the centre was prevented from establishing agencies at 
the local level regarding the tasks assigned to the local administrations42. However, 
the governors were made the chief responsible for the delivery of central government 
tasks and the hierarchy between the appointed governor and the popularly elected 
municipal institutions remained unchanged. This reform package had been accepted 
in the General Assembly but was vetoed by the President on 3 August 2004 on the 
grounds that it was against the unity and integrity principle of the state as stated in 
the Constitution.  
 
  
                                                 
42 Article 9 of the Draft Law 
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Turkey is considered among the Napoleonic states because of its strong 
central state tradition and this tradition has had a considerable impact over the centre-
local relations as it has been the case in the Western European context. Turkey was 
also affected by the economic crisis situations, which changed the role of the central 
state in Europe. These crisis periods coincided with the formation and consolidation 
of the Turkish state and the Turkish state elite opted for strong centralization in 
coping with economic and domestic political challenges. 
 As it was explained in the second chapter in detail, in the 1970s, when the 
central state was in retreat through various means in the Western Europe, Turkey’s 
top priority was to consolidate its newly established democratic system and the 
central state remained as the primary service provider and decision-maker regardless 
of the financial burdens of the municipal services. The municipalities were not able 
to fulfill their various duties because of the lack of financial means and they were 
dependent on the centre both politically and economically. This situation 
institutionalized the authority of the centre over the local both formally and 
informally in Turkey. 
 The historical and political setting, which affects the impact of the EU 
accession process in Turkey, increases the importance of the actor preferences and 
the level of the impact of Europeanization in analyzing the transformation of centre-
local relations. Up to this point, the central political elite have been able to reproduce 
its power vis-à-vis the local political actors by various means while dealing with 
political and economic challenges. Once the adaptational pressures from the EU level 
are introduced, the central political elite are likely to try to determine the way in 
which Turkey will deal with these pressures. The local political actors are also likely 
to try to redefine the balance of power in their own way. Thus, the actor preferences 
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need to be an integral part of the analysis of the transformation of centre-local 
relations in Turkey during the process of EU accession. 
 As one of the potential new members, Turkey is likely to face with more 
adaptational pressures like the CEE countries from the EU level. Thus, the nature of 
the EU-level pressures and the position of the EU regarding the balance of power 
between the centre and the local levels in Turkey also need to be analyzed. The 
remaining part of the research focuses on the perceptions of the central and local 
political elite regarding the centre-local relations in Turkey, the prospects for 
administrative reform and institutional change and the role of the EU in this process. 
Together with the perceptions of the major political actors, the position of the EU is 
also tried to be determined by using various empirical data. 
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CHAPTER V 
  
THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE CENTRAL ELITE, 
EUROPEANIZATION AND THE CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS 
IN TURKEY 
  
 
As it was mentioned in the previous section, in Turkey, the dynamics of the 
centre-local relationship have been determined by the elite of the central state right 
from the beginning. Following this pattern, one should expect that the perceptions of 
the political actors of the centre regarding the form of response to be given to the 
pressures from the EU-level will be crucial in shaping the new balance of power 
between the local and central levels during the course of EU accession. This chapter 
aims to analyze the standpoint of the centre about the existing Turkish administrative 
structure and reform of this structure, its perceptions regarding the demands of the 
EU about administrative change in Turkey and the impact of the EU as a factor over 
these perceptions. 
 The empirical data used for these analyses have been obtained from the legal 
documents, which organize the Turkish administrative system, the programs of the 
major political parties, the development plans prepared by the State Planning 
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Agency, the programs of the governments as well as from the in-depth interviews 
conducted with the specialists of the State Planning Agency and various political 
figures (mainly the members of the parliament, who have participated in the 
preparation of the administrative reforms and the officials of the Ministry of 
Interior).  
 In order to determine the impact of EU factor over the transformation of the 
administrative structure in Turkey, the progress reports have been analyzed and a 
comparative analysis has been conducted between the progress reports and the 
national program, development plans and reform packages according to timeline and 
content. In the last section of the chapter, all of these data are combined in order to 
reveal the relationship between the EU accession process and the position of the 
centre, which has a substantial impact over the prospects for an institutional change 
regarding the centre-local relations in Turkey. 
 
5.1 The Official Discourse of the Centre and Administrative Reform 
 The most appropriate starting point in determining the official discourse of 
the Turkish state about the centre-local relations and its transformation in time is the 
comparative analysis of the Turkish constitutions43. Continuities and differences in 
terms of the administrative organization of the state provide valuable empirical data 
for understanding the institutionalization of the central tutelage over the local 
administrative bodies in Turkey and the implications of this tutelage over the 
understanding of administrative reform. 
                                                 
43 There have been four constitutions of the Turkish state: 1921, 1924, 1961 and 1982 Constitutions. 
The first constitution change took place after the founding of the Republic in 1923. The 1961 and 
1982 Constitutions were prepared after the military coups of 1960 and 1980. There have been debates 
about a new and civilian constitution. However, so far there is no consensus about the content of this 
constitution and the 1982 Constitution is the existing highest legal text in Turkey. 
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 The 1921 Constitution was prepared in the time of the national war of 
liberation and in the absence of central state machinery. The parliament, which was 
established in Ankara as an alternative to the Ottoman rule in Istanbul, relied on the 
support of the local level extensively in order to coordinate the war. This political 
context led to a constitution, which was based on the understanding of decentralized 
government. 14 out of 23 articles of the constitution (articles 10-23) were about the 
decentralized governments and gave extensive responsibilities to the local level, i.e. 
vilayets. According to the 1921 Constitution, vilayets were responsible for their own 
social and economic affairs44 and they had councils to be elected by the local 
people45. The governors of the vilayets were appointed by the Grand National 
Assembly and they were to act only in case of a conflict between the general interest 
of the state and the affairs of the vilayet46. 
 To give an important role to the local level for the conduct of state affairs 
during the war years was the best option for the founders of the Turkish Republic, 
since there was no central state organization to deal with the daily affairs of the 
people at the time. However, after the Republic was founded in 1923, the state-
building process gained pace and the pioneers of this process were the central state 
elite. The 1924 Constitution reveals the initial steps for the creation of a strong 
central state as it tries to create a geographical division of the administration and a 
local-level administration based on the principle of deconcentration, whose head 
would be appointed by the centre47.  
 Starting with the 1924 Constitution, one may observe that the emphasis on 
the unity of administration and the tutelage of the centre over the local administrative 
                                                 
44 Article 11 of 1921 Constitution. 
45 Article 12. 
46 Article 14. 
47 Articles 89-91 of the 1924 Constitution. 
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bodies has increased in the legal documents organizing the Turkish administrative 
system. The previously mentioned political conditions, the military coups, the 
problems of state building and democratic consolidation have led the state elite to 
strengthening the central control over each level of administration in Turkey. The 
1961 Constitution stressed the indivisibility of the administration by stating that “[it] 
forms a whole in terms of organizations and functions”.48 Furthermore, the 1961 
Constitution defined the local administrative bodies strictly in terms of their function 
to fulfill the common local needs of the citizens49 without giving any reference to 
their powers to generate their own resources and to contribute to the political and 
democratic representation of the local population. This situation implied a local level, 
which was assigned certain functions by the centre and was dependent on the 
assistance and supervision of the centre while fulfilling these functions. 
 The 1982 Constitution followed the same pattern as it also emphasized that 
“the administration forms a whole with regard to its structure and functions”50. The 
1982 Constitution took one further step in the institutionalization of the tutelage of 
the centre over the local level as it identified the terms and conditions of the tutelary 
powers of the centre in extensive detail51. With the 1982 Constitution, the central 
administration was given “the power of administrative trusteeship over the local 
administrative bodies in the framework of principles and procedures set forth by law 
with the objective of ensuring that the functions of the local administrations are in 
conformity with the principle of integral unity of administration, securing uniform 
public service, safeguarding the public interest and meeting the local needs in an 
                                                 
48 Article 112 of 1961 Constitution. 
49 Article 116. of 1961 Constitution 
50 Article 123. 
51 Article 127. 
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appropriate manner”52. The vague wording of the Article 127 and the lack of the 
definition of what ‘an appropriate manner’ or ‘public interest’ is have enabled the 
central state to define the boundaries of its tutelage over the local on its own terms 
and to gradually increase its control over the lower levels of administration.  
 A comparative analysis of the constitutions of the Turkish state reveals that 
the process of state-building and consolidation was accompanied by extensive 
centralization of the administration. Assisted by the political and economic 
requirements, the centre was able to establish and institutionalize its dominance over 
the local and gained leverage in determining the rules of future change and 
transformation. Within the legal framework of constitutions, which facilitated central 
control, the laws regarding the administrative structure also became the tools of the 
centre in supervising the local administrative bodies. 
 The local administrative organization in Turkey has been designed to 
facilitate the high involvement of the centre with affairs of the local level. The 
Turkish administrative structure has two types of local authorities. At the city level, 
both a popularly elected mayor and an appointed governor are responsible for the 
administration. At all local levels, the popularly elected rulers and centrally 
appointed administrators co-exist and the centrally appointed figure has tutelage over 
the figure elected by the local people.  
 The co-existence of the governor and the mayor at the local level has been 
designed as the means of the centre to establish its control over the local. The 
governor has been appointed as the representative of the government and the state at 
the local level and has been assigned tutelary powers over the decisions and affairs of 
the mayors and municipal councils53. The law 1580, which formed the municipalities 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Special Provincial Administrations Law (2005). 
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in 1930 and went on to regulate their affairs for over 60 years, assigned certain 
responsibilities to the municipalities such as cleaning, health, transportation and 
certain construction services, but it did not assign the necessary financial capacity to 
fulfill these responsibilities54. The lack of financial means and the authority of the 
governors at the local level strengthened the control and power of the centre over the 
local and increased its role in deciding any prospects for change or transformation. 
 The Metropolitan Municipalities Law of 1984 illustrates an example for this 
ability of the centre to guide change. The law 3030 of 1984 introduced a new tier to 
the local administration in Turkey. In the cities, which contained more than one sub-
province within the municipal boundaries, metropolitan municipalities were 
founded55. The law also introduced a new political figure at the local level, the 
metropolitan mayor, who acquired important powers with respect to district mayors 
at the city. According to the law, the decisions taken by the district municipalities 
were to be sent to the metropolitan mayor for approval56 and the governor retained its 
tutelary power over these decisions57.  
 The Metropolitan Municipalities Law gave some of the tutelary powers of the 
centre to the metropolitan mayor and this situation created a hierarchy among the 
popularly elected office holders (Heper, 1987: pp. 54-57). The legal and 
administrative tutelage at the local level was to be exercised by both the metropolitan 
mayor and the governor and this situation was far from the devolution and 
democratization of the system. At the same time, the financial deficiencies of the 
municipalities were still a problem and the political and economic control of the 
                                                 
54 Law No. 1580 (Municipalities Law). Official Gazette (14.04.1930), No. 1471. 
55 Article 1 of Law No. 3030 (Metropolitan Municipalities Law). Official Gazette (09.07.1984), No. 
18453. 
56 Ibid, Article 14. 
57 Ibid, Article 24.  
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centre at the local level remained intact as some of the duties of the metropolitan 
municipalities were transferred back to the centre in 1987. 
 The 2000s represent a period in Turkish politics, when there has been an 
extensive debate about public administration reform.58 There were several draft laws 
and reform attempts, which are important for the purpose of this study and the 
concentration of these attempts in the given period is not a coincidence. The 
international context and especially the EU accession process have had an important 
impact over these reform attempts and this impact will be dealt with extensively in 
the following sections. In this discussion, the word ‘attempt’ is often used, since all 
of the draft laws were met with resistance within the centre. The government, the 
president of the time and the opposition parties had different opinions regarding the 
reform of the administrative system and the prospects for public administrative 
reform have revealed a clash within the centre itself regarding the reconstruction of 
the balance of power between the centre and the local. 
 The first draft law that needs to be considered in this respect is the law about 
the restructuring of public administration, which was debated in the parliament for 
seven months, from January, 2004 to July, 2004 and finally accepted on 15 July 
2004. The law aimed to redistribute the responsibilities between the centre and local 
levels according to the principle of unity of administration and the idea of assignment 
of the duties, powers and responsibilities to the closest and most appropriate level to 
the recipients of the public services59. In other words, the law introduced the 
principle of subsidiarity to the Turkish administrative system along with the unity 
                                                 
58 One of the reasons of this situation was the fact that the AKP government that came to power in 
2002 elections had a vast experience in the local administrations and was a strong advocate of 
administrative reform. 
59 The Draft Law on the Restructuring of Public Administration (2004), Article 5. 
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principle and this situation was one of the sources of heated debates within the 
centre. 
 While redefining the responsibilities and powers of the central and local 
levels, the law assigned the central administration with the duty of determining the 
general principles, purposes, targets and standards at the national level and providing 
the centre-local coordination according to the principle of deconcentration60. The 
centre was assigned to the duties of justice, defense, security, international relations, 
the economic and social policies of national scale, national education, social security 
and citizen affairs, while the local administration was responsible for all kinds of 
duties, which were related to the common needs of the local population61. In other 
words, while limiting the duties of the centre in very concrete terms, the draft law 
defined the duties of the local administrative bodies in a rather abstract manner, 
which enabled the widening of these duties in the future only with the justification of 
meeting the local needs. 
 In addition to the redefinition of duties and responsibilities, the draft law also 
attempted to redefine the relations of tutelage and authority between the central and 
local levels. With the draft law, the centre limited its power by stating that the central 
administration could not establish organizations, which fall within the boundaries of 
the powers and duties of the local administration and could not make any legal 
arrangements, which limit the powers of the local administrative bodies62. However, 
despite increasing the powers and duties of the local level, the draft law did not do 
much in terms of democratizing the dual administrative structure at the local level. 
The responsibilities of the centre were left to the special provincial administrations at 
                                                 
60 Ibid, Article 6 
61 Ibid, Articles 7 and 8. 
62 Ibid,  Article 9. 
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the local level63, whose head is the governor, i.e. a figure appointed by the centre and 
this situation may be considered as a strategy of the centre to decrease its duties 
while retaining its political power and control at the local level. Although this draft 
law did not come into effect because of the presidential veto on 3 August 2004, it is 
still crucial for analyzing whether the public administration reform attempts reflected 
a change in the philosophy of administration on center’s behalf as well as the other 
legal documents, which attempted to reorganize the Turkish administrative system in 
this period. 
 The Municipalities Law of 9 July 2004 (also vetoed by the President) aimed 
to increase the efficiency of the municipal services and increase the resources of 
municipalities. The subsidiarity principle was apparent in the law64 and the 
municipalities were assigned with the duties of infrastructure, environment, traffic, 
construction, culture and art, sports, tourism, social services, pre-school education, 
construction of school buildings and health facilities services65. In order to provide 
the necessary financial means for the delivery of these services, the law gave the 
municipalities the right to establish firms and engage in economic activities and to 
borrow money66. The review of the decisions and activities of the municipalities also 
changed with this law and financial review of the municipalities was assigned to a 
commission selected from the members of the municipal council67. In 2004, the 
Metropolitan Municipalities Law was also changed and the metropolitan mayor has 
taken over some of the powers of the governor regarding the approval of the budget 
and decisions about the boundary changes between the district municipalities68. 
                                                 
63 Ibid, Provisional Article 1.  
64 The Municipalities Law (2004), Article 14. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid, Article 15. 
67 Ibid, Article 25. 
68 Ibid, Article 24. 
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 The last step of the public administration reform wave was the new law on 
the special provincial administrations, which affected the tutelary powers of the 
governor at the local level as the representative of the state. The law was debated in 
the parliament for almost a year and came into effect in March, 2005.  This law also 
became one of the battlefields for the different segments of the centre and caused a 
lot of controversies. The new Special Provincial Administration Law basically tried 
to decrease the role of the governor and increase the powers of the general provincial 
assembly, which is popularly elected69. The law reflected the principle of 
subsidiarity, again without directly mentioning it, and the governor was assigned 
with the duty of coordination70 without any open reference to his tutelary powers at 
the provincial level.  
 All of these attempts to reconstruct the Turkish public administration system 
and to redefine the parameters of the centre-local relations were the initiatives of the 
central government with no considerable local demand. However, these initiatives 
were met with much resistance from within the centre itself and revealed different 
opinions regarding the parameters of centre-local relations in Turkey. Thus, the 
approaches of different segments of the centre to these laws and draft laws are very 
significant for understanding how the EU factor affected this process. 
 
5.2  Public Administration Reform Attempts and the Clash within the Centre: a 
Re-definition of the Centre? 
 Within the context of the public administration reform process, three major 
actors, whose views have been influential at the central level, come into the picture. 
The first one of these actors is the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, 
                                                 
69 The Special Provincial Administration Law (2005), Article 6. 
70 Ibid. 
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which came to the office after the 3 November 2002 elections. The party has 
presented itself as the pioneer of the public administration reform and prepared the 
previously mentioned reform drafts.  
 The JDP government justified these reforms with the emerging needs of 
democratic governance and efficient, active and flexible public administration71. The 
government often argued that in their existing form, the municipalities are far from 
delivering the local services they are required to and instead they have become the 
extensions of the central administration72. Moreover, the government emphasized the 
point that the municipalities lack the institutional structure for the proper delivery of 
services, including an autonomous decision making mechanism, appropriate 
financial resources and freedom from the administrative tutelage of the centre73. The 
government also presented these reforms as an opportunity to show the confidence of 
the state in the officials elected by the people and to increase the trust relationship 
between the central state apparatus and the citizens74. 
 During the preparation phases of these draft laws, the government defined its 
targets as “to facilitate economic development, to increase the administrative 
efficiency in line with the EU norms and the necessities of the liberal economy and 
to establish a stable political structure”75. Often, the 1921 Constitution was presented 
as a justification basis and the democratic qualities of the constitution in terms of 
local administration were presented as an inspiration for the new reforms76. Another 
point that is often encountered in the official discourse of the party and thus, the 
                                                 
71See the justification for the Municipalities Law, 3 March 2004, www.belgenet.com  
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 The report of the Commission of Interior in the Parliament about the Draft Law on Municipalities 
(26 April 2004). 
75 The report of the Commission of Interior in the Parliament about the Draft Law on the 
Reconstruction of Public Administration (14-15 January 2004). 
76 The speech of the Deputy President of the JDP, Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat in the Parliament during 
the debates about the Reconstruction of Public Administration (18 February 2004). 
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government is the underlining of the fact that the envisioned system in these reforms 
was not contrary to the unity of administration principle set in the Article 123 of the 
1982 Constitution. In each draft law, the principle of the integral unity of 
administration was set forth at the beginning as the basis of the legal arrangements, 
however, it was followed by the description of the principle of subsidiarity, which is 
considered to be against the unity of administration77. 
 The JDP has reflected its understanding of public administration to the draft 
laws it prepared as the governing party. In the party program of 2001, it is clearly 
stated that the JDP envisioned a system, which strengthens the local administration 
as the structures closest to the citizens, where the central state apparatus is 
responsible only for security, justice, national education, health, coordination and 
review and the local administration has discretionary powers and responsibilities 
(JDP, 2001). The democratization, transparency, financial capabilities and 
accountability of the administrative bodies were often emphasized in the party 
program and in the office, the party reflected this orientation to the draft laws.  
 According to the official discourse of the government, the tutelary powers of 
the centre over the local had gone beyond the original limits defined by the law and 
the need for the approval of the governor for the decisions of the municipalities have 
slowed down the delivery of services78. The new laws were seen as practical 
arrangements, which would remedy the extreme bureaucratization of administration 
and prevent the delays in the delivery of local services79. During the phases of 
preparation and debate of these draft laws, the main opposition party in the 
parliament was the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and it approached these reform 
                                                 
77 See the draft law on the restructuring of public administration. 
78 Interview with the Deputy Director of the Ministry of Interior, Mr. Zekeriya Sarbak (10 October 
2007). 
79 Ibid. 
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attempts with much suspicion and criticism, which were expressed in the 
parliamentary proceedings and the statements of the party figures. 
 Two major points of criticism can be seen in the arguments of the RPP 
regarding the public administration reform in Turkey and the new arrangements are 
considered to be problematic in terms of their economic and political implications. In 
terms of the economic problems, the RPP criticizes the new arrangements for their 
ambiguity regarding the creation of economic resources for the delivery of services 
at the local level. The major criticism of the RPP is the lack of specified resources in 
these legal documents, which would help the local authorities to fulfill their newly 
assigned duties80. Another important concern is the fact that the new arrangements 
are enabling the municipalities to borrow money. According to RPP, borrowing 
money would increase the dependency of the local administration on the centre and 
on other institutions and bring the possibility of the bankruptcy of a municipality81. 
 From the political perspective, the major criticism of the RPP was the fact 
that the new laws were against the principle of the integral unity of administration 
stated in the Constitution. RPP argued that with the new system, a division of duties 
between the governor and the mayor was introduced to the local level, which was 
against the unity principle. Moreover, the draft laws were extensively criticized for 
decreasing the authority and tutelary powers of the governor at the local level and for 
the RPP, the local administrative bodies were to be given new duties and resources 
without any competences and powers, which would seriously endanger the unitary 
structure of the state given the complex situation in the Southeastern part of the 
country82. 
                                                 
80 Interview with Oğuz Oyan (former RPP MP) on 10 September 2007 and the reports of the Planning 
and Budget Committee on the Municipalities Law (25 June 2004).  
81 Interview with Oğuz Oyan. 
82 Ibid. 
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 In addition to the resistance from the opposition, the JDP government also 
faced with the presidential veto during its public administration reform attempts. The 
president of the time, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, vetoed the Law on the Restructuring of 
the Public Administration on constitutional grounds arguing that the law was in 
conflict with the unitary character of the state83. According to the president, the fact 
that the duties of local administration were defined in abstract terms, while those of 
the central administration were limited in concrete terms, damaged the balance of 
power between the centre and the local to the advantage of the latter and this 
situation constituted a threat to the integral unity of the state and opened the way for 
the establishment of an administrative system, which was not envisaged by the 1982 
Constitution84.  
 The following laws were also vetoed by the President on similar grounds and 
on each occasion, the President emphasized the necessity of defining the powers and 
duties of the municipalities in more concrete and limited terms85, the importance of 
protecting the unitary state, unity of the administration, the principle of 
deconcentration and administrative tutelage as defined in the Constitution86. The 
vetoes of the president were based on the existence of certain conflicts between the 
prepared laws and the principles of the state as they were defined in the Constitution 
and this situation posed a major challenge for the government in the administrative 
reform process, which could only be solved by amending or changing the 
constitution in a way that would enable the formation of a new administrative system 
based on new centre-local dynamics. 
                                                 
83 President’s veto on the Draft Law on the Restructuring of Public Administration (3 August 2004). 
84 Ibid. 
85 Presidential Veto on the Municipalities Law (22 July 2004). 
86 Presidential Veto on the Special Provincial Administrations Law (10 July 2004). 
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 The public administration reform attempts of the 2000s have revealed a 
tension between the major actors of the centre. While one party appeared to be the 
advocate of change in the name of democratization, efficiency and reform, the other 
parties seemed to be the protectors of the status quo. However, one should note that 
the agenda of public administration reform is not an issue that appeared in the 2000s. 
The need for reform in the system has begun to be discussed in the 1990s and the 
current opponents of the reform attempts were once strong advocates of these 
attempts. 
 This situation can be proved by a brief analysis of the programs of the 
governments founded by different political parties since 1997. In each government 
program87, the need to reform the public administration system was emphasized, the 
redistribution of powers and responsibilities between the central and local levels, the 
strengthening of the local administrative bodies and increasing democratic 
participation at the local level were set as the targets of the government. However, 
while in the 1990s, the approach of the government to reform was based on the 
efficiency and well-functioning of the state system, in the 2000s, one can see more 
emphasis on the democratization-administrative reform relationship and 
democratization, devolution and efficiency of the state machinery were presented as 
inter-related processes88.  
 In addition to the programs of the governments, the programs of the political 
parties also reveal a consensus within the centre in terms of the need to restructure 
the Turkish administrative system. The program of the RPP, for instance, emphasizes 
the necessity of downsizing the central administrative apparatus as much as possible 
and strengthening the local administration (CHP, 1994). In its program, the party 
                                                 
87 The programs of the 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60. governments were examined. Only the last three are 
the JDP governments. 
88 See the program of the 58th government (23 November 2002).  
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announces that once it holds the office, the RPP will “decrease the tutelage over local 
administration, reform the municipalities and special provincial administrations by 
transferring various tasks, powers and resources to the local level, including the 
educational affairs” (CHP, 1994).  
 The analysis of the party program shows that the public administration reform 
understanding of the RPP does not reveal a substantial difference from that of the 
JDP government. However, despite this fact, the previous account of the post-2002 
developments illustrates a suspicion on the side of the RPP towards reform. The 
interviews with the representatives of the party have revealed that while RPP 
recognized the need to reform the system, it was against the specific measures 
chosen by the JDP government. The most common concerns stated by the RPP were 
the possible weakening of the unitary character of the state and a possible chaos of 
unclear division of responsibilities between the municipalities and the special 
provincial administrations at the local level89.  
 This mistrust towards the government on the side of the main opposition 
party stems from the political dominance of the JDP at the local level90. Since the 
majority of the city and district mayors are from the JDP91, the RPP sees the 
strengthening of the local level through the reforms as a means for the JDP to 
consolidate its political dominance both at the local and central levels92. Because of 
the mistrust towards the relationship between the mayors and the government, the 
governors are seen as the guarantee of the well-functioning of the state machinery 
                                                 
89 Interview with Oğuz Oyan and Tuncay Alemdaroğlu (former mayor of Yenimahalle district in 
Ankara).  
90 Interview with Tuncay Alemdaroğlu. 
91 In the local elections of 2004, the JDP got 41.67% of the total votes and 60 out of 81 city mayors 
were candidates of the JDP. 
92 Interview with Oğuz Oyan and Tuncay Alemdaroğlu. 
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and curbing of their authority and tutelary powers is seen as a threat to the 
established balance of power.  
This situation can be considered as a reflection of the state elite-political 
elite93 clash in Turkey. The RPP has seen itself as a part of the state elite because of 
the legacy of the founders of the Republic. Traditionally, the RPP elite have been 
suspicious towards the intentions of the other political parties because of their self-
defined role as the guardians of the strong state tradition. The public administration 
reform is one of the most sensitive issues regarding the prospects for an institutional 
change in Turkey. Thus, it has naturally become one of the areas, where the clash 
between the state elite and political elite became apparent. While the RPP and the 
president tried to defend the status quo in order to prevent the establishment of a 
system outside of the control of the state elite, the JDP government saw this reform 
process as an opportunity to increase the power of the political elite within the 
Turkish administrative system. Both sides desire to control a possible process of 
administrative change in Turkey, since this process provides the opportunity to 
redefine the parameters of power relationships in Turkish politics.  
In the post-2000 period, an important variable in this struggle about the new 
rules of the game has been the EU factor. In terms of the perceptions about the 
impact of the EU over administrative transformation in Turkey, one can observe 
different approaches of the state elite and political elite. While the state elite see the 
EU factor as an arbitrary pressure, which does not consider the requirements of the 
internal dynamics of Turkey and advocate a transformation from within instead of 
                                                 
93 This clash refers to the tension among the ruling elite of the Turkish state, which basically stems 
from the dichotomy between the state and the civil society. The theme of elite confrontation between 
the state elite, representing the state tradition and the political elite, who emerged with the transition to 
the multi-party period has been the defining characteristic of Turkish politics. See Metin Heper 
(1985), State Tradition in Turkey for details.  
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one triggered by the EU94, for the political elite, the EU factor serves as a 
justification basis95 for the restructuring process in a way that will strengthen its 
position vis-à-vis other major domestic actors of the game. Nevertheless, the EU 
accession process is an important factor, which has influenced the perceptions of the 
major political actors, the available options to these actors in terms of creating and 
preventing institutional transformation and the political context of the struggle 
between the Turkish political and state elite. Thus, the impact of the EU factor over 
the position of the centre needs to be analyzed extensively through empirical data. 
 
 
5.3  The EU Factor and the Re-definition of the Centre 
 In order to determine impact of the EU accession process over the perceptions 
of major political actors and centre-local relations in Turkey, first of all, the 
expectations of the EU regarding the matter need to be accounted and for this 
account, the Progress Reports prepared by the European Commission provide the 
primary empirical data. These reports illustrate the extent and content of the 
adaptational pressure coming from the EU level, which triggers administrative 
reform in Turkey. For determining the response of the centre to these pressures, the 
content of the Accession Partnership Document, the National Program, EU reform 
packages and development plans need to be examined in comparison with the EU 
demands according to a certain timeline. The final step in determining the EU impact 
over the centre-local relations will be an analysis of the perceptions of the major 
political actors regarding the EU factor. 
 
                                                 
94 Interview with Oğuz Oyan. 
95 Statements of the JDP’s important political figures: Minister of State Kürşat Tüzmen and the vice 
president of the party, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat. 
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5.3.1 The Expectations of the EU Regarding Administrative Reform in Turkey 
 In the first two progress reports of 1998 and 1999, the problems regarding the 
centre-local relations were dealt with within the context of regional economic 
differences and the economic progress of the less developed regions. Both reports 
pointed out the need to develop decentralized and differentiated regional 
development policies and stressed the importance of establishing an appropriate 
administrative structure for such a regional development policy (European 
Commission, 1998; 1999).   
 It was the 2000 Progress Report that examined the centre-local relations as a 
part of the compliance with the political criteria for the first time. Thus, it is possible 
to argue that the administrative reform wave of the post-2000 period in Turkey 
coincided with the period, when the adaptational pressures from the EU level began 
to intensify. In the 2000 report, Turkey was criticized for the tutelary powers of the 
centre over the local level and the lack of administrative reform (European 
Commission, 2000). In addition to this new political dimension of the adaptational 
pressures, the report also underlined the misfit between the EU practice and Turkish 
practice in terms of the coordination of regional development policies and Turkey 
was called to adopt a classification of regions in line with the EU understanding, to 
establish local level organizations to deal with the regional development policies and 
to develop a modern approach to regional policy in accordance with the EU norms 
(European Commission, 2000). 
 In 2001, the Commission stated that Turkey did not show any progress 
regarding the demands in the previous progress report (European Commission, 2001) 
and criticized the country for the lack of the institutional structure, programming and 
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financial and administrative planning necessary for the application of a regional 
development policy (Ibid). These criticisms seem to prompt some measures at the 
central level in Turkey as the 2002 and 2003 progress reports both indicate that 
Turkey has taken some steps in terms of the formation of a regional development 
policy in line with the EU norms (European Commission, 2002; 2003). Although 
these steps were positively acknowledged by the European Commission, both reports 
pointed to the lack of the institutional framework and local level organizations, 
which are necessary for the success of these policies in the long run.  
 The 2004 progress report acknowledged the importance of the public 
administration reform attempts and stated that if these reforms could be realized, then 
it would modernize the Turkish administrative system, bring it to the EU standards 
and facilitate Turkey’s accession to the EU (European Commission, 2004). This 
approach of the EU and the openly given support to the reform attempts of the JDP 
government have arguably gave leverage to the political elite in the domestic scene 
in re-setting the parameters of the centre-local relations in Turkey and served as a 
legitimacy source.  
 The EU continued to support the political elite in the reform process and the 
struggle with the state elite as in the 2005 progress report, while the president was 
criticized for vetoing the Framework Law on Public Administration, and thus 
blocking the reform the process, the content of the proposed legislation was highly 
praised for rationalizing the administration and increasing the responsiveness and 
transparency of the system vis-à-vis the citizen (European Commission, 2005). 
 In the 2005 progress report, the Commission for the first time established a 
linkage between the administrative reform attempts and the formation of a regional 
policy in line with the EU standards. In the report, the public administration reform 
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process was presented as the prerequisite of the successful implementation of the 
regional policy and the highly centralized nature of the state system was once again 
criticized by calling Turkish state to devolve certain responsibilities and executive 
functions to the lower tiers of public administration and to introduce a measure of 
local democracy at the provincial level (European Commission, 2005). From that 
point on, the devolution of public administration in Turkey became one of the 
conditions for the development of a well-functioning regional development policy. 
The progress report in 2006 was along the same lines as it suggested the increase of 
the efforts to decrease the centralist tendencies of the state apparatus and criticized 
the presidential veto of the draft laws for blocking the modernization and devolution 
of administration (European Commission, 2006).  
 The analysis of the European Commission’s progress reports between 1998 
and 2006 shows that the adaptational pressures from the EU level regarding the 
transformation of centre-local relations in Turkey have increased over time. These 
pressures had two different impacts over these relations. On one hand, they led the 
major political actors at the central level to redefine their positions with respect to 
institutional transformation. While the political elite strengthened its hand with the 
open support of the EU, the state elite tried to re-position itself within the new 
dynamics of the EU accession process. On the other hand, the adaptational pressures 
also required concrete measures to be taken by the government in terms of 
decreasing the misfit between the EU standards and Turkish practice about the 
regional development policies and administrative practices, which contributed to the 
re-definition of the centre itself and the centre-local boundaries. 
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5.3.2 The Turkish Response to the EU Demands and Administrative Reform 
 An important indicator of the importance of the adaptational pressures in the 
process of administrative reform is the targets set in the Accession  Partnership 
Documents and the National Programs. Both Accession Partnership Documents of 
2000 and 2003 have emphasized the establishment of a regional development policy 
as one of the aims of the Turkish state during the accession process and guaranteed 
that Turkey would harmonize its regional policy with the EU practice in the long run 
(ABGS, 2000; 2003). The National Programs, which were prepared as Turkey’s 
roadmap to the EU accession, in 2001 and 2003 followed the Accession Partnership 
Documents and identified Turkey’s targets as preparing development plans, 
establishing the legal and organizational framework for the regional policy initiatives 
and realizing a local administration reform, which would accompany these initiatives 
(ABGS, 2001; 2003). However, it should be noted that the National Program of 2003 
is much more detailed and concrete in terms of Turkey’s regional development and 
local administrative reform strategies and it acknowledges the relationship between 
the administrative reform and economic development as it was suggested by the EU 
in the progress reports. 
 Despite this apparent impact of EU accession in the formulation of a 
systematic regional development policy and administrative reform, it would be 
misleading to assume that Turkey had no agenda of regional development prior to the 
EU accession process. Since its establishment, the State Planning Agency, which is a 
central administrative organization, has prepared National Development Plans for 5-
year periods96 and the regional development policies and reformation of 
administration have been a part of these plans right from the beginning. However, 
                                                 
96 These periods are 1963-1967, 1968-1972, 1973-1977, 1979-1983, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1996-
2000, 2001-2005 and 2007-2013. 
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one can argue that the way in which these targets were to be achieved and the 
understanding about the substance of change have transformed in time and the EU 
accession process has been one of the triggering factors of this transformation. 
 Until the 1980s, the regional development strategies have always been 
presented as a part of a bigger national-scale development strategy and the unity of 
the state and its economic and development policies were highly emphasized (DPT, 
1963; 1968; 1973). In the development plans of the 1980s, one can observe the 
increased emphasis given to the administrative reform aspect as well as the regional 
economic problems and the acknowledgement of the connection between the two 
aspects (DPT, 1979, 1985). However, the philosophy of conducting the policies 
remained unchanged and the central administrative apparatus was designed as the 
planner and implementer of all development policies (Ibid).  
 From mid-1990s to 2007, one can observe an increased emphasis to the EU 
standards and practices in the development plans. During this period, the 
development plans have become more detailed and concrete in terms of the strategies 
to be followed for regional development and administrative reform. Moreover, the 
restructuring of public administration was presented as an integral part of regional 
development (DPT, 2001) and these targets were put into the context of Turkey’s 
accession to the EU (Ibid).  
 The change in the rhetoric and targets of the national development plans 
shows that there occurred a value change at the bureaucratic apparatus through 
interaction with the EU as Börzel’s (1999) “misfit model” has suggested and 
“Turkey’s accession to the EU began to be seen as an opportunity for the country to 
realize a substantial institutional change regarding regional development policies and 
the increased local level participation in the formation of these policies” (DPT, 
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2007). This value change showed itself in the concrete legal arrangements and as the 
following table shows, one can see an increase in the responses to the EU-level 
pressures for change in the recent years. 
Table 2: The EU Expectations and Turkish Response 
YEAR EXPECTATIONS RESPONSE 
1998-2000 • Development of a 
regional policy in 
line with the EU 
standards 
• Classification of the 
regions according to 
the NUTS II 
statistics 
• Local and central 
capacity building 
for regional 
development 
• No concrete policy 
response 
• More emphasis on 
the EU standards in 
the national 
development plans 
2001-2003 • Development of a 
regional policy in 
line with the EU 
standards 
• Classification of the 
regions according to 
the NUTS II 
statistics 
• Local and central 
capacity building 
for regional 
development 
• NUTS II 
classification in 
September 2002 
• Regional 
Development Plans 
prepared by the 
State Planning 
Agency 
• EU standards 
accepted as 
benchmark in the 
National 
Development Plans 
2004-2006 • Local capacity 
building 
• Devolution 
• Administrative 
Reform 
• Strengthening of 
Local Democracy 
• Public 
Administration 
Reform Attempts 
• Establishment of the 
Regional 
Development 
Agencies in 2006. 
• E-State Project  
• Administrative 
Capacity Building 
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Projects (2007) 
 
 The table indicates that the adaptational pressures from the EU level have led 
to more efforts on the side of the central government for decreasing the misfit 
between the EU and Turkish practices in the matters of regional development and 
local administrative capacity building. In addition to their policy consequences, the 
pressures from the EU have also had an impact on the perceptions of the centre. 
However, as a result of the segmented and conflictual nature of the centre in Turkey, 
this impact was not of a uniform nature. 
 For the political elite, who were the pioneers of the reform wave in the 2000s, 
the EU pressure was first of all a source of legitimacy in the reform efforts. 
Moreover, in their clash with the state elite, the EU factor gave leverage to the 
political elite as the EU accession was seen as a part of the national modernization 
and Westernization project by the state elite as well. At a more fundamental level, 
however, the EU factor created a value change for the political elite and determined 
the language and philosophy of the reform. The most common reference in the draft 
laws, development plans and national strategies was to harmonize the Turkish 
practice with the EU norms and thus the means of institutional change were 
determined under the influence of the EU-level demands. 
 On the side of the state elite, however, the EU factor shows itself as another 
source of suspicion and mistrust since the reform attempts triggered by external 
demands have often been criticized. The EU-level pressures are criticized for 
neglecting the unique characteristics of the Turkish administrative system and the 
state elite tries to protect the status quo by trying to differentiate Turkey’s accession 
process to the EU from the internal affairs of administrative research. 
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 From all these analyses, it can be inferred that by triggering and facilitating 
the administrative reform process in Turkey, the EU revealed and deepened the clash 
within the centre between the state elite and the political elite. For the political elite, 
the EU factor presented an opportunity for creating institutional change and re-
defining the balance of power within the centre. For the state elite, however, the 
same process was a threat to its institutionalized superior position within the centre 
and they resisted the transformation of the system in order to preserve the status quo. 
While the power relationships are being re-defined at the central level, it is necessary 
to consider what is happening at the local level during the course of EU accession in 
order to understand transformation of the centre-local relations in Turkey and to 
decide whether a value change is really taking place for the political elite regarding 
the role of the centre at the local level, which accompanies the legal change. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE LOCAL, EUROPEANIZATION 
AND CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS: THE CASE OF KAYSERİ 
  
 
In order to understand the relationship between Europeanization and the 
centre-local relations in Turkey, in addition to the perceptions of the centre, the 
position of the local needs to be analyzed in detail as well. This chapter seeks to 
conduct this analysis through the case of Kayseri, one of the largest cities in Central 
Anatolia and Turkey and to determine whether the EU accession process has created 
some sort of value change at the local level. Before deriving theoretical conclusions 
from the analyses, the chapter first justifies the choice of Kayseri for the purpose of 
the study and gives an account of the methodology of the study conducted in the city. 
Then the chapter proceeds with the historical and political context of local 
administration in the city as a part of the theoretical framework. Finally, the data 
collected during the research are accounted and analyzed in the chapter and the case 
is reassessed through the revisiting of the theory. 
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6.1 Why Kayseri? 
 The most appropriate means of measuring value change is choosing a 
particular setting and dealing with the past and present of that setting through an 
extensive observation of all the major actors and intervening factors. Within this 
context, dealing with multiple cases may not give a well-portrayed picture since the 
need for finding points of comparison may lead to overlooking the unique attributes 
of each case. Since this study primarily aims to determine a whether a learning 
process that will lead to value change during the EU accession exists at the local 
level, concentrating on only one case seems to be a viable methodological choice. 
However, at this point, the choice of that single case becomes extremely critical as 
the case serves as the universe from which theoretical generalizations will be 
derived. Thus, before reaching to the general conclusions, the study is expected to 
justify the choice of Kayseri as the unit of analysis. 
 For several reasons, Kayseri was determined as an appropriate case for the 
purpose of the study at the initial stage. First of all, as it was mentioned in the 
previous chapters, the regional development funds and their distribution were the 
main mechanisms through which the EU exerts its adaptational pressures for 
institutional change. In the Turkish case, the bulk of these funds were reserved for 
Central Anatolia, where Kayseri is the most economically developed city. Since the 
EU attention and assistance are concentrated in this region, choosing the case of the 
study from Central Anatolia seems to be the appropriate way for determining the 
impact of misfit with the EU and its consequences. The fact that the Central Anatolia 
Development Agency is located in Kayseri makes the city the appropriate case 
choice as it reveals the importance of the city within the region. 
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Table 3: The Distribution of EU funds to the Regions in Turkey 
Eastern Anatolia 45 million euros 
Black Sea Region 52.33 million euros 
South Eastern Anatolia 47 million euros 
Central Anatolia 90.67 million euros 
Source: State Planning Agency (2007). 
  
As it was mentioned earlier, one difficulty of determining the impact of 
Europeanization over any aspect of policy making is to differentiate the impacts of 
the process of globalization from those of Europeanization. The case of Kayseri 
serves to make this distinction within the context of this study as any other choice of 
bigger cities like Ankara, Istanbul or Izmir, would not work since these cities were 
already integrated to and in contact with Europe even before the EU accession 
process for Turkey began. The impacts of globalization can also be observed in 
Kayseri. However, these impacts have been mostly in economic terms and facilitated 
the economic transformation and infrastructure building of the city. The formation of 
new approaches to the administrative practices and relations with the centre has been 
a phenomenon of the 2000s, which should be attributed to the EU accession process 
more than globalization as the research will reveal. 
 Another reason for choosing Kayseri as the case study is the fact that the city 
has prepared and conducted the highest number of EU-funded projects in Central 
Anatolia, which indicates that it has more contact with the EU than the other cities 
and thus, is more viable for the impact analysis within the context of the study. The 
final reason, which makes Kayseri the appropriate case in this study, is the fact that it 
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has been governed by the same cadre since 1994.  This situation is critical for the 
purpose of this study since to deal with the same group of people over time gives 
more reliable results in terms of observing value change and determining the EU 
impact over this change, while keeping the other factors constant. 
 
6.2 The Methodology of the Case Study 
 The methodology of studying Kayseri is essentially based on the application 
of the theoretical framework to the local context. In other words, the study firstly 
deals with the historical and political context of local administration in the city. Then 
it proceeds with the positions of the major actors in the city regarding the centre-
periphery debate and it finally tries to determine the impact of the EU over the 
perceptions of these major actors. 
 To give an elaborate account of the historical and political context, the works 
of the historians and interviews with the prominent researchers of the city are utilized 
as well as the reports prepared by the State Planning Agency, the municipality and 
special administration of the city and the news collected from the local press. 
 The nature of actor perceptions and their transformation during the EU 
accession process are tried to be determined mainly through the in-depth interviews. 
For the purpose of the study, the Deputy Governor and Mayor of Kayseri were 
interviewed together with the one representative from each of the following: the 
Chamber of Industry, the Businessmen Association, the Chamber of Commerce and 
Central Anatolia Development Agency. In addition to these major actors in the city, 
the managers of two EU-funded projects were also interviewed for an account of 
their experiences with the EU and the centre during the conduct of their projects. 
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 The information gathered from these interviews are supplemented by various 
statistical data about the EU-related activities in the city and the budget of the 
municipality, which will give an impression about the relationship between Kayseri 
and the centre and also between Kayseri and the EU. All of this information is then 
utilized to fit the case to the theory of institutional change and the Europeanization-
institutional change relationship. 
 
6.3 The Historical and Political Context of Local Administration in Kayseri 
 The first municipal administration in Kayseri was established in 1869, during 
the Ottoman period (Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2007). The municipal status of 
the city continued during the Republican period and in 1989, it became a 
metropolitan municipality. Between 1989 and 2004, the city had one metropolitan 
municipality and two district municipalities (Melikgazi and Kocasinan) in an area of 
356 square kilometers (Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2007). With the new 
municipalities’ law in 2004, the municipal area was redefined and the metropolitan 
municipality of Kayseri was enlarged to an area of 2150 square kilometers, with five 
district and nineteen first level municipalities (ibid). 
 
Table 4: The Municipal Organization of Kayseri 
The Metropolitan Municipality 
The District Municipalities 
Kocasinan, Melikgazi, Talas, Hacılar, Incesu          
The First Level Municipalities 
Gesi, Mimarsinan, Erkilet, Gürpınar, Hisarcık, Kıranardı, Kızılören, Güneşli, Ebiç, 
Zincirdere, Kepez, Kuruköprü, Başakpınar, Erciyes, Bürüngüz, Turan, Süksün, 
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Mahzemin, Kuşçu. 
Source: Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2007. 
  
 In order to understand the inner city dynamics and the nature of the 
relationship between Kayseri and the state better, one needs to revisit the history of 
the local administration in the city especially during the Republican Period. The 
process of post-Independence War reconstruction, the approach of the state to 
Kayseri in the early Republican period and the characteristics of the cadre, which 
governed the city since the early 1920s are all important factors in understanding the 
present with respect to the Europeanization of the city and thus, they are worth a 
brief discussion. 
 The major event of the early 1920s, which had an impact over the character of 
the city was the deportation of the Armenian and the Greek Orthodox population 
from Anatolia. As a result of deportation and population exchange, the population of 
the city has decreased enormously during this period (Çalışkan, 1995: pp. 93-94). 
Kemal Karpat (1985: pp. 186-187) notes that while Kayseri had 154.000 inhabitants 
in 1914, in 1927, only 100.000 people were living in the city. The changing character 
of the Kayseri population during this period is significant in terms of understanding 
the preferences and stand points of the local people on various matters including the 
integration of the city to the world and to Europe.  
 Until 1950, when the multi-party period began in Turkey, Kayseri was one of 
the fields of consolidating the newly established regime for the founders of the 
Republic and as Doğan (2007) illustrates, the construction of public buildings like 
the train station, tank-mending factory, the airplane factory, Sümerbank textile 
factory and the People’s Houses were a means for the central government to 
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transform the city dynamics in accordance with the official ideology. These new 
buildings were considered as a place for socialization, which could change people’s 
worldviews and integrate them to the system (Subaşı, 2007). However, various 
accounts of the period indicate that, the centre has encountered some kind of 
resistance while applying this strategy of transformation. During the period between 
1930 and 1950, the mayor of the city was replaced twenty five times while the 
governor was changed six times (Dayıoğlu, 1998). This situation can be considered 
as a sign of a clash between the local community and the centre regarding their 
governors and the strategies followed by these people.  
 
Table 5: The Mayors and Governors, who served for the longest period of time 
Mayor Necmettin Feyzioğlu October 1930- February 1931 and 
August 1939- August 1942 
Mayor Hayrullah Ürkün September 1936-April 1938 and 
November 1938-March 1939 
Mayor Emin Molu February 1943-June 1944 
Governor Nazım Toker May 1933-August 1936 
Governor Sait Koçak May 1945-December 1946. 
Source: Dayıoğlu, 1998. 
  
One can argue that until the 1950s, Kayseri went through a period of 
consolidation both for the central and the local forces. On one hand, the centre tried 
to establish the roots of its official ideology at the local level mainly through post-
war reconstruction. On the other hand, the local gradually began to exert its pressure 
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and demands over the centre. This situation has been one of the defining 
characteristics of Kayseri’s relationship with the central state. 
 After 1950, the dynamics of the city began to change with the major changes 
taking place in the country. In 1950, RPP was replaced by DP with the general 
elections. The effect of this result over Kayseri was the appointment of a new mayor 
in 1950. Mayor Osman Kavuncu, who served between 1950 and 1957, has become 
one of the most prominent figures of the city politics with his policies, which 
changed the city life (Satoğlu, 1977). During the Kavuncu period, a more 
institutionalized understanding of local administration was initiated. For the first 
time, a concrete city construction plan was formulated and the construction of wide 
avenues and roads was made a priority. Moreover, the budget was increased in 
accordance with the new services and Kavuncu managed to attract the public 
investment and assistance to Kayseri (Dayıoğlu, 1998).  One reason for the increase 
in the central investment was patronage relationship between the local organizations 
of DP and the central party organization. The local investments were one way of 
securing the votes of the citizens in the elections and it was often used by the DP 
government. One of the implications of this situation is the institutionalization of the 
organic relationship between the centre and the periphery, which is a factor to be 
considered in understanding the changing dynamics during the EU accession process. 
 The 1960 military coup changed the political dynamics in Turkey and with 
the replacement of the DP at the central level, the mayors from DP were replaced 
with the mayors from RPP. The two mayors of the 1960-1980 period, Mehmet Çalık 
(1963-1973) and Niyazi Bahçecioğlu (1973-1980) changed the balance of power 
among the major actors in the city. The alliance between the municipality, the land 
owners and the commercial bourgeoisie of the DP period was replaced with the new 
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alliance between the city administration, the workers, public servants and the 
representatives of the service sector (Doğan, 2007: pp- 150-158). Once again the 
changes in the balance of power at the central level affected Kayseri and led to the 
emergence of new important actors in the city. 
 The 1980 coup and the rise of Islamic, nationalist and conservative elements 
in Turkish politics and the reconstruction of the party system changed the dynamics 
of Kayseri again. In the 1983 elections, the newly founded Motherland Party (MP) 
has won the majority of the votes and took over the government. In the absence of 
the other parties and as the governing party, MP was able to organize at the local 
level for the municipal elections. In the 1984 elections, the candidate of the MP, 
Hüsamettin Çetinbulut, won the %45.51 of the votes and became the mayor of 
Kayseri for the next five years. The organization of the MP was similar to DP in the 
sense that the patron-client relationships were an important factor in the distribution 
of resources from the centre to the local level. As a result, during the period of 1984-
1989, the construction projects and the budget of the city increased with the pouring 
of resources. However, the MP period in Turkey was highly criticized especially 
because of corruption at the central and local levels. This situation led to replacement 
of the mayor of Kayseri in 1989 with a social democrat and familiar figure for the 
city. Niyazi Bahçecioğlu was once again elected as the mayor to serve between 1989 
and 1994. 
 During the second term of Bahçecioğlu a new issue emerged in Kayseri, 
which has a close relationship with the city dynamics. After the 1989 elections, while 
the metropolitan municipality and one of the district municipalities were won by the 
Social Democrat Party (an heir of the RPP), the other district was won by the MP 
(DIE, 1989) and this created a challenge in the delivery of services in the city. The 
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problem of clientelism and the issue of the coordination of the services were 
reproduced at the local level between the metropolitan and the district municipalities. 
Various interviews with the prominent local figures of the time have revealed that 
there were times when the internal struggles among the mayors became more 
important than delivering services to people. The perception about the second 
Bahçecioğlu period was that the metropolitan municipality had distanced itself from 
the local capital owners and the poor and troubled people of the city. This situation is 
seen as one of the reasons of the success of the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) in the 
1994 municipal elections as the party had an extensive plan of municipal 
administration aiming to create a debt-free administration that is integrated with the 
local people (Kazan, 2003). This attitude and the grassroots level campaign gave the 
WP %31 of the votes, the metropolitan municipality and the two district 
municipalities in Kayseri. 
 The new mayor of Kayseri, Şükrü Karatepe, would be a highly criticized 
figure in the late 1990s, who would be sentenced to jail because of his anti-Atatürk 
and anti-Republic statements in 1999. The political personality of the mayor 
Karatepe during the time was somehow identified with the city and contributed to the 
image of Kayseri as a closed, religious and conservative city. However, this situation 
did not have a negative effect over the relationship of the city with the centre and 
Kayseri managed to retain its important position.  
 Various researchers have identified a tendency in Kayseri to try too hard to 
maintain good relations with the state or the government (Korat, 1997: 20; Doğan, 
2007). One evidence of this situation is the number of religious associations 
established in the city between 1945 and 1950. While 84 associations were 
established in Turkey during this period, there were no religious association in the 
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city and this situation is accepted as the sign of the willingness to maintain good 
relations with the central government (Doğan, 2007: 140). In fact, the former mayor, 
Karatepe, defines Kayseri as the city, which “always tries to keep up with the 
changing dynamics of the state” (Karatepe, 2001: pp. 250-251). The need to maintain 
good relations with the government is a prerequisite for the continuation of the 
commercial activities, which are integral to the city. Thus, the major actors in 
Kayseri have tried to establish alternative venues for keeping the centre-friendly 
status of the city. The activities and statements of the mayor Mehmet Özhaseki, who 
has been in the office since 1999, reveals this somewhat pragmatic approach of the 
city to the centre-local relations, which will be utilized during the later stages of the 
analysis. Mayor Özhaseki, describes this situation as keeping the city’s distance from 
holding a constant political position.97 He argues that  
 
although Kayseri is a conservative city in terms of living according to 
religious and traditional values, this does not mean that the city is 
resistant to change. It is not like Konya in terms of being oriented to a 
certain political stance and it has always been at the centre of politics. The 
city has been governed by all political parties and it has never been a part 
of political polarization and this is mainly because of the level of 
economic development in the city.98  
 
 This brief account of the history of municipal administration in Kayseri has 
revealed certain clues about the city dynamics in particular and the position of the 
local vis-à-vis the centre in general. First of all, the implications of the changes in the 
balance of power at the central level can be observed at the local level in the form of 
changing powers of the major actors and establishment of new alliances among them. 
In addition to that, the historical account of Kayseri also reveals that the local level is 
important for the centre in terms of reasserting and consolidating its power and 
control. Finally, the tendency of Kayseri to keep a friendly distance with the centre 
                                                 
97 The Interview held with the mayor on 14 December 2007. 
98 Ibid. 
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and the nature of the local political and economic elite have both facilitated the 
adaptation of the city to new developments and made it more prone to change and 
prepared an environment for the centre to exert its pressure at the local level. 
  
6.4 Measuring the EU Impact in Kayseri 
 At this point of analysis, the values and attitudes of the major political actors 
in Kayseri regarding the EU and the central government need to be discussed. The 
analysis is based on the in-depth interviews conducted with the representatives of 
each of these actors and various reports and statistical information, which will help to 
determine the EU impact in the city. For this, the perspectives of the municipality, 
the Central Anatolian Development Agency, which is located in Kayseri, the 
business circles of the city and the managers of certain EU-funded projects are 
examined and tried to be integrated into the theoretical framework. 
 
6.4.1 The Metropolitan Municipality 
 The changes in the administrative structure of the municipality, the new 
administrative practices, the new principles of administration and the intensity of the 
EU-related activities all indicate that the EU accession process has initiated new 
political dynamics in Kayseri. These data and the information gathered in the 
interviews have revealed that the mechanism of Europeanization is in order and has 
begun to change the local in the case of Kayseri. 
 One of the changes in the administrative structure, which may be related to 
the EU accession process, is the establishment of the city council. The city councils 
are a novelty in Turkey and various cities have founded them as a part of the new 
plural and participatory understanding of public administration with the 2000s. These 
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councils are made up of the representatives of the municipalities, districts, 
businessmen and the universities in each city. The City Council is an important 
means of political participation, which establishes the basis for local democracy and 
changing of the local level in terms of a new administrative understanding. What 
makes the Kayseri case important is the fact that the City Council has to meet on a 
regular basis and develop new ideas for the improvement of the city administration. 
Moreover, within the Council, one of the working commissions is responsible only 
for the relations of Kayseri with the EU (Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2007). The 
EU Commission helps the municipality to develop projects to be funded by the EU 
and to institutionalize the principles of good governance in Kayseri.  
 Another administrative structure that reveals the importance of the EU 
accession for Kayseri is the Department of EU Relations, which was established in 
2006, in the metropolitan municipality (Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2006). The 
department is responsible for “the structural transformation and capacity building in 
Kayseri during the EU accession process, to increase the city’s access to the EU 
funds and to integrate Kayseri with the EU network” (Ibid: 18). Since its 
establishment, the department has been actively working to bring Kayseri closer to 
the EU99 and has prepared various project to that end. In 2006, the department 
prepared three projects to be funded by the EU and two of these projects received 
funding of a total sum of 1.131.498 euros (Ibid). In 2007, the number of EU-funded 
projects increased to eight and in the strategic plans of the city, it is planned to 
prepare ten additional projects for the EU funds in 2008 and fourteen projects in 
2009 (Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2007). 
                                                 
99 Interview with Mehmet Özhaseki, the Metropolitan Mayor (14.12.2007). 
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 These numbers indicate an eagerness to get access to the advantages of the 
EU accession process in Kayseri, mainly through getting funds for the projects. 
However, these projects have a spillover effect in terms of increased contact with the 
EU level, increased adaptational pressures and development of a new understanding 
of administration, which contribute to value change. The traces of this change can be 
observed in various administrative practices, which became popular since 2000.  
 With the 2000s, one can detect a change in the language of administration in 
Kayseri. The principles like transparency, participation, legality and efficiency began 
to be pronounced more often. The municipality began to announce its annual 
activities, budget and future strategies publicly. The reports regarding the municipal 
activities became more detailed and legal and financial auditing became an important 
part of the administrative system. In the annual reviews of the municipality, one can 
see that the municipality now tries to establish an internal control mechanism for 
itself in terms of auditing and institutional capacity evaluations, which can be 
considered as an indicator of changing understanding of administration. This change 
is to a certain extent related to the EU accession process, as the city’s need to reach 
the EU standards in order to integrate with the world was one of the common themes 
expressed by the interviewees.  
 With regard to the changing position of the local in the EU accession process, 
one important issue that needs to be considered is its financial capacity and 
dependence on the centre. The following table shows the changes in the budget of 
Kayseri and the amount of state assistance between 1999 and 2006: 
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Table 6: The Budget of Kayseri (1999-2006) 
YEAR TOTAL 
BUDGET IN TL 
STATE 
ASSISTANCE IN 
TL 
STATE 
ASSISTANCE IN 
% 
1999 12.714.705 5.523.435 %43 
2000 19.994.200 9.590.750 %48 
2001 29.900.538 15.205.428 %51 
2002 50.806.121 31.515.741 %62 
2003 65.038.763 37.010.194 %57 
2004 75.451.600 52.087.856 %69 
2005 120.892.259 68.302.625 %57 
2006 214.085.886 87.764.891 %41 
Source: Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi Statistics, 2007. 
 The table indicates that until 2006, the city’s budget increased together with 
the state contribution to Kayseri. In 2006, the state contribution decreased and this 
situation has two main reasons. One reason is the fact that the terms of distribution of 
money to the provinces were changed with new legal arrangements. In addition to 
that, Kayseri found new sources of income and one of these sources was the loans 
from international financial agencies. The 2007 budget was prepared according to the 
EU standards and the French Development Agency (AFD) provided the city of 
Kayseri a loan of 22 million euros for a transportation project without demanding 
any state guarantee (Kayseri Gündem, 27 November 2007). In other words, the 
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dependency of the city on the central state has not changed during the EU accession 
process and through the international loans, the city became financially dependent on 
the private agencies as well. The fact that AFD did not demand any state guarantee 
for the loan, was one of the mostly discussed issues in the city during the time and 
the public was generally really enthusiastic about it and perceived it as a sign of 
Kayseri’s integration to the EU as a ‘world city’100. This development was seen as an 
indicator of the prestige of Kayseri in Europe and increased the self-perceived power 
of the city. The interviewees, who participated in this research often described 
Kayseri as “the proof that Turkey is ready for the EU” and this also reveals the 
awakening of the city to its economic and political power. As “the shining star of 
Anatolia”, Kayseri is considered to be a European city, which will set a model for the 
rest of the country. 
 These developments, the EU-funded education and capacity and 
infrastructure-building projects and twinning projects with the EU cities reveal the 
increasing contact of the city with the EU, which started to change the perceptions 
about governance. At this point, however, what needs to be answered in order to 
understand the impact of the EU better is the question of the changing perceptions of 
the local about the centre.  
 Based on the harmony between the central government and the Kayseri 
municipalities (both from the same political party) and the fact that the president of 
the state is a native Kayseri citizen, one may expect that the position of the city 
regarding administrative issues would comply with that of the centre. However, the 
interviews conducted at the municipality revealed certain concerns and criticisms 
                                                 
100 “Fransız Kalkınma Ajansı (AFD), Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi'ne sağladığı 22 milyon Euro’luk 
kredi için hazine garantisi istemeyerek bir ilke imza attı” (Kayserim.net 
http://www.kayserim.net/haberd.asp?id=6902 20.11.2007, “KAYSERİ'NİN İMZASI YETER” 
(http://www.kayseri-bld.gov.tr/haber/haberler/kayserinin.imzasi.htm 20.11.2007. 
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about the policies of the central government. For instance, the city is expecting much 
more independence for the municipal administrations in terms of financial issues and 
personnel recruitment. The new laws and public administration reform drafts are 
highly criticized for reproducing the control of the centre at the local level and the 
EU membership is seen as the only solution to bring a new understanding of 
administration that will empower the elected administrative bodies at the local level. 
 These responses reveal the existence of a tension between the central and 
local levels in terms of redistribution of powers and resources. During this 
redistribution process, the EU factor is influential in two aspects. Initially, the 
increased contact with the EU and the learning process, which accompanied it, made 
the local redefine its identity, functions, expectations and its position vis-à-vis the 
centre. Then, in the process of redefining the balance of power with the centre, it is 
utilized by the local level as a legitimacy basis to increase its gains and to strengthen 
its hand. In other words, during this process, the EU increases the financial means for 
the local level and serves as a justification basis for the actions in addition to giving 
leverage in the relations with the central government. 
 During the process of re-establishing the power balance, the centre also 
adopts new strategies to reproduce its influence at the local level and to limit the 
freedom of the local level in terms of its access to the EU. One of these strategies is 
the establishment of new agencies at the local level, which would exert the power of 
the centre. The Regional Development Agencies can be considered among these 
agencies and thus, the Central Anatolian Development Agency, which is located in 
Kayseri, becomes one of the actors to be assessed in determining the EU impact in 
Kayseri. 
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6.4.2 The Central Anatolian Development Agency 
 The establishment of the regional development agencies has caused extensive 
debate in Turkey. The agencies were based on the NUTS (Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units System) classification of the EU, which was adopted in 2002 to the 
Turkish structure. According to the NUTS classification, Turkey is statistically 
divided into 3 NUTS levels. NUTS 3 level is composed of all of the 81 provinces in 
Turkey. NUTS 2 level is composed of the groups of provinces, which are 
economically, socially and geographically similar to each other and there are 26 
NUTS 2 regions. NUTS 1 level is composed of the groupings of NUTS 2 regions and 
there are 12 NUTS 1 regions in Turkey101. The Regional Development Agencies 
were established for assisting the development of NUTS 2 regions, which have 
priority in the development strategies.  
 When the law establishing the agencies was adopted by the parliament in 
2006, the first two agencies were founded for İzmir and Çukurova-Mersin regions 
and 24 more agencies were planned to follow. However, various groups in society, 
including the main opposition party, RPP and various professional chambers applied 
to court for the annulment of the law. It took almost one year for the decision to be 
taken and on 30 November 2007, the Constitutional Court rejected certain articles of 
the law. This ambiguous status of the development agencies and the fact that they 
have not done much in one year prevent a healthy impact analysis. Nevertheless, the 
philosophy behind the establishment of these agencies and their approach to regional 
development constitute an important part of the current analysis.  
 According to the law, the Development Agencies are based on the 
understanding of welfare state, which is understood to be responsible for the 
                                                 
101 www.dpt.gov.tr  
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improvement of the lives of its citizens. This justification alone gives a clue about the 
philosophy, since it shows that these agencies are planned to be a means of the 
central state to improve the conditions of the local level. In addition to that, these 
agencies are important in terms of accessing the EU funds as they are a part of the 
required institutional structure for an appropriate distribution mechanism for the 
funds.  
 Within this mechanism, twelve cities from Central and Eastern Anatolia were 
identified as the centers of attraction and they were reserved %70 of the development 
assistance funds. According to the EU, these centers of attraction are Diyarbakır, 
Elazığ, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Kayseri, Konya, Malatya, Samsun, Sivas, Sanlıurfa, 
Trabzon and Van (DPT, 2007). While choosing these provinces, the EU has taken 
the population and urbanization structure, the potential for emigration, social and 
economic development level, distance to under-developed regions, potential for 
growth and the existence of universities into consideration (EU Commission, 2007) 
and these cities were given a great deal of importance. Among these cities, Kayseri is 
the city, which has received the most funding from the EU with a total amount of 3 
million euros102 and from a total sum of 575 projects prepared by these cities, 
Kayseri owns most of the projects with an amount of 98 projects103. 
 Four NUTS 2 regions are subject to same conditions and same development 
strategies according to the classification of the State Planning Agency. These regions 
are TR A2 region including Ağrı, Ardahan, Iğdır and Kars; TR 72 region of Sivas, 
Kayseri and Yozgat; TR 52 region composed of Karaman and Konya and TR B1 
region including Bingöl, Elazığ, Malatya and Tunceli. The programs and funds 
reserved for these regions are designed for local development, improvement of small 
                                                 
102 Information provided by the Central Anatolian Development Agency. 
103 Ibid. 
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and middle-sized businesses, capacity building and infrastructure building and they 
are distributed under the supervision of the State Planning Agency.  
 
Table 7: The EU-funded projects (2005-2007) 
Regional development projects 166 projects 
Small and Middle-Sized Businesses 277 projects 
Infrastructure projects 66 projects 
Source: The Central Anatolian Development Agency, 2007. 
 
Out of 509 projects funded by the EU in the above-mentioned 13 provinces, 108 
projects were prepared in Kayseri104 (see Annex 2 for the complete list of these 
projects), which is another indicator of the willingness of the major actors in the city 
to gain access to the EU network and resources.  
 One significant point that came out during the interviews is the fact that the 
Agencies are only designed to be responsible for the application of the plans. In 
terms of the planning stage, the centre still has the full authority mainly via the State 
Planning Agency and this situation seriously limits the capacity of the Development 
Agencies to contribute to the development and change at the local level and prevents 
the direct access of the local to the European level.  
 Another concern, which became apparent during the research, is the fact the 
same criteria and strategies are applied to all of the thirteen provinces in the NUTS 2 
regions. The grouping of the regions are not thought to be adequate for solving the 
regional development problems and a more differentiated approach, which gives 
                                                 
104 Central Anatolian Development Agency, 2007. 
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more discretion to the local level during the planning process as well as 
administration, is one of the expectations from the central government. However, this 
expectation is not thought to be realized in the near future as the project selection and 
fund distribution mechanisms are perceived as the means of Ankara to continue its 
control over the integration of the local level to the EU. In the interviews, it was even 
hinted that the other cities were slowing down Kayseri in the process of integration 
and a development plan and funding mechanism designed according to the special 
features of Kayseri are thought to be more suitable than the existing system. This 
attitude can be considered as the reflection of the previously-mentioned awakening 
of the city about its economic and political potential, which is an indicator of value 
change in terms of administrative practices and expectations as a result of the impact 
of the EU accession process. 
 
6.4.3 The Business Circles 
 In a city like Kayseri, where the commercial and industrial activities are an 
integral part of the life, the business circles naturally become one of the major actors, 
who need to be considered in any analysis of political and economic change. In the 
analysis of the EU impact in Kayseri, the Chamber of Commerce is the main object 
of analysis for the reason that it is the most active institution in terms of EU-related 
activities and thus more open to EU influence. 
 Between 2005 and 2007, the Kayseri Chamber of Commerce has conducted 
eight EU-funded projects. These projects were not limited to their areas of specialty, 
i.e. commerce but they also tried to improve the capacity and well-being of the 
people. With the “Women of Steel Project” initiated in 2007, the Chamber aims to 
improve the skills of Kayseri women and to contribute to their economic 
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independence105. With the projects like Pedal, Anafor and Gençev, the Chamber has 
tried to bring the employers with the university and vocational school graduates 
together106 and these education projects received a total amount of approximately 
500.000 euros from the EU. The Chamber also designed various projects for its 
members such as the Electronic Archive System Project and twinning projects with 
the Utrecht Chamber of Commerce and UK Foreign Trade Club. In addition to these, 
the Chamber also started a project to raise awareness about energy sources and 
consumption, called “If Only Edison Knew…”.  
 The research has revealed that this extensive amount of EU-related activities 
is mainly due to the pragmatic approach of chamber to the EU process. When asked, 
the Chairman of the Chamber basically explained the reason for these projects as 
“the need for Turkey to take back what it has paid for the assistance programs”107. In 
other words, for the business circles, the EU accession process is a process of 
intensive bargaining and give and takes and Turkey has to take the advantage of the 
situation as much as possible and to try to get back as much as it contributes. The 
EU-funded projects are seen as a means of compensating Turkey’s losses and a 
window of opportunity to increase the economic relations with the EU countries. 
 In terms of assessing the impact of the EU over the business circles in 
Kayseri, one can argue that it has increased the awareness about Turkey’s position 
and potential gains and losses during the negotiation process. Moreover, it can also 
be argued that the EU accession process is perceived as an asset for the development 
of Kayseri as the possible ways for the Kayseri businesspeople to integrate with 
Europe and expand their businesses are constantly searched for through the projects, 
seminars and other international activities. Following this, the central government is 
                                                 
105 Interview with Ali Kilci, the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, 5.12.2007. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
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expected to increase these opportunities for the business, to facilitate the cooperation 
of the local business with Europe and to be more assertive about their sectoral 
interests during the accession negotiations. 
 
6.4.4 The EU Impact and Project Management: Yön-Çiz and KAYHAM 
 As the previous analysis has revealed the EU-funded projects are the main 
means of contact of the city with the European level. Thus, the experiences during 
the conducting of these projects can be a good indicator of how the contact with the 
EU changes the approaches, practices and values at the local level. 
 In order to achieve this in this study, two EU-funded projects are analyzed. 
These two projects were chosen according to their budget, their partners and with the 
idea that a comparison between one completed project and an ongoing one may 
provide insight in terms of impact analysis. The ongoing project was conducted by 
the Chamber of Commerce and it is called “Yön-çiz”. The project, which was 
completed, is the “KAYHAM” project and was conducted by the university. The 
analyses are based on the project documents, reports and the interviews with the 
managers of these projects. 
 
 The “Yön-Çiz” project was prepared and conducted by the Chamber of 
Commerce together with a foundation of education and culture (Sağanak 
Foundation) located in Kayseri. The focus groups of the project were the firms, 
vocational schools, teachers and the unemployed people in the city and the aim of the 
project was to increase the guiding and advising skills of the teachers in Kayseri in 
order for them to guide the students to proper jobs, in which they would not be 
unemployed. Within the scope of the project, sixty advisor and counselor teachers 
 159
were educated in line with these aims and %90 of the total 54.270 euros of the 
budget was funded by the EU108. 
 The project started in January, 2008 to continue for a year and various 
activities were carried out in order to realize the project aims. In order to determine 
the jobs, which will be the most needed ones in the city, surveys were conducted in 
643 firms, education seminars were organized for the teachers in order for them to 
guide their students towards the jobs of the future and a book about entrepreneurship 
was prepared, published and distributed to the people in the focus group109. The 
interview conducted with the project manager has revealed that the people, who 
worked in this project, also wanted to share their experiences with the other cities in 
the TR72 region (Sivas and Yozgat) as this sort of capacity-building project that aims 
to reduce structural unemployment was the first example in the region. Apparently, 
the conductors of the Yön-Çiz project believe that they have the important mission of 
setting a model in the region and they think that if similar projects are applied in the 
neighboring cities, then the migration from these cities to Kayseri will decrease and 
the economy of the Central Anatolian region as a whole will improve. 
 Within the context of this study, the main issue that was brought up during 
the interview was the concerns about the project selection process and the lack of 
direct contact with the EU level. The fact that the projects, which will receive the EU 
funds, are essentially determined by the Central Planning Agency and that Ankara 
has the final say about the selection process is perceived as a form of center’s 
pressure at the local level and there seems to be a mistrust towards the institutions at 
the central level in terms of the selection process. During the interview, the project 
manager has claimed that there exists various projects, which were rejected by the 
                                                 
108 www.kato.org.tr/yon_ciz.html  
109 Interview with the project manager, Şafak Öztaş on 25.11.2007. 
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State Planning Agency, even though they were suitable for the EU standards in terms 
of structural assistance. Because of the existence of this perception, there is demand 
for more direct contact with the EU level during the application and conducting 
processes of the projects. However, the central level resists this demand as it means 
the loss of authority within the resource distribution mechanism and the planning 
process, which will lead to the loss of the power of the centre vis-à-vis the local 
level. 
 Another point that came out during the research was the fact that the EU is 
welcomed as a partner in terms of local development and capacity-building 
initiatives. According to the project manager Öztaş, the structural funds helped to 
realize many aims, which could not be achieved because of the lack of resource 
transfer from the central government. In other words, the EU structural funds 
replaced the role of the central government in terms of local development and 
provided more efficient assistance at the local level. However, the central level is 
perceived as a gatekeeper in terms of receiving these funds and it is criticized for 
blocking the pace of Kayseri in its integration with Europe. 
 In order to make analytical generalizations within the theoretical framework 
of this study, one needs to verify this information with additional research and 
interviews with the managers of other EU-funded projects. Thus, at this point, it 
seems both useful and necessary to provide an analysis of another important EU-
funded project in Kayseri. 
 
 The aim of the KAYHAM project was to gather all of the books, research 
documents, reports and other related documents about Kayseri in one center. The 
project was conducted by the university with the support of the Chamber of 
 161
Commerce, Chamber of Industry and the Foundation for University-Industry 
Cooperation110. These partners contributed %10 of the total budget of 62.996 euros 
and the rest of the budget was funded by the EU. The project was started on 1 
December 2006 and it was completed one year later.  
 The aim of the project was to develop the cultural capacity of the city111. The 
idea was to contribute to the structural, social and cultural transformation of the city 
through archiving its memory, i.e. its past and offering it to the service of future 
researchers. After the project was completed, the center was planned to remain under 
the supervision of the university, so that the continuity would be secured112. 
 According to the project coordinator and creator, Professor Rıfat Yıldız, the 
idea of establishing a memory center for Kayseri was born during his contacts at the 
international level through various EU exchange programs. During his contacts at the 
European level, he has observed the cultural and social affairs of various cities and 
felt that Kayseri lacked an archive of its affairs, which can be researched 
systematically. Thus, the project was the consequence of value change, which took 
place through contact and learning.  
 Professor Yıldız also noted that his project was supported enthusiastically in 
the city and they have received donations from various institutions and people in 
Kayseri. The volunteers, bookstores, metropolitan and district level municipalities, 
the special provincial administration, university, academicians, civil society 
organizations and chambers all donated various books, documents and reports about 
the economic, cultural and social characteristics of Kayseri113.  
                                                 
110 KAYHAM Project Document, 2006. 
111 Interview with the Project Coordinator Prof. Rıfat Yıldız, 1 December 2007. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
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 The fact that an essentially cultural capacity building project with no 
immediate material gains was widely supported by the local community indicates 
that some sort of attitude change is taking place in the city and the importance of 
cultural development has increased in addition to the importance of the economic 
prosperity of the city. According to a survey conducted within the scope of the 
project, %84 of the respondents believed that the project was very useful for the 
development of the city, while %6 had a negative attitude about it and %10 were 
undecided114. 
 The interview with the coordinator of the KAYHAM project has also 
revealed that the European accession process has provided new channels for the 
actors at the local level to contribute to their cultural, social and economic affairs. 
The funds provided by the EU creates the opportunity to realize the various projects, 
which could not be conducted before because of the lack of the resources and 
increased the awareness at the local level about participation. The interview with 
Professor Yıldız also revealed a mistrust towards the State Planning Agency, thus the 
centre in terms of the selection procedures of the projects as he argued that “there 
would be even more projects, which received EU funding, if the EU made the 
decision without the involvement of the State Planning Agency. Thus an inclination 
to get past the central level and establish a more direct contact with the EU level 
seems to hold in the case of Kayseri.  
 The alternative process, which would decrease the role of the State Planning 
Agency, that came out in both interviews, was to increase the role of the Central 
Anatolian Development Agency in the distribution of the EU funding as they would 
be more aware of the local needs than the State Planning Agency in Ankara and 
                                                 
114 Ibid. 
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distribute the funds to the projects more efficiently. However, since the Regional 
Development Agencies work as the instrument of the centre at the local level, the 
only benefit of empowering these agencies would be to gain better access to the 
funds through effective networking at the local level. The experiences of the project 
managers have revealed that there exists a demand for more participation at the 
decision-making process of the distribution of the structural funds as well as their 
administration at the local level but the centre finds alternative ways to block this 
demand and prevents the empowerment of the local through various channels. 
  
6.5  Europeanization and the Re-positioning of the Local 
 The study conducted in Kayseri revealed that two different processes were set 
in motion with Turkey’s EU accession at the local level. On one hand, the local level 
became more aware of the opportunities to assert its political and economic power 
and sought alternative ways to gain more access to the EU level, which led to a 
change in the political values in terms of administrative practices. On the other hand, 
the centre applied alternative policies to limit this access and to re-adjust the balance 
of power to its advantage vis-à-vis the local.  
 The case of Kayseri proved the initial position that the choices and structures 
of the past have a determining impact over the present relations between the actors 
and the prospects for change. The pro-business and profit-seeking character of the 
city elite made it more open to both change and progress and the pressure from the 
centre. Kayseri traditionally welcomed change if there was any economic and social 
value in it and the priority of economic prosperity in the city made it a necessity to 
maintain good relations with the centre as a means of networking, which also opened 
channels for the centre to exert pressure, if necessary. These features of the city 
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shaped the process of re-definition of centre-local relations during the EU accession 
process. 
 The research has shown that the impact of Europeanization can be observed 
in the context of Kayseri, which can be differentiated from that of globalization. The 
administrative changes, which took place in the city, in the 2000s and the increased 
awareness about the integration with the world after the EU accession process gained 
pace indicate that the increased contact with the European level set a process of value 
change in motion at the local level.  This change is argued to be a consequence of 
Europeanization instead of globalization because of the fact that it coincided with the 
period in which there was an intensive contact with the EU in the form of projects 
and funds and the administrative changes were made deliberately by the political 
elite of the city with a clearly expressed motive of realizing the EU standards in 
Kayseri. 
 The establishment of the city council and the importance given to it, the EU 
Affairs Commission within the council, the Department of EU Relations established 
in the metropolitan municipality, adoption of the new principles of public 
administration and the intensive activities regarding the flow of the EU funds to the 
city are all concrete indicators of the EU impact at the local level. The important 
point that needs to be stressed is the fact that as the local actors see the benefits and 
immediate positive effects of the EU accession process, especially in terms of the 
EU-funded projects, they become more supportive of Turkey’s EU accession and the 
EU gains new allies for itself at the local level. The increased contact with the 
European level and the changes in the values make the local political actors re-
position themselves with respect to the centre and the choices of the major actors 
also become crucial in this process. 
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 The interviews conducted with the major local political figures during the 
study revealed that the city had a somewhat pragmatic approach to the EU accession 
process and saw it as a means of improving Kayseri’s economic prosperity. In other 
words, the actors choose to prepare various projects for the EU funds and to establish 
contacts at the European level because this is perceived as the only way to gain 
benefits from the EU accession process in the short run. The study also revealed that 
the EU accession process was perceived as a means of justifying various policies and 
projects by the local political elite in the eyes of both the community and the centre. 
In fact, as the city mayor has argued, the new laws of the state regarding the local 
administration in Turkey were not seen as adequate in terms of empowering the local 
and the EU was thought to be the only mechanism, which would give financial and 
economic power to the municipalities.  
 The case of Kayseri shows that the EU accession process has contributed to 
the local demands for more financial and political autonomy from the centre. 
However, these demands were met with resistance by the centre and although the 
local level have found various means of gaining access to the European level and to 
empower itself against the centre, the centre managed to block these means and to 
reproduce its control at the local level.  
 The financial dependency of the local administration on the centre is one 
means of control, which the centre managed to retain even after the public 
administration reforms. Despite sharing the similar political ideas and being from the 
same party, the mayor of Kayseri also raised various criticisms to the government for 
“not treating the municipalities properly” and pointed to the need of the 
municipalities to have more financial autonomy. This situation shows that the centre 
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has managed to block the empowerment of the local during the EU accession process 
through retaining its financial control and power.  
 Another means for the centre to retain its power, as the research has revealed, 
is to control the framework within which the local level would interact with the 
European level. The way in which the EU structural funds are distributed, the local 
projects are selected and managed helps the centre to control the process of 
Europeanization and to re-establish its power vis-à-vis the local. The regional 
development agencies lack the authority to control the project planning and selection 
process and they are only assigned with the duty of coordination and project 
administration. The State Planning Agency makes the final decision about the 
projects, which will be supported by the EU and the local entrepreneurs can not 
contact directly with the EU without any partners from the state agencies and 
bypassing the State Planning Agency. In a sense, the centre place the role of a 
gatekeeper during the project management process and becomes capable of affecting 
the path for structural and institutional change at the local level by deciding which 
capacity building and development projects will be assisted. However, these projects 
also contribute to the economic transformation and improvement of the city, which 
will provide the infrastructure for more local political participation. 
 The interviews conducted in Kayseri revealed that there exists a certain level 
of mistrust at the local level towards this way of managing the EU-funded projects 
and the local level demands more role at the stage of project planning and selection 
and more direct contact with the EU level. Moreover, the local level also prefers that 
the centre adopts a more differentiated approach to the planning of regional 
development programs. Development programs, which are prepared by the local 
experts, who know the needs and problems of each region, are preferred to the 
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current approach of the State Planning Agency that entails the application of the 
same development program to multiple regions.  
 The analysis in Kayseri has proved the point that the EU accession process 
has triggered a change in the values, positions and powers of the major political 
actors at both central and local levels. In this process, the local level has discovered 
alternative ways to increase its economic and political power. However, with the 
impact of the historical factors, which made the centre traditionally more powerful 
than the local, the centre managed to block these alternatives to a certain extent and 
to control the context in which the mechanisms of Europeanization were in order. 
Thus, in the Turkish context, it is not possible to claim that Europeanization 
empowers the local level and leads to devolution. Instead, it would be more accurate 
to argue that the process of Europeanization changed the balance of power between 
the central and local levels through adding new parameters to the relationship 
between the major political actors. With the new parameters, both sides began to 
reconstruct their positions and retain and increase their powers. At this point, the 
legacy of strong state tradition came into the picture and although the process of 
Europeanization had an impact over the values and preferences of the actors, 
especially at the local level, the centre managed to control how this impact would be 
channeled into action and to structure the path to institutional change. In other words, 
the local administration has not transformed into local government yet despite the 
formation of new demands at the local level towards this direction because of the 
lack of change in the philosophy of administration at the central level and lack of the 
consent of the centre.  
 When the Turkish case is reassessed in a more analytical manner and within 
the theoretical framework, the above-mentioned struggle between the central and 
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local levels and its relation with the EU accession process will become clearer. Thus, 
in the next chapter the theoretical framework, initial hypotheses and variables are 
revisited and applied to the Turkish case through the data collected during the 
research. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: FITTING THE TURKISH CASE 
INTO THEORY 
 
  
The previous three chapters dealt with the three variables of institutional 
change, which were stated at the beginning, i.e. historical and political context, actor 
preferences and the EU factor to explain the centre-local relations in Turkey. At this 
point, however, it is necessary to revisit the theoretical framework and the initial 
hypotheses and to analyze the Turkish case within the theoretical models set at the 
beginning. In this manner, it will be possible to both offer an analytical perspective 
to understanding the Turkish case and to contribute to the theory with the findings of 
the study. 
  
7.1 Variables of Institutional Change in the Turkish Case 
 The Turkish case has showed that the historical and political context affects 
the centre-local relations and the probability of change through operating at both 
central and local levels. In other words, the local dynamics and history are as 
effective as the traditions and practices of the state in general. As Robert Putnam 
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(1993) has argued in his study of civic tradition in modern Italy, the social context 
and history affect the performance and future of institutions.  
 The most determining factor in terms of the historical and political context of 
the centre-local relations is the strong state tradition that has prevailed since the 
Ottoman period. Beginning with the late Ottoman period and continuing during the 
Republican period was the tendency to use centralization as a means of reproducing 
the state’s control at the local level. In other words, although local administrative 
bodies were introduced to the system, their aim was to fulfill certain functions 
assigned by the state on behalf of the central government instead of taking over a 
political role like democratization of the system. This initial institutional design has 
been the major determinant of the future of centre-local relations and any mode of 
change in these relations.  
 This initial institutional design was later consolidated and justified because of 
the political and economic conditions in the country and while the 1970s witnessed 
the retreat of the central state from the local level in Europe, in the case of Turkey, 
the economic and political reconstruction process strengthened the centre even more 
in the absence of a democratic local government tradition. Because of the lack of 
organizational and economic capacity at the local level, the centre has been very 
much involved with the political and economic affairs of the local and through the 
principle of administrative tutelage, the centre retained its control by legal and 
political means. The concerns about the unity and integrity of the state also 
contributed to the philosophy of highly centralized and uniform administration and 
made the centre the sole actor in determining the course of centre-local relations in 
Turkey. 
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 In the second half of the 1980s, administrative reform came to the agenda of 
the centre as a part of the economic liberalization policies and the local 
administrative bodies were assigned new responsibilities. However, the language of 
the reform was still far from concerns about democratization and it reproduced the 
power of the centre at the local level through the increased financial dependency of 
the local on the centre. The EU accession process gave a new impetus the process of 
administrative reform in the late 1990s and 2000s and created a new political 
environment in which the actors had to reposition themselves. 
 The historical and political factors were also in motion at the local level. As 
the case study conducted in Kayseri revealed, the history of the relations of the city 
with the central government and the political and economic character of the city had 
an impact over how Kayseri positioned itself in the new political environment 
created by the process of EU accession. The economic infrastructure of the city 
facilitated the development of civic culture115 based on the idea of involvement and 
participation in the communal affairs and commitment to the development of the city 
in all areas. 
 The economic prosperity of the city and the intensity of the economic 
activities at both domestic and international scales, made Kayseri more open to both 
change and the pressures of the centre. On one hand, increased contacts with the 
other environments set a process of learning and change in motion in the city. On the 
other hand, the primary importance of the economic activities made it a requirement 
for the local elite to maintain good relations with the centre and made Kayseri more 
vulnerable to the control of the centre. The fact that Kayseri has a considerable 
economic and political potential makes the process of value change during the EU 
                                                 
115 See Robert Putnam (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. Chichester: 
Princeton University Press for the detailed discussion of civic culture concept.  
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accession process and the struggles with the centre all the more important and the 
historical and political attributes of the city, such as the fact that the same cadre has 
been in the office in the local administration of the city for more than a decade, 
become crucial in understanding process of change at the local level. 
 
 The analyses have revealed that the preferences of the major political actors 
at the central and local levels are the most important determinants of how the EU-
level pressures are processed and institutional design changes in the Turkish context. 
The analyses illustrated the fact that different types of struggles take place among the 
political actors within the centre on one hand and between the centre and the local on 
the other hand.  
 Traditionally, the actors at the central level have followed a trend of 
centralization and tried to be involved with the affairs of the local level as much as 
possible. When the need to transfer new responsibilities or resources to the local 
level became inevitable, it was done without empowering the locally elected bodies 
politically and in a way that would reproduce the power and presence of the centre at 
the local level. The fact that there exist no explicit reference to local democracy in 
none of the new laws on public administration reveals that the centre tries to prevent 
the empowerment of the local and to determine the boundaries within which the local 
actors will act through the way in which legal changes are made.  
 As the Turkish case revealed, another aspect of the centre-local relations is 
the character of the centre itself and whether there exists a consensus about the terms 
of institutional change within the centre. As it happened in the Turkish context, in 
case of disagreement and struggle among the central elite in terms of the rules of the 
system, the outcome of institutional change becomes more contested. In Turkey, the 
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historically-rooted struggle between the state elite and the political elite has turned 
the terms of the centre-local relations into a battlefield as changing the balance of 
power between the central and local levels was perceived as a means of changing the 
balance of power within the centre itself. On one hand, as the political elite, the 
government supposedly wanted to empower the local level as it saw this as a means 
of re-asserting its power through the existing networks and patronage relations. On 
the other hand, the state elite, namely the main opposition party and the president of 
the time, resisted this change as the outcome of this change would change the 
balance of power at the central level in return. Both sides wanted to control the 
process of change as its outcome would have implications over their respective 
positions. 
 At the local level, the interactions among the major political actors and their 
perceptions about how centre-local relations should be organized had an impact over 
their dealings with the central state. The case of Kayseri showed that while the 
economic and political interests of the major political actors, like the municipalities 
and the business circles, determined whether the local level would engage in a direct 
struggle with the centre or would prefer to fine-tune its relationship at different 
periods.  
 Traditionally, the local level has been politically weak regardless of its 
economic potential. The weak democratic governance culture at the local level 
makes it easier for the centre to reproduce its power at the local level through various 
institutions and formal and informal mechanisms of pressure. Because of this weak 
political organization culture, the local level develops a pragmatic approach to its 
relations with the centre and clears the way for the centre to exert its control. 
However, as the analyses have revealed, the EU accession process has begun to 
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change this position of the local level and initiated the re-definition of the power 
relations between the central and local levels. However, before discussing the 
outcome of this process of re-definition, the concrete consequences of the EU impact 
at both levels need to be accounted for. 
 
 In the first chapter, the institutional change was defined as a combination of 
organizational change and value change, initiated by external pressure. The historical 
and political context identify how the interaction between the external factors and 
domestic setting takes place and the preferences of the major political actors have a 
decisive role in the processing of the external pressures. The research illustrated the 
fact that the EU accession process works at three levels in the Turkish context. 
Firstly, it serves as a leverage for the political elite at the central level while re-
positioning themselves vis-à-vis the state elite through administrative reform. 
Secondly, at the local level, the EU accession process changes the values of the 
major political actors and creates new venues for them to pursue and legitimize their 
interests and increase their power at both domestic and international realms against 
other actors. Finally, the EU accession process also affects the nature of the centre-
local relations and while creating opportunities for the local level to increase its 
political power, it also makes the centre to invent new ways of controlling the local 
in order to retain its power.  
 Since 1999, the EU has exerted certain adaptational pressures over Turkey, 
which initiated the process of re-definition of the powers of the central and local 
levels. The expectations from Turkey to re-organize its regional development policy 
in accordance with the EU standards, the demands for capacity-building and 
administrative reform for the successful application of the regional development 
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strategies were all the pressures coming from the EU-level, which would inevitably 
have an impact over the balance of power between the central and local levels and 
both levels responded differently to these pressures. 
 At the central level, the political elite and the state elite had different 
perceptions about these pressures. For the state elite, the demands of the EU had to 
be adjusted to the special conditions of Turkey and the state had to retain its unity 
and control. For the political elite, on the other hand, these pressures served as a 
source of legitimacy in re-defining the parameters of their relationship with the state 
elite. Turkey’s EU accession and the need for modernization during this process were 
the common notions in the attempts for administrative reform and they gave the 
political elite leverage at the central level.  
 In their dealings with the local level, however, the political elite adopted a 
different approach and while making the required changes for the EU accession, they 
invented new ways through which the centre could exert its control at the local level. 
The fact that the special provincial administrations were given more powers at the 
local level than the municipalities, the continuing financial dependency of the 
municipalities on the state and reproduction of this dependency by allowing them to 
get loans instead of creating their own resources and the ambiguous boundaries of 
central tutelage were all the alternative ways of retaining control at the local level. 
Moreover, the centre also retained its power in terms of the planning and resource 
distribution stages of the regional development initiatives and acted as a gatekeeper 
in the dealings of the local level with the EU in terms of receiving funds for the 
development projects. 
 These indicators prove the point that the EU accession process created a new 
phase in the struggle between the major political actors and made them re-define 
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their positions. However, the outcome of the EU impact was not a value change for 
the actors at the central level. Instead, the centre changed its strategies in dealing 
with the local level and developed alternative means of retaining its control and 
power. In other words, the legal changes, which came out during the EU accession 
process were not accompanied by discourse change at the central level and the 
formal and informal means of central pressure at the local level remained intact 
together with an unchanged philosophy of administration. 
 At the opposite side of the equation, i.e. the local level, the EU accession 
process initiated value change. The increased contact with the European level and 
EU-level practices through development projects and structural funds changed the 
perceptions of the local regarding the nature of centre-local relations. The research 
conducted in Kayseri revealed that the EU accession process is perceived as an 
opportunity for increasing the economic and social prosperity of the city and the 
centre is seen as an obstacle in maximizing the profits of the city in the EU accession 
process. Moreover, the process also contributed to a change in the civic culture in 
terms of more participation, mainly through the City Council. However, the 
increased participation in communal affairs have not yet turned into an institutional 
change in the form of democratization of centre-local relations because of the lack of 
the center’s consent.  
 The interviews conducted with the major political actors in the city have 
pointed out to the new demands of the local level, such as to have more financial and 
administrative autonomy from the centre and to have direct access to the EU-level, 
which indicate a value change initiated by the EU accession process. The research 
also revealed that as the benefits of the European accession become more apparent 
through the financial assistance and local development projects in the short run, the 
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local level becomes more supportive of the accession process and the EU gains new 
allies at the local level. However, in the Turkish case, this value change has not been 
channeled into the power relations by the local level.  
 As long as the centre controls the means of contact of the local level with the 
European level, it will have an influence over how the changing values of the local 
political actors will be reflected upon the domestic policy processes and the centre 
will be able to shape the way in which the EU-level pressures are interpreted at the 
domestic level. Thus, for the Turkish setting, it is possible to argue that the EU 
accession process has changed the values of the political actors at the local level, 
however, without the consent of the center, this value change can not lead to an 
institutional change in terms of centre-local relations. If institutional change is 
understood as an organizational change that follows value change, as it was done in 
this research, then it is possible to argue that an institutional change has not taken 
place yet in terms of centre-local relations as it is the central political elite that 
determines the terms and channels of administrative reform. 
 With these inferences from the research, the hypotheses provided at the 
beginning of the study need to be revisited and the main arguments need to be 
provided in terms of applying the theoretical framework to the Turkish case. 
 
7.2 Assessing the Europeanization-Devolution Relationship in Turkey 
 The account of the European experience provided in the second chapter 
showed that the theory of institutional change adopted in this study actually works 
and that the Europeanization-devolution relationship is not that straightforward. The 
analyses showed that the similar stimuli from the European level, which could 
change the nature of centre-local relations, were processed differently in each setting 
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according to the impact of historical, political and agency factors and the relationship 
between the central and local levels was re-defined differently. Besides revealing 
these differences, the European case also offered certain general principles, which 
could be applied to the theory of institutional change and the Europeanization-
devolution relationship: 
1. The states with a strong central tradition are more resistant to the EU-level 
pressures in terms of changing the balance of power between domestic 
political actors. In these states, the impact of the actors’ preferences, powers 
and perceptions are more influential over determining the course of centre-
local relations than the EU factor. The central political actors control the way 
in which the EU-level adaptational pressures are processed and determine the 
outcome of institutional transformation. In France and Italy, for instance, it 
was the central political elite, who controlled the EU impact and defined the 
terms of institutional change. 
2. The federal state tradition, which historically and politically empowers the 
local level, facilitate the utilization of the EU impact by the local political 
actors, decreases the resistance of the central political actors and leads to 
devolution as a result of Europeanization. In case of the federal states, the 
historical and political dynamics are more influential than the actor 
preferences over the way in which the input from the EU-level is processed. 
In the states with strong local identities, like Spain and Germany, the 
Europeanization process legitimized the political demands of the local level 
vis-à-vis the centre.  
3. The degree of the institutionalization of the power relations has an impact 
over the direct effect of the adaptational pressures from the EU. If the costs of 
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changing the status quo are higher, then the domestic political actors are more 
resistant to the EU impact.  
In terms of testing the hypothesis that Europeanization leads to devolution, the 
analysis of the European case also provided certain criteria for arguing its validity. 
As the Central and Eastern European experience regarding the restructuring of the 
centre-local relationships during EU accession illustrated, Europeanization leads to 
devolution, if 
1. the actor preferences are not institutionalized and already in the process of 
restructuring in the domestic setting, 
2. the intensity of EU’s adaptational pressures is higher, 
3. there exits no actor resistance to the regulatory role of the EU and 
4. the costs of institutional change are lower. 
The post-communism experience of the CEE countries created an institutional 
vacuum, in which the domestic political actors were already in a process of re-
defining their preferences and were more prone to external pressures. Moreover, the 
EU had a stronger position as a regulatory actor in these countries because of the 
existing accession criteria and higher adaptational pressures. Within this context, the 
process of Europeanization has led to institutional change in the form of devolution. 
When these criteria are applied to the Turkish case, as the analyses conducted in 
the previous chapters revealed, it is possible to argue that although as an accession 
country, Turkey is more open to intense adaptational pressures from the EU level, 
since 
1. the actor preferences and positions are highly institutionalized, 
2. the costs of institutional change are high and 
3. there exists a certain level of resistance to the EU impact, 
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the EU accession process does not lead to a process of devolution in Turkey. 
 
 The study of changing dynamics of centre-local relations in Turkey with the 
case of Kayseri revealed that no devolution process has taken place in Turkey with 
the EU accession process contrary to most of the expectations. The locally elected 
bodies were not politically empowered in terms of decision-making, the new 
administrative reforms of the 2000s did not contain any references to the concept of 
local democracy and the financial dependency of the local administrative bodies on 
the center still continues. Moreover, the regional development and local 
administration policies of the centre have not been differentiated according to the 
local needs and the centre managed to reproduce its power at the local level even 
after the reforms directed to the aim of EU accession. The supremacy of the special 
provincial administrations over the municipalities at the local level, the continuation 
of the tutelage principle and the gatekeeper status of the central state in terms of the 
relations between the supranational and local levels are the indicators of the 
continuation of the central power over local administrative bodies. Although the 
study revealed that the demands for more participation and more administrative 
autonomy emerged at the local level through increased contacts with the EU, these 
demands have not been channeled into an institutional change in the form of 
devolution in Turkey because the centre has not given up the status quo in its 
relations with the local level. 
 The ongoing process and the existing situation in Turkey can be embedded 
into the theoretical framework provided in the first chapter as follows: 
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Table 8: The Mechanism of Institutional Change  
Formal pressures and increased contact and learning: Progress Reports and EU-
funded projects conducted at the local level 
↓ 
New Demands at the local level: direct access to the EU, financial and administrative 
autonomy, i.e. value change at the local level 
↓ 
Mediating Factors: strong state tradition, lack of self-government culture, economic 
and political construction process, tutelage, concerns about the unity and integrity of 
the state and clashes among the political actors at the centre 
↓ 
NO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
 In addition to dealing with the prospects for institutional change in the centre-
local relations in Turkey, the study also contributes to the theory by generating new 
questions for future research. Since the study of value change at the local level has 
been conducted only in one case, it is possible to conduct the same research in other 
cities or certain regions of Turkey in order to make a comparative analysis of 
institutional change and gain a deeper knowledge of context-specific factors, which 
facilitate or hinder change. The same research can also be conducted in the same case 
in the future in order to re-evaluate the impact of the currently ongoing process of 
EU accession and provide additional evidence for theoretical generalizations. By 
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generating new analytical questions and future research topics, the study will 
contribute to the study of institutions and institutional change in Turkey and at a 
more theoretical level. 
 
.
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APPENDIX A 
 
THE EUROPEAN CHARTER ON LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
 
1. The principle of local self-government shall be recognized in 
domestic legislation, and where practicable in the constitution. 
2. Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local 
authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a 
substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility 
and in the interests of the local population and this right shall be 
exercised by freely elected council or assemblies. 
3. The basic powers and responsibilities of local authorities shall be 
prescribed by the constitution or by statute. Local authorities 
shall, within the limits of the law, have full discretion to exercise 
their initiative with regard to any matter within their competence. 
4. Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, 
by those authorities who are closest to the citizen. 
5. Local authorities shall be consulted, insofar as possible, in due 
time and in appropriate way in the planning and decision-making 
processes for all matters which concern them directly. 
6. Without prejudice to more general statutory provisions, local 
authorities shall be able to determine their own internal 
administrative structures in order to adapt them to local needs and 
ensure effective management. 
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7. Any administrative supervision of local authorities may only be 
exercised according to procedures and in cases provided by the 
constitution or by statute and it may be done only for ensuring 
compliance with the law and with the constitutional principles. 
8. Local authorities shall be entitled to adequate financial resources 
of their own, which they may dispose freely within the framework 
of their powers. Part of these resources shall derive from local 
taxes and charges, whose rates can be determined by the local 
authorities. Financial equalization measures shall be adopted in a 
way that will not diminish the discretion of the local authorities 
and the grants to local authorities shall not be given for specific 
projects and the local authorities shall be left discretion to use 
these grants. 
9. Local authorities shall be entitled to co-operate with each other, 
join an association and to co-operate with their counterparts in 
other States. 
10. Local authorities shall have the right to recourse to a judicial 
remedy in order to secure free exercise of their powers and 
respect for such principles of local self-government as are 
enshrined in the constitution or domestic legislation.”116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
116 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Strasbourg, 15.10.1985. 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/122.htm  
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APPENDIX B 
 
SOME OF THE PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE EU IN CENTRAL 
ANATOLIA SINCE 2006 (SOURCE: STATE PLANNING 
AGENCY (www.dpt.gov.tr) 
 
NO THE RECEIVER OF THE FUND 
THE NAME OF THE 
PROJECT 
THE 
LOCATION 
OF THE 
PROJECT 
THE 
DURATION 
OF THE 
PROJECT 
THE 
AMOUNT OF 
FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE 
(in euros) 
1 
1165 ELBAŞI 
TARIM KREDİ 
KOOPERATİFİ 
MERKEZİ SÜT SAĞIM 
ÜNİTESİ KAYSERİ 11 77.975,50 
2 
AĞRI TİCARET 
VE SANAYİ 
ODASI 
AĞRI TİCARET VE 
SANAYİ ODASI TAM 
OTOMASYON SİSTEMİ 
AĞRI 6 25.303,23 
3 
AKTİF 
İŞADAMLARI VE 
SANAYİCİLERİ 
DERNEĞİ 
KOBİLERE YÖNELİK 
NİİŞİKLİ DIŞ TİCARET 
ELEMANI YETİŞTİRME 
PROJESİ 
KONYA 7 74.927,99 
4 
ALTINYAYLA 
KAYMAKAMLIĞI 
KÖYLERE 
HİZMET 
GÖTÜRME 
BİRLİĞİ 
SOSYAL VE KÜLTÜREL 
GENÇLİK EĞİTİM 
MERKEZİ PROJESİ 
SİVAS 11 73.917,00 
5 ARALIK ZİRAAT ODASI 
ARALIK İLÇESİNDE 
TOPRAK TAHLİLİ VE 
ANALİZLERİNİN 
YAPILARAK, UYGUN 
GÜBRELEME 
İLAÇLAMA SULAMA VE 
TOPRAK ISLAH 
KONULARINDA 
ÜRETİCİMİZİN 
BİLİNÇLENMESİNİ 
IĞDIR 12 80.085,60 
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6 
ARDAHAN ESNAF 
VE 
SANATKARLAR 
ODALAR BİRLİĞİ 
BAŞKANLIĞI 
DOĞALGAZ 
TESİSATÇILIĞI ARDAHAN 10 63.228,14 
7 
ARDAHAN 
TİCARET VE 
SANAYİ ODASI 
ARDAHAN TİCARET VE 
SANAYİ ODASI TAM 
OTOMASYON SİSTEMİ 
ARDAHAN 6 25.303,23 
8 
ARDAHAN 
ZİRAAT ODASI 
BAŞKANLIĞI 
ARDAHAN VE KÖYLERİ 
ÇİFTÇİ EĞİTİMİ VE 
DANIŞMANLIK 
MERKEZİ PROJESİ 
ARDAHAN 12 91.204,64 
9 
AYRANCI İLÇESİ 
KÖYLERE 
HİZMET 
GÖTÜRME 
BİRLİĞİ 
KIRSAL KESİMDE 
KALKINMA VE 
GİRİŞİMCİLİĞİN 
TEŞVİKİ 
KARAMAN 9 27.669,60 
10 
AYRANCI İLÇESİ 
KÖYLERE 
HİZMET 
GÖTÜRME 
BİRLİĞİ 
BENİM PEYNİRİM 
DİVLE 
KARAMAN 
KONYA 12 38.056,23 
11 
AYŞE BALDÖKTÜ 
MESLEKİ EĞİTİM 
MERKEZİ 
ANADOLU GÜLLERİ - 
"KADIN 
GİRİŞİMCİLERİN 
MESLEKLERİNDE 
GELİŞME SAĞLANARAK 
İŞ KAPASİİŞERİNİN 
ARTIRILMASI 
KAYSERİ 12 49.342,02 
12 
BATTALGAZİ 
KÖYLERE 
HİZMET 
GÖTÜRME 
BİRLİĞİ 
KALİTELİ KAYISI 
ÜRETİMİNİN TEMEL 
KOŞULLARI 
MALATYA 11 60.328,80 
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13 
BİNGÖL 
ARICILAR 
BİRLİĞİ 
BİNGÖL ARI 
YETİŞTİRİCİLERİNİN 
EGİTİMİ 
BİNGÖL 8 62.583,64 
14 BİNGÖL BELEDİYESİ 
BİNGÖL AFET 
YÖNETİMİ SİSTEMİ 
PROJESİ 
BİNGÖL 12 91.623,29 
15 
BİNGÖL ESNAF 
VE 
SANATKARLAR 
ODALARI BİRLİĞİ 
BİNGÖL ESNAF VE 
SANATKARLARININ 
HİZMET 
KAPASİTESİNİN VE 
KALİTESİNİN 
GELİŞTİRİLMESİ 
PROJESİ 
BİNGÖL 12 54.089,10 
16 
BİNGÖL TİCARET 
VE SANAYİ 
ODASI 
BİNGÖL TİCARET VE 
SANAYİ ODASI TAM 
OTOMASYON SİSTEMİ 
BİNGÖL 6 18.568,53 
17 
BİNGÖL ZİRAAT 
ODASI 
BAŞKANLIĞI 
ÇİFTÇİLERİN 
KAPASİİŞERİN 
GELİŞİMİİÇİN EĞİTİM, 
BİRİM, FESTİVAL VE 
BAŞVURU KAYNAK 
DESTEĞİ SAĞLANMASI 
BİNGÖL 12 45.693,63 
18 ÇEKEREK BELEDİYESİ 
ÇEKEREK İLÇESİNDE 
YAŞAYAN İŞSİZ LİSE 
MEZUNLARINA 
BİLGİSAYAR VE 
İNGİLİZCE DESTEKLİ 
MODERN TİCARET 
EĞİTİMİ VERİLMESİ 
PROJESİ 
YOZGAT 10 85.667,40 
19 
ÇIRAKLIK 
EĞİTİMİNİ 
GELİŞTİRME 
DERNEĞİ 
İŞ'DE ENGELLİ (İŞE 
GÖRE BEDENSEL 
ENGELLİ) 
KAYSERİ 11 69.300,90 
20 
ÇUBUKLU KÖYÜ 
TARIMSAL 
KALKINMA 
KOOPERATİFİ 
ÇUBUKLU'DA 
HAYVANCILIĞIN 
GELİŞTİRİLMESİ 
AMACIYLA YEM 
BİTKİLERİ ÜRETİMİNDE 
İYİ TARIM (YÜKSEK 
VERİMLİ ÇEVRE 
DOSTU) 
UYGULAMALARININ 
KAYSERİ 12 82.054,33 
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ÇİFTÇİLERE 
AKTARILMAS 
21 DEVELİ BELEDİYESİ 
ERCİYESTEN GELEN 
LEZZET ; CIVIKLI KAYSERİ 8 66.895,96 
22 
DİVRİĞİ 
KÖYLERE 
HİZMET 
GÖTÜRME 
BİRLİĞİ 
SİVAS İLİ DİVRİĞİ 
İLÇESİNİN TURİZM 
POTANSİYELİNİN 
DOĞAL VE KÜLTÜREL 
MİRASIN 
DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ 
VE SUNUMU 
ARACILIĞIYLA 
GELİŞTİRİLMESİ 
SİVAS 12 99.230,92 
23 DOĞUBEYAZIT BELEDİYESİ 
GÜNEŞ 
DOĞUBEYAZITTAN 
YÜKSELECEK 
AĞRI 12 85.225,81 
24 
DÖRT EYLÜL 
KÜLTÜR VE 
DAYANIŞMA 
DERNEĞİ 
BÜRO YÖNETİMİ VE 
SEKRETERLİK KURSU SİVAS 12 86.678,10 
25 
DR. AHMET 
KEMAL KÖKSAL 
SOSYAL HİZMET 
VAKFI 
MADDE BAĞIMLILARI 
REHABİLİTASYON VE 
EĞİTİM MERKEZİ 
SİVAS 12 68.056,50 
26 
DR. AHMET 
KEMAL KÖKSAL 
SOSYAL HİZMET 
VAKFI 
YARINLAR İÇİN ÖNCE 
ÇOCUKLAR SİVAS 12 59.628,96 
27 ELAZIĞ BELEDİYESİ 
DEZAVANTAJLI 
GURUPLAR MESLEKİ 
EĞİTİM VE İSTİHDAM 
MERKEZİ 
ELAZIĞ 10 130.461,40 
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28 
ELAZIĞ KÜLTÜR 
VE TANITMA 
VAKFI ELAZIĞ 
ŞUBESİ 
BÖLGESEL İSTİHDAM 
VE KOBİ GELİŞİM 
PROJESİ 
BİNGÖL 
ELAZIĞ 
TUNCELİ 
12 110.937,19 
29 
ELAZIĞ SANAYİ 
VE TİCARET 
ODASI 
PAZARLAMA ELEMANI 
MESLEKİ EĞİTİM 
PROJESİ 
ELAZIĞ 6 30.078,60 
30 
ELAZIĞ SERBEST 
MUHASEBECİ 
MALİ 
MÜŞAVİRLER 
ODASI 
İŞ ÇÖZÜMLEYİCİ 
MESLEK PROJESİ 
BİNGÖL 
ELAZIĞ 10 86.483,17 
31 
ELAZIĞ TİCARET 
VE SANAYİ 
ODASI 
ETSO ÜYELERİNİN 
BLİŞİM 
TEKNOLOJİLERİNİ 
ETKİN KULLANIMINI 
SAĞLAMAK 
ELAZIĞ 10 93.404,60 
32 ERCİYES ÜNİVERSİTESİ 
KAYSERİ HAFIZA 
MERKEZİ (KAYHAM) KAYSERİ 12 54.456,43 
33 
ERCİYES 
ÜNİVERSİTESİ 
KAYSERİ 
MESLEK YÜKSEK 
OKULU 
SEKTÖRDE İHTİYAÇ 
DUYULAN BİLGİSAYAR 
VERİTABANI 
PROGRAMCILARINI 
YETİŞTİRME 
PROJESİ(KAYDB) 
KAYSERİ 12 54.832,50 
34 
ERCİYES 
ÜNİVERSİTESİ 
SAFİYE 
ÇIKRIKÇIOĞLU 
MESLEK 
YÜKSEKOKULU 
TARIMSAL BİLGİ 
TEMİNİ VE 
DANIŞMANLIK DESTEĞİ
KAYSERİ 12 56.466,00 
35 
ERCİYES 
ÜNVERSİTESİ 
SÜREKLİ EĞİTİM 
MERKEZİ 
ETKİN MESLEKLERE 
UZANAN EL PROJESİ 
(EMUEL) 
KAYSERİ 12 58.774,26 
36 
EREĞLİ 
SAZLIKLARI 
AKGÖL VE 
ÇEVRESİNİ 
KORUMA VE 
EREGLİ-AYRANCI 
HAVZASINDA DOGAL 
KAYNAKLARIN AKILCI 
KULLANIMI VE DOGAL 
ALANLARIN 
KONYA 12 110.423,98 
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GÜZELLEŞTİRME 
DERNEĞİ 
KORUNMASI 
37 FIRAT ÜNİVERSİTESİ 
BÖLGESEL TURİZMİN 
GELİŞTİRİLMESİ 
KAPSAMINDA FIRAT 
ÜNİVERSİTESİ 
BÜNYESİNDE BOTANİK 
PARKI KURULMASI 
ELAZIĞ 12 114.434,46 
38 
GAZİ ANADOLU 
TEKNİK, TEKNİK 
VE ENDÜSTRİ 
MESLEK LİSESİ 
NİİŞİKLİ İŞ GÜCÜNÜN 
SAĞLANMASI ELAZIĞ 11 116.568,90 
39 
GENÇ 
KAYMAKAMLIĞI 
KÖYLERE 
HİZMET 
GÖTÜRME 
BİRLİĞİ 
GENÇ İLÇESİNDE 
KÜLTÜR MANTARI 
YETİŞTİRİCİLİĞİ 
EĞİTİMİ 
BİNGÖL 5 61.861,50 
40 
GÖLE ESNAF VE 
SANATKARLAR 
ODASI 
AYAKKABICILIK ARDAHAN 10 64.240,20 
41 
HACILAR ALİ 
İHSAN KALMAZ 
ÇOK PROGRAMLI 
LİSESİ 
İŞSİZ GENÇLERE 
MESLEK EDİNDİRME 
EĞİTİMİ 
KAYSERİ 8 37.755,00 
42 HALIKÖY BELEDİYESİ 
HALIKÖY 
KASABASINDA 
YAŞAYAN YEREL 
HALKA KÜLTÜR 
TURİZMİ AMAÇLI 
BESLENME, HİJYEN VE 
YEREL MUTFAK 
EĞİTİMİ VERİLMESİ 
PROJESİ 
YOZGAT 10 82.846,80 
43 
HEKİMHAN 
SOSYAL 
YARDIMLAŞMA 
VE DAYANIŞMA 
VAKFI 
KALİFİYE ÇİFTÇİ 
YETİŞTİRME PEOJESİ MALATYA 12 83.053,86 
 210
44 HİSARCIK BELEDİYESİ 
BAYANLARA 
EKONOMİK ÖZGÜRLÜK KAYSERİ 10 117.311,08 
45 İNCESU BELEDİYESİ 
ÜZÜMDEN ŞIRAYA, 
ŞIRADAN PEKMEZE 
PROJESİ 
KAYSERİ 9 75.142,73 
46 İNCESU ZİRAAT ODASI 
BAGCILIK SEKTÖRÜ 
GELİŞİM PROJESİ KAYSERİ 12 69.027,80 
47 
İNÖNÜ 
ÜNİVERSİTESİ 
SÜRGÜ MESLEK 
YÜKSEKOKULU 
SÜRDÜRÜLEBİLİR 
BALIKÇILIK 
KAPSAMINDA BİLİNÇLİ 
ÜRETİCİ PROJESİ(BİL-
ÜRET) 
MALATYA 12 73.422,15 
48 İYİLİK DERNEĞİ KOCA ÇINAR SİVAS 12 64.818,56 
49 KANGAL ZİRAAT ODASI    
KANGAL SÜT 
SIĞIRCILIĞINI VE YEM 
BİTKİLERİ 
YETİŞTİRİCİLİĞİNİ 
GELİŞTİRME PROJESİ 
SİVAS 10 89.239,50 
50 
KANGAL ZİRAAT 
ODASI 
BAŞKANLIĞI 
KANGAL KOYUN 
YETİŞTİRİCİLİĞİNİN 
GELİŞTİRİLMESİ 
PROJESİ 
SİVAS 8 54.714,29 
51 
KARAMAN İLİ 
ARI 
YETİŞTİRİCİLERİ 
BİRLİĞİ 
BALLI YAŞAM PROJESİ KARAMAN 12 95.996,17 
52 
KARAMAN İLİ 
DAMIZLIK SIĞIR 
YETİŞTİRİCİLERİ 
BİRLİĞİ 
BEYAZ GELECEK 
PROJESİ KARAMAN 11 27.241,02 
53 
KARAMAN İLİ 
MERKEZ İLÇESİ 
KÖYLERE 
HİZMET 
GÖTÜRME 
BİRLİĞİ 
KARAMAN'DA 
EROZYONLA 
MUCADELEDE YEREL 
İNİSİYATİFİ HAREKETE 
GEÇİRME PROJESİ 
KARAMAN 12 59.478,30 
54 
KARAMAN İLİ 
MERKEZ İLÇESİ 
KÖYLERE 
HİZMET 
GÖTÜRME 
BİRLİĞİ 
GÖKSU HAVZASI 
ANTEP FISTIĞI 
AŞILAMA PROJESİ 
KARAMAN 7 89.408,55 
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55 
KARAMAN 
PAZARCILAR 
ODASI 
ÜRÜN KAYIPLARININ 
ÖNLENMESİ PROJESİ KARAMAN 9 114.187,31 
56 
KARAMAN 
TİCARET VE 
SANAYİ ODASI 
KARAMANDA 
İSTİHDAMI ARTIRMA 
PROJESİ 
KARAMAN 9 57.358,15 
57 
KARAMAN 
TİCARET VE 
SANAYİ ODASI 
KARAMAN TSO TAM 
OTOMASYON SİSTEMİ KARAMAN 6 25.303,23 
58 
KARAMANOĞLU 
MEHMET BEY 
ÜNİVERSİTESİ 
YAPTIRMA VE 
YAŞATMA VAKFI 
YUNUS EMRE 
KAMPÜSÜ'NDE 
EROZYONLA 
MÜCADELE VE 
AĞAÇLANDIRMA 
EĞİTİMİ PROJESİ 
KARAMAN 12 104.727,54 
59 
KARAURGAN 
KALKINMA 
DERNEĞİ 
GELENEKSEL SÜT 
İŞLEME TESİSLERİNİN 
(MANDIRALAR) VE SÜT 
ÜRETİCİLERİNİN 
KAPASİTESİNİ 
GELİŞTİRME 
KARS 11 68.961,86 
60 KARS KASAPLAR ESNAF ODASI 
KARSTA KASAPLIK 
HİZMETLERİNDE 
KAPASİTE GELİŞTİRME 
KARS 12 67.448,21 
61 
KARS TİCARET 
VE SANAYİ 
ODASI 
KARS KOBİ SAHİP VE 
YÖNETİCİLERİ GENEL 
KAPASİTE ARTTIRIM 
PROJESİ 
KARS 12 57.331,80 
62 
KAYISI 
ARAŞTIRMA, 
GELİŞTİRME VE 
TANITMA VAKFI 
MALATYA KAYISISINI  
MARKALAŞTIRMA(MİŞ 
MİŞ)PROJESİ 
MALATYA 4 53.688,95 
63 
KAYSERİ 
BÜYÜKŞEHİR 
BELEDİYESİ 
SOKAKTA ÇALIŞAN 
ÇOCUKLARIN SOSYAL 
HAYATA VE 
EKONOMİYE 
KAZANDIRILMASI 
(KAYSEVİM) 
KAYSERİ 12 116.792,67 
64 
KAYSERİ 
DEMİRCİLER 
ODASI 
MEKATEK ( METAL 
KAYNAK 
TEKNOLOJİLERİ) 
KAYSERİ 12 56.448,39 
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65 
KAYSERİ GENÇ 
SANAYİCİ VE 
İŞADAMLARI 
DERNEĞİ 
KAYSERİ TASARIM 
ATÖLYESİ PROJESİ KAYSERİ 12 109.506,59 
66 
KAYSERİ 
GÖNÜLLÜ 
EĞİTİMCİLER 
DERNEĞİ 
TEKNOKENT KAYSERİ 11 51.088,98 
67 
KAYSERİ 
HACILAR İLÇESİ 
KÖYLERE 
HİZMET 
GÖTÜRME 
BİRLİĞİ 
MEYVE AĞAÇLARINDA 
KÜLTÜR- TEKNİK 
İŞLERİNİN EĞİTİMİ 
KAYSERİ 8 63.815,40 
68 KAYSERİ İL ÖZEL İDARESİ 
KAYSERİ İLİ TURİZİM 
EĞİTİMİ PROJESİ KAYSERİ 12 65.344,50 
69 
KAYSERİ 
KOCASİNAN 
BELEDİYESİ 
KAYSERİ DOĞALGAZ 
MESLEKİ EGİTİM 
PROJESİ 
KAYSERİ 12 112.189,50 
70 
KAYSERİ 
LOKANTACILAR 
VE PASTACILAR 
ESNAF ODASI 
AŞMAKARNA KAYSERİ 12 98.085,50 
71 
KAYSERİ 
MARANGOZLAR 
MOBİLYACILAR 
VE 
DÖŞEMECİLER 
ODASI 
DESTEK EGİTİM 
PROJESİ KAYSERİ 12 75.566,61 
72 
KAYSERİ 
SANAYİCİ VE 
İŞADAMLARI 
DERNEĞİ 
KOBİ'LER İÇİN İŞLETME 
GELİŞTİRME PROJESİ KAYSERİ 12 68.010,84 
73 KAYSERİ TİCARET ODASI YÖNÇİZ PROJESİ KAYSERİ 12 48.843,36 
74 KAYSERİ TİCARET ODASI 
KAYSERİ TİCARET 
ODASI ELEKTRONİK 
ARŞİV SİSTEMİ 
KAYSERİ 8 67.924,26 
75 
KAYSERİ YAPI 
MALZEMELERİ 
VE 
İMALATÇILARI 
DERNEĞİ 
REKABET İÇİN 
VERİMLİLİK PROJESİ KAYSERİ 11 71.763,75 
76 
KEBAN 
KAYMAKAMLIĞI 
SOSYAL 
ÇOCUK BAKICILIĞI 
EĞİTİMİ ELAZIĞ 12 56.074,50 
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YARDIMLAŞMA 
VE DAYANIŞMA 
VAKFI 
77 
KELKİT HAVZASI 
KALKINMA 
BİRLİĞİ 
SU ŞEHRİ 
BAKLAGİLLER EĞİTİM 
VE ÜRETİM MERKEZİ 
SUBAM 
SİVAS 12 60.245,10 
78 KOCASİNAN ZİRAAT ODASI 
TARIMIN ÖNÜNDEKİ 
TAŞLAR KALKIYOR! KAYSERİ 12 59.761,80 
79 
KONYA 
BERBERLER 
ODASI 
EĞİTİM ALTYAPISI 
OLUŞTURMA PROJESİ KONYA 12 98.584,20 
80 
KONYA 
BÜYÜKŞEHİR 
BELEDİYESİ 
THE PROJECT FOR 
EDUCATING THE 
WORKERS WHO WORK  
IN FOOD PRODUCTION 
PLANT IN THE CENTRE 
OF KONYA ON 
HYGIENE AND  
TRAINING WORKERS 
FOR THE SECTOR WHO 
HAVE HYGIENE 
EDUCATION AND 
CERTIFICATE 
KONYA 12 78.906,12 
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